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SUMMARY
The major objective of my thesis was to understand why sectors 
of the reconstructed anarcho-syndicalist trade union, the 
Confederación Nacional de£Trabajo, were addressing concerns 
which were identical to sectors of the Marxist Left in other 
countries of Europe, For my views on anarchism had been 
informed by a Marxist interpretation of anarchism, which 
rested on the assumption that anarchism was an agrarian, and/or 
a petit bourgeois philopsopy which could have little relevance 
in advanced industrial societies. This anomaly - my experience 
of anarchist militants within the CUT, and the vision of anarchism 
expounded by "classical" Marxism - led me to undertake an histor­
ical study of the Spanish anarchist movement and a theoretical 
study of Marxist and anarchist thought. Moreover, in order to 
understand the demands of the anarchists and the CNT during the 
1960's and 1970’s, I had to thoroughly study the developments 
which had taken place within the workers’ and student movements 
during the Francoist period, and the nature of the CUT organ­
isation in exile, factors which would bear heavily on the CNT's 
attempt at reconstruction. Through extensive interviewing and 
the use of documents, I tried to piece together the process of 
anarchist re-emergence in Spain from the mid-1960's, and the 
nature of the reconstruction of the CUT during the political 
transition to democracy in Spain in 1976-1979.
The overall theme of my thesis centres on the relationship 
between Marxism and anarchism, and their relationship to 
historical development and tradition. By emphasising the 
importance of historical tradition - the political aspect 
most sorely underestimated in both Marxist and anarchist 
thought - I hope my thesis will contribute towards the 
possibility of a more realisable socialist utopia.
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GLOSSARY of SPANISH TBRI.iS
C.N.T.
cenetista.
F.A.I.
faista
P.S.O.E.
U.G.T.
P.O.U.M.
F.S.U.C«
C.E.D.A•
Confederación Nacional del Trabajo, (The 
National Confederation of Labour), the 
anarcho-syndicalist trade union, founded 
in 1911.
A member of the C.N.T.
Federación Anarqista Ibérica. (The Iberian 
Anarchist Federation), founded in 1927.
A member of the F.A.I.
Partido Socialista Obrero Español. (The 
Spanish Socialist Workers' Party), founded 
in 1879.
Unión General de Trabajadores. (General 
Workers* Union), the Socialist trade union, 
founded in 1888.
Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxists. 
(Unified Marxist Workers’ Party), formed by 
left Communist dissidents from the BOC,
(Bloc Ober y Can perol) and Izquierda Com­
unista in 1935.
Partit Socialist Unificat de Catalufiya (The 
Unified Catalan Socialist Party). The 
Catalan Communist Party.
Confederación Española de Derechas Autónomas. 
(The Spanish Confederation of Autonomous 
Right groups), founded in 1933.
Generalität The Catalan parliament
Treintistas.
F.S.L.
The "official” 
C.K.T.
"caciquismo
Ramblas. 
pueblo.
convenio. 
"desencanto".
Literally "The Group of Thirty". This name 
was given to the group around Peiró, Pestaña 
and Lopez, who drew up a thirty-point prog­
ramme at the beginning of the Republic. The 
"Treintista" manifesto called for more res­
ponsible trade union action, in the context 
of a dialogue with the Republican regime.
It also heavily critised P.A.I. interference 
in C.N.T. affairs.
Federación Socialista Libertaria (The Libert­
arian Socialist Federation). The "specific" 
organisation set-up by the Treintistas in 
1933-1934.
The C.N.T. organisation in exile.
The Spanish political system within which 
the "caciques" (normally a large landowner 
in the countryside and the Civil Governor 
in the towns), organised their respective 
districts politically for the government 
in exchange for certain privileges.
A central promenade in Barcelona.
A village, a people or a nation. Often 
used for the "common people".
The yearly wage agreement.
Literally, "desenchantment". A term used 
to describe the growing lack of interest 
in politics which occurred after the
summer '77 elections in Spain
Grupos Obreros 
Autónomos.
c.c.o.o.
F.O.C.
H.O.A.C.
»
Autonomous Workers* Groups.
Comisiones Obreras (The Workers* 
Commisions ).
Front Obrer de Catalunya (The 
Catalan Workers* Front), the 
Catalan branch of the F.L.P.
(Frente de Liberación Popular),
The Popular Liberation Front.
Hermandades Obreras de Acción 
Católica. (Catholic Action Workers' 
Fraternity).
Juventud Obrera Católica. (The Young 
Workers' Catholic Association).
INTRODUCTION
My interest in the Spanish worker's movement dates from 
the mid-1970's, when I lived for a few years under the 
decomposing Francoist regime. These were years of great 
opposition and intense political discussion, when many 
of us felt that the revolution was at hand. This perhaps 
is one of the distinguishing characteristics of Spanish 
political society : at times, like the mid-seventies, it 
seems like the structures of the old regime can be 
overthrown with just another great push, only to discover 
that they have enormous solidity, and that ultimately 
the armed forces can be counted on to uphold them.
My knowledge of the Spanish libertarian movement at that 
time was minimal. I was of course impressed by the 
anarchist collectives during the Civil War, and convinced 
that the anarchist movement was the most important revolu­
tionary movement in Spanish working class history. But 
my Marxist prejudice took its classical form. Had it not 
been proved that anarchism, as a political ideology of ^ the 
working class, had serious limitations, by joining the 
Popular Front government during the Civil War, and not 
seizing power ? Had the events of the Civil War not shbwn 
that "anti-politicism" was just another petit bourgeois 
cop-out ? But at the same time the Spanish anarchist 
movement held a strange fascination for me. After all, 
it had succeeded in remaining a powerful working class 
movement till the 1930's, when anarchism in the rest of 
Europe had been reduced to small, insignificant groups. 
Moreover, my contacts with "older generation" anarchists 
in Valencia province had left a strong personal impression
on me. Their generosity, optimism and zest of life contrasted 
dramatically with the "old age syndrome" of bourgeois 
society. So, while I could accept that anarchism had some 
validity as a "personal philosophy", I did not believe 
it had much to offer the working class movement and 
socialist revolutionary politics.
I had decided to do something on Spanish working class 
history for my Ph.D., so when my first supervisor,
Jose M. Maravall, suggested I look at the C.N.T. during 
the repression of the 1940's, the idea attracted me. I 
wanted to do this, as far as possible, by talking to
C.N.T. militants themselves and how they had experienced 
it. So I set-off for Spain in May, 1978 to interview as 
many militants as possible and get their impressions.
My first field-work stay, from May to September, 1978, 
was to be decisive in changing not only the type of thesis 
which I would eventually write, but my rather limited 
and prejudiced views on Spanish anarchism. Firstly, the 
idea of working on the 1940's appealed less and less.
I had managed to track down a fair number of those who 
had been active in the period, but their narrative,
(apart from the invaluable details they supplied) of 
imprisonment and personal tragedy, was extremely grim.
But more importantly, on my visits to the local federation 
of trade unions, I discovered that the C.N.T. was almost 
in a state of war. Perplexed, but fascinated, I began to 
interview younger militants, not only to assess where 
they stood vis-à-vis the factional strife, but also to 
try to understand why they had joined the C.N.T. or why 
they considered themselves anarchists. I
I did not limit myself solely to interviewing, but spent 
a great deal of time listening-in on debates, and 
discussing political problems with those who were interested 
in doing so. I discovered that I could not be wholly
honest with those who considered themselves theMarxism"anarchist orthodoxy" - the very wordAwas anathema 
to them. However, there were those who were either 
sympathetic, or merely non-sectarian, and were eager 
to spend long hours in debate. It was through these 
militants that I began to capture some of the comple­
xities of the Spanish libertarian movement. Moreover, 
these militants impressed me deeply by their "personal 
politics" — a great contrast to the type of "arrogant 
politics" I had encountered during my own political lifetime. 
Perhaps this was one of the most important reasons for 
my growing interest in anarchism, and my search for an 
historical evaluation of the C.N.T. But there were other 
factors which influenced my decision to examine the 
history of the C.N.T. in depth. For the debates which 
were taking place within the C.N.T. were always argued 
with reference to its history, rested on historical 
precedent. If I wanted to make some sense out of what 
was happening, then I would have to seriously look at 
C ,N .T . history and place these tendencies within some 
sort of historical perspective. I
I was now more interested in what was happening within 
the C.N.T. during the period of transition from Francoist 
dictatorship to some form of bourgeois democracy, the 
period roughly between 1976 and 1979. I had become 
intrigued with the debates within the organisation, 
and the factions which espoused them. Was the C.N.T. 
essentially a trade union, or was it a broader movement 
for change ? What role could, or should it play during 
the present period ? Moreover, I could not isolate these 
years and present an empirical study of this three year 
period. As I previously mentioned, the debates within the 
C.N.T. were of an historical character, so I too was 
forced to deal with them in this way. But there were 
other influences at work as well. My increasing involvement
in the women's movement meant that the anarchist's 
insistence on the importance of "personal" politics, and 
the need for an "integral" revolutionary process found 
a greater resonance within my own political experience. 
However, fny experience of these months in 1978 had 
shown that there were many different sorts of anarchists.
Some were entrenched in an "orthodoxy" which I found to be 
as rigid as any other political ideology, others were of 
the "pasota" type (a Spanish term which could be roughly 
translated as "libertine" as opposed to libertarian), 
while there were others with whom I felt a great affinity, 
much to my amazement. This latter group was fairly 
heterogeneous. Many of them called for a dialogue with 
Marxism, or any other ideology which could shed light 
on the problems of the workers' movement. Others felt 
that Marxism had nothing to offer : the failure of the 
Russian revolution, they argued, had graphically demonstrated 
the "statist" nature of Marxist thought, and had shown 
the need for a libertarian response in the form of the 
widest possible local democracy. Moreover, they argued, 
Marxism had never been able to incorporate "psychological" 
factors, and therefore was extremely limited in its 
approach to the "whole" person. This was why their 
revolutions had failed.
These months had also demonstrated that the anarchist 
movement in Spain was of a very different type than the 
one I had experienced in Britain. There were of course 
groups within the C.N.T. that bore a great resemblance 
to the extreme "anti-organisational / anti-almost- 
everything" type that I had known here, whose main aim 
it seems is to decry everything that isn't "strictly 
anarchist" - a purely negative political approach. But 
the overwhelming majority of active militants whom I 
met in Spain were of a very different species.
I was not only impressed by their level of political 
discussion, but at their attempts to "live-out" their 
brand of socialism in their personal lives. I did, 
however, remain fairly critical, and learned a further 
lesson -■ the difficulty of relinquishing a particular 
ideological stance, of giving up the "truths" that 
one has come to almost live by. At the same time as I 
was impressed and interested in the debates taking place 
within the organisation, I was astounded by the organis­
ational chaos that reigned. I was determined to try to 
understand why it had come to this sorry impasse, and 
luckily I was given both documents and information to
help me to do this. But it meant that I was forced toDureaucracylook at the nature of the —  within the C.N.T., and 
how this had developed historically. I realised that I 
had probably "bitten off more than I could chew", but 
was, in a sense stuck with it, as I could see no other 
way of writing a piece of work which I felt was not 
only honest, but more importantly perhaps, would satisfy 
my own need for an explanation.
This was the state of play at the end of 1978. Before 
embarking on my next field-trip in 1979, I was determined 
to "place" these years, not just in terms of the history 
of the C.N.T. itself, but also within Spanish history. 
This meant that I brought new and somewhat different 
concerns to my interviewing in that year. Having myself 
lived under Franco, and felt some of the "ethos" of 
this period, I remembered how much discussion there had 
been around the question of sexuality, when Castillo del 
Pino (a psychoanalyst who attempted to link-up Marxism 
and psychoanalysis) had lectured to packed audiences.
I remembered how difficult it had been for many young 
Spaniards to loosen ties with their families, to have 
sexual relationships without guilt and traumas, and how 
this was much more a "political" question, in the context
of repression, than in Western bourgeois / liberal 
democracies. This was bound to be taken-up more openly 
and wholeheartedly within the libertarian movement, and 
indeed, many of those I'd interviewed in 1978 had 
referred to this as one of the major factors for moving 
towards a libertarian position, or simply joining the 
C.N.T.
Another strand which I wished to explore on my second 
trip was the fairly widespread phenomenon that I had 
discovered within the C.N.T. during my stay in 1978 
- the existence of numerous small groups which on the 
whole had their "leaders". This "group identity" 
syndrome had continued operating even when they adhered 
to the C.N.T., and had been the cause of much friction. 
Moreover, these groups covered a wide ideological spectrum, 
from "Marxist-libertarians" to Stirnian individualists, 
although the latter were extremely thin on the ground.
I spent most of my 1979 trip in Barcelona, with a short 
stay in Madrid. I had decided on Madrid for my first 
field-trip because the national committee resided there, 
and had gone on to Valencia briefly to interview the 
leader of the FAI, Juan Ferrer. The organisational crisis 
had deepened in the intervening year, and it now seemed 
likely that the organisation would split, (which it 
subsequently did at the 1979 Dec. Congress). I found 
it almost impossible to interview militants at the 
local federations of trade-unions, either because they 
were reluctant to speak to anyone, or because they were 
too embroiled in the factional conflict. So I decided to 
spend most of my time talking to members of the groups 
who had participated in the reconstruction process in 1976, 
many of whom had now left, or been expelled. At an informal 
level, however, I managed to keep abreast of the doings
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of the "official" tendency and others allied to it, 
and established contact with some older militants who 
had worked within the official Francoist trade-unions, 
trade-unions which had entered the C.N.T. en block.
Barcelona was certainly a very different thing altogether. 
This had always been the centre of the libertarian 
movement and where it had had its greatest strength, and 
this could still be felt in many ways. Some C.N.T. trade- 
unions had reasonable strength here, and those of the 
"opposition" were in more leading positions. More surpri­
singly though, I discovered that there were many who could 
be considered as being within the "libertarian orbit" 
without actually joining the C.N.T.. Libertarian publications 
(which experienced a "boom" throughout Spain on the 
death of Franco) were fairly widely read and there were 
quite a few "anarchist" bars. However, the "pasota" 
influence was reasonably strong, which I discovered while 
attending a regional plenum on my arrival, but was also 
in evidence on the "Ramblas" and in the bars.
The violence I witnessed at this regional plenum really 
shocked me. "Opposition" members were being expelled at 
an astonishing rate, using the crudest of tactics. I was 
also in a rather awkward position. The "opposition" had 
always been more open about giving information, and 
certainly I felt more affinity with these individuals 
at a personal level. As a researcher, however, I had to 
keep-up contacts with all the groups within the organi­
sation, and couldn't be seen to be "favouring", as it were, 
one particular tendency. Apart from that though, I wanted 
to try to understand why these groups acted with such 
vehemence and why they adopted such dogmatic positions.
But it was almost impossible to interview members of 
these pro-official groups, although there were notable
VII
exceptions. The whole situation depressed me, and I 
grew sick of catalogueing the series of expulsions, 
bureaucratic wranglings and other rather unpleasant 
goings-on taking place . Ik had ceased to be interesting, 
as it became increasingly predictable. I was merely a 
witness to the annihilation of the opposition, whose 
demise was inevitable. Luckily I had been given introduc­
tions to certain members of the groups who had taken part 
in the reconstruction process in 1976/77, and it was to 
these that I now turned my attention.
If the 1978 trip had somewhat altered my views of 
Spanish anarchism, the one in 1979 was more of a 
consolidation process, and led me to think much more 
about the Marxist/anarchist problematic. This was, of 
course, not simply fortuitous. My own political beliefs 
had been undermined both by my involvement in feminism 
and my contact with Spanish anarchism. However, it was 
something of a coincidence that many of the militants I 
interviewed in Barcelona that year were wrestling with 
fairly similar problems.
It was fascinating to discover how different militants 
evolved towards anarchism. To a greater extent than 
Madrid, militants in Barcelona had been involved in the 
workers' movement under Franco, and had been active 
within the Workers' Commissions, which increasingly became 
a Communist Party enclave. A frequent accusation against 
the Communist Party was that it had been "immoral", i.e. 
that it had "used" the workers' movement in show 
demonstrations for its own political ends. Moreover, 
they had not all agreed with the C.P.that the next stage 
was one of "bourgeois revolution", nor did they agree 
with the C.P. analysis of Spanish capitalism - essentially 
that Francoism was upheld by a small clique of monopolists,
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while large sections of the bourgeoisie were for a 
democratic solution. This meant, they argued, that the 
C.P. tried to keep the workers' movement within certain 
bounds, attempting to tame and control it. Not that the 
"revolutionary left" was any better.While these militants 
were able to work with the "revolutionary left" at certain 
times, they too wished to "use" the, workers
to impose their own political solutions. The sheer number 
of these groups in Spain must have increased the tension. 
Each one, it seemed, had a perfectly worked-out programme, 
which would, as if by magic, install the millenium.
"The Party" and the "programme" became unassailable truths, 
like tablets of stone, handed-down to the faithful in an 
exaggerated jargonistic way. The "worker" became, a mere 
abstraction, just part of an overall equation.
The level of violence within these "revolutionary left" 
groups was quite astonishing, and forced me to view the 
violence I'd experienced within the C.N.T. in the wider 
perspective of Spanish political life. One militant had 
had to "lie low" for about a year, as the factional 
fighting within the Maoist group to which he belonged had 
already claimed one victim. Another had had to flee the 
country, returning under a false name.
On the whole, there wasn't, on the part of these militants, 
an immediate anarchist embrace. On the contrary, most of 
them worked within their trade-unions as "independents". 
There was, however, a general feeling of "looking around" 
an openness to other political currents. One group set-up 
a reading circle where Rosa Luxembourg, Pannekoek and 
other "dissident" Marxists were read. Interestingly enough, 
this group was called "What is to be done". The "discovery" 
of Spanish anarchism came about in different ways for 
different people. There were, of course, personal contacts.
Older anarchists in their neighbourhoods, for example, 
would recount their experiences, particularly those of 
the Civil War, and the collectives. Through these, 
contacts were made with anarchist groups in France.
The Perpignan group of the C.N.T. (which had split from 
the "official" body some years back) impressed these 
militants enormously. Their help seemed disinterested : 
they didn't attempt to impose their views on what should 
be done. More importantly, their personal lives, and 
generally their personal relationships, seemed to offer 
an alternative to the deeply-entrenched "authoritarianism" 
displayed by militants of political parties. Others, 
however, were more sceptical. After their experiences 
within the Workers' Commissions, they felt it was best 
to be completely non-aligned.
Another source of information about the Spanish 
libertarian movement came from the publishers ZYX. The 
latter began to publish a series of texts which were to 
be crucial in disseminating the history of the libertarian 
movement, a movement virtually unknown to many. Above all 
else, the experience of the collectives impressed itself 
upon them. In these they believed they had found^an 
indigenous alternative way of organising and^which
moreover, had been reasonably successful This is one 
of the few questions on which all members of the various 
groups agreed i.e. the importance of the collectives. 
Otherwise, the ideological framework varied considerably 
from group to group, and even from person to person. Some 
militants were unimpressed by their readings of Bakunin 
and Kropotkin, and in no way did they want to be considered 
anarchists (this attitude was reinforced considerably 
after their experience within the C.N.T. and their dealings 
with the anarchist "orthodoxy"). Others felt that they 
had found their "ideological niche" in these writers,
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while others felt greater affinity with the Italian 
school of Malatesta, Fabbri and the hero of their own 
Civil War, Berneri.
There was, of course, a certain "68" flavour to all 
of this, although the influence were less important than 
I originally thought. The Spanish situation had its own 
"time-scale", which didn't correspond exactly with the 
May’68 movement. On the one hand, it could be said that 
their own equivalent began much earlier, in 1967, while 
some of the ideas which some of the Spanish libertarians 
were to espouse didn't cross the Pyrenees till the early 
'70's. On the whole though, most of the Barcelona militants 
(a serious bunch in the main) felt that May '68 was a 
peculiarly French phenomenon, and didn't think that it 
had much to say to Spain. May '68 did however confirm what 
many of them had been thinking anyway, and found a 
sympathetic hearing.
These militants joined the C.N.T. believing it offered 
the best alternative to the reformism of the Communist 
Party, and the "ultra-left" sectarianism of the 
Trotskyist-Maoist left. The C.N.T., they argued, had 
always been a broad Church. What mattered was that one 
accepted the principles of workers' autonomy and direct 
action, which had, more than anything else, defined the 
anarcho-syndicalist organisation. Workers' unity was one 
of the main aims of all these groups, who felt that the 
C.N.T. tradition of organising at the point of production 
i.e. along economic lines, was the way to achieve it.
They were not willing to accept, however, that these 
principles could be simply resurrected, after almost 
forty years of historical development, and applied 
dogmatically to the present situation. After all, this 
was one of the reasons they'd come to the C.N.T. - to
find a "place" where principles were not mechanically 
applied. Direct action, for example, had to be redefined 
in the context of the changed relationship between the 
state and the workers' organisations, a legacy of 
Francoist "dirigismo". Calling for a boycott of trade- 
union elections would not find the response that political 
abstentionism had done during the 1930's. As for workers' 
autonomy —  yes, it was applicable at times and in 
particular struggles, but that didn't preclude a national 
structuring of trades, ever more necessary in the context 
of the developments within international capitalism.
These groups, who, despite their other differences, could 
be classified as the pro-syndicalists, were astonished 
to find the level of resistance their ideas met. They 
discovered that the libertarian organisation had its 
bureaucracy, its saints and its tablets of stone. Lumped 
together indiscriminately as "Marxists", they were not 
even allowed to carry-on their trade-union work. Finally 
the majority were expelled, or worn-down.
The pro-syndicalists were not the only ones forced to 
leave. Even those who held to a strictly libertarian 
conception i.e. a total rejection of Marxism, scepticism 
about the revolutionary potential of trade-unions etc.., 
were not accepted within the organisation as "true" 
anarchists. This was primarily because these groups also 
called for an up-dating of anarchism. Critical of the 
C.N.T.'s participation in the Popular Front government, very 
aware of the bureaucratisation that had taken place from 
then onwards, and with their emphasis on the "integral" 
revolution, they too were seen as threats to "the essence 
of the C.N.T.".
While there was an ideological battle going on within 
the organisation, I increasingly saw it as a smoke-screen 
—  a way of making palatable (and, in the process, gaining 
adherents) the blatant attempt to maintain control.
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There is little doubt that the C.N.T. was almost 
over—run with all sorts of elements who wished to gain 
a foothold in the leadership. Trotskyist "entrists", 
police spies, "pasotas" and others, all had their plans 
vis-à-vis C.N.T. committees and policies. However, from 
the information I'd obtained during my two trips, it was 
evident that the leadership was willing to ally itself 
with Marxists, "pasotas", or whoever, when it wanted to 
smash a particular oppositional faction. Its policies 
too seemed to be taken "in contradistinction to" those of 
the main opposition.
It was, of course hardly surprising that a bureaucracy 
should have developed after forty years in exile. A similar 
process had affected the Socialists, who, however, had 
overthrown their elders in the early 70's. It was not that 
all militants were unaware of this. In fact, there was 
enormous reluctance to enter the organisation for this 
very reason. But one group especially believed that, as 
a plethora of groups., there was little chance of the 
anarcho-syndicalist option taking off. This group,
Solidarity, argued that they needed the C.N.T. initials, 
the tradition and "aura" of the organisation, and felt 
that the groups were sufficiently numerous to dictate 
terms within the reconstructed C.N.T.
The bureaucracy, however, fought tenaciously, and used 
all sorts of "dirty tricks" to maintain its position.
The ferocity of this battle totally astounded these 
militants. One of their hopes had been that a dialogue 
and possibly a compromise could be reached —  after all, 
weren't they libertarians and settled disputes this way ?
It was clear then that the C.N.T. was little different 
from other trade-union and political organisations. The 
"sacred" nature of the organisation had to be defended at 
all costs, principles upheld and dissidents expelled. Was 
this the result of almost forty years of exile ? Some militants
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argued that this process had begun during the Civil War, 
others that it had existed throughout the history of the 
C.N.T. This was something that I was to spend the next 
year working on, and came to the tentative conclusion 
that while it was difficult to speak of an entrenched 
bureaucracy before the Civil War, (and the latter did 
contribute considerably to the bureaucratisation process, 
for fairly obvious reasons) it always had its entrenched 
"orthodoxy", the defenders of the anarchist faith, who 
would admit to no redefinition of what they considered to 
be the "essence" of anarchism.
The similarity with Stalinism and many of the Trotskyist 
groups was striking. Both Marxist and anarchist wings of 
the workers' movement seem to suffer from the same disease : 
intransigent defence of the "faith" at all costs. However, 
the attempts at renewal within Marxism are fairly well- 
known, while the general assumption about anarchism is that 
its basic tenets have not changed, since Bakunin in the 
late 19th century. I myself held to a fairly similar view 
at the start of my research, and was very surprised to 
find the degree to which the "orthodoxy" had been challenged 
from within its own ranks. In fact, many of the criticisms 
Marxists made of anarchism were also made by fellow- 
libertarians, who, of course could be dispensed with under 
the rubric of "Marxist deviants".
No one would dare say that Stalinism and the more rigid 
of the Trotskyist sects represented the sum total of Marxist 
thought. On the contrary, many would argue that the most 
interesting contributions to Marxism have come from outside 
of these currents. This has increasingly been the case since 
the Second World War, though the '68 experience has 
greatly speeded-up the process. Anarchism has not however 
been viewed with the same type of understanding, and the 
"orthodox" brand of anarchism has come to be seen
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as synonomous with anarchism itself.
This is hardly surprising, given the dominance of 
Marxism within the workers' movement since the Russian 
revolution in 1917, and many of the anarchists one 
encounters in Western Europe seem to confirm the Marxist 
critique that anarchism is primarily a negative response 
and a relic from a by-gone era. The Spanish case is 
unique in that anarchism remained a potent and enduring 
working-class ideology, continually tested in practice, till 
1939. Increasingly, I began to feel that the Marxist 
critique of anarchism did not hold up very well for Spain, 
or at most could only be levelled at one section of the 
anarchist movement i.e. the "orthodoxy". A critique of 
Stalinism has not meant that the whole of Marxism has been 
written-off, yet this is exactly what has occurred with 
anarchism.
There was, too,yet another Marxist assertion about anarchism 
which did not correspond to my experiences in Spain. The 
organisational chaos which ensued after the C.N.T. was 
reconstructed in 1976, and the subsequent split and virtual 
demise of the organisation in 1979, seemed to prove the 
Marxist point that anarchism was primarily an agrarian 
movement and had little chance of success in advanced 
industrial society. True, the organisation was in a mess, 
as I would readily admit. However, there were a substantial 
number of experienced militants within the organisation who 
had reasonable success in setting-up trade-unions and took 
part in many of the wild-cat strikes during the 1976-1978 
period. In fact, in some of these struggles the C.N.T. was 
the moving force. Much of this trade-union work was disrupted 
if not totally boycotted, by the bureaucracy's attempts 
to keep these militants out of the trade-unions. As many 
militants commented, it was as if the bureaucracy did not 
want the C.N.T. to be a success, or at any rate it was 
subordinated to their primary aim of keeping control.
There is little doubt that there would have been many 
difficulties in trying to weld together the many disparate 
groups even without the interference of the bureaucracy, 
and it has to remain as one of the "ifs" of history if this 
would have been possible. I can only say that I was surprised 
at the degree of tolerance I experienced. Many pro-syndicalists 
for example, were quite willing to accept the presence 
within the organisation of those who were sceptical, if not 
downright hostile, to the syndicalist approach. As long as 
they didn't hinder trade-union work, they accepted the fact 
that within a libertarian organisation there would be many 
who would be happier working within groups, cultural centres, 
the Free Women movement and other branches of the libertarian 
movement. On the contrary, while they considered the trade 
Unions to be the most important arena of struggle, they 
believed that the contacts with the rest of the libertarian 
movement were of considerable importance. The trade-union was 
part of the movement for change, albeit for them the most 
crucial. At the anecdotal level, on many occasions I was 
present at meetings where anarcho-communists, pro-syndicalists 
and "counter-culture" anarchists took part in interesting 
but heated debates, which usually ended-up with a comradely 
drink in the bar.
There were, moreover, other factors, specific to the 
1976-1979 transitional period, which made the organisational 
tasks extremely difficult, to say the least. After the long 
repression of the Francoist era, there was a veritable 
libertarian "boom", when hundreds of thousands attended 
anarchist meetings, and swamped the organisation. This perhaps 
has always been one of the problems historically within the 
C.N.T. i.e. its "open" recruitment policy. In the past 
however, this has usually been counter-balanced by the 
strength of the trade-union organisations. Moreover, this 
type of "boom" had no historical precedent, but was directly 
linked to the previous era. Now, with the organisation
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falteringly attempting to set up trade-unions, and 
generally get the organisation off the ground, it lacked 
the structure to deal with this influx. While condemning 
these "pasota " types vehemently, the bureaucracy secretly 
did deals with some of the leaders of these groups at certain 
times when it meant that it could score a point over the 
opposition. There is little doubt that the existence of 
these types within the organisation discredited it enormously 
many workers refusing to have anything to do with it for 
this reason. I have heard of a case where the workers' 
representative from the C.N.T. smoked dope during a joint 
trade-union meeting, and another where the "pasota" at the 
local federation refused membership to a worker because he 
didn't consider him an "anarchist".
Government policy vis-à-vis the C.N.T. was also an important 
factor in its demise. For a while it seemed that perhaps 
the C.N.T. could be used as the "anti-communist" card 
against the Workers' Commissions, but as that role was not 
taken-up by the C.N.T., government policy suffered a radical 
reversal. It was easy to present the C.N.T. as a sloppy/ 
hippy type organisation or as an "anojrcho-terrorist" one, 
and certain unexplained bombings were laid at its door.
These attempts to discredit the organisation were successful, 
and certainly widened the rift between the opposition and 
the bureaucracy. They perhaps would not have acquired the 
significance they did had the context been different. For the 
years 1978-1979 witnessed a sharp downturn in workers' struggi 
which demoralised militants from all political organisations. 
It was not just the C.N.T. which underwent a "crisis" in 
these years, but indeed the whole of the left, including the 
Communist Party. In view of the above factors, it seemed 
that there wasn't a watertight case to support the Marxist 
view about anarchism in advanced industrial society.
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It had certainly shown that it had its problems, but so 
too had others on the left. In fact, its strength in Catalonia 
far outstripped the Maoist and Trotskyist groupings, and its 
sympathisers were fairly numerous. That this could happen 
after almost forty years of absence, and without the inter­
national backing that the Socialists and Communists enjoyed, 
was no mean achievement.
This led me on, inexorably, to the whole question, "why 
anarchism in Spain" ? There were those who argued, even 
within the anarchist movement, that the response the C.N.T. 
had in 1976-78 showed that something in the Spanish character 
propelled it towards anarchism. Yet I believed that the 
re-birth of Spanish anarchism at this time could be located 
fairly specifically to a particular historical period and 
the political problems of the time. It had been crucial, 
of course that the libertarian tradition existed. One of the 
things which struck me most was that if many of the militants 
I'd known had been somewhere else where this tradition had 
not existed they would never have considered themselves 
"anarchists". What impressed these people was not so much 
the theoretical underpinnings of the C.N.T., but its tradition 
of radical opposition, and its espousal of workers' control 
and democracy.
There are other objections to this view. It is patently 
obvious that all Spaniards are not anarchists, otherwise 
the Civil War would never have happened. Spain also possessed 
a strong Socialist movement, while the Communist Party has 
grown continuously since the 1930's. A more refined variation 
on the "national character" analysis has to be taken more 
seriously i.e. that it fits the "Catalan / Mediterranean" 
character. My Marxist bent meant that I could not accept this 
type of explanation., though it is undeniable that the C.N.T. 
was viewed, not just in Catalonia but in the rest of Spain, 
as the "Catalan trade-union". When interviewing older militants,
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many of them, on beinq asked why they hadn't joined 
the Socialist UGT had replied : "What, join a Madrid 
trade union ?".
This of course brought up the whole question of Soanish 
centralism and the national / regional problem. The C.N.T. 
had had its greatest strenqth in the peripheral provinces, 
but above all in Catalonia. The fact that Catalonia was 
the most industrialised cart of Spain, and that its 
capital, Barcelona, was the centre of the anarchist 
movement, seems to belie the Marxist view that anarchism 
is primarily agrarian. It did of course, have its agrarian 
side : Andalusia, the province par excellence of 
Latifundio, had a continuinn anarchist presence since 
the 1870's. However, the Socialists had been making 
increasing inroads here since the 1920's while during 
the Republic of 1931 - 1936, their Landworkers' Federation 
became the dominant agrarian organisation in the south. 
Another interesting paradox, which also showed the 
problems of the Marxist view, was the fact that the 
C.N.T. did not become a mass movement in Catalonia until 
the First World War, when Spain, which remained neutral, 
underwent considerable industrial expansion.
These were the problems which now interested me most, and 
I believed that the only way I could hope to deal with 
them was through history. For the classical definition of 
the nature of anarchism has been based on a static, 
abstract analysis, which implied that anarchism had been 
"superceded" by Marxism, the "true" and only ideology of 
the working class. The Spanish case has demonstrated that 
this is not necessarily the case, and that what anarchism 
"meant" at any particular historical period can not be 
deduced from an abstract "nature of" type argument.
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Ianarchism
From my experience in 1978-79 I discovered that^meant 
very different things for very different people, but 
united them on the basis of a certain kind of political 
action, and was always related to other available 
ideologies. I could not "read back" into history some 
of the conclusions I'd reached for the post-Francoist 
period. What this period had demonstrated however, was 
that anarchism, as a particular form of political action, 
has to be seen in a historical relationship with Marxism, 
as the competing form of political action. That anarchism 
had managed to maintain an important presence in Spain 
until the 1930's, where everywhere else it had been 
reduced to impotence, says something about the nature 
of the Spanish state, but also about the relevance of 
Marxist political strategy in Spain, and the nature of 
its main competitor, the Spanish Socialist Party.
This led me to look more closely at Marxist and anarchist 
theory and their political strategies, and in so doing, 
discovered that there were problems in applying the 
Marxist type of political action in certain regions of 
Spain, right up to the 1930's. Unlike other countries,
Spain had in the anarchist movement an alternative 
tradition which "contested" this, and proposed its 
own form of political action which had greater meaning 
and possibilities in the context of the Spanish militaristic / 
bureaucratic / centralist state. For anarchism allowed 
many different types of political action, like terrorism, 
which could not be contained within Marxism. Its "open- 
endedness" was, I believe, one of its greatest strengths s 
Catalan syndicalists, southern anarcho-communists and 
terrorists could co-exist within the same movement, albeit 
uneasily. This was crucial in Spain, where regions differed 
so greatly from one another, in terms of their level of 
economic, social and political development.
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There are of course many other and important factors 
which may help to explain the success of anarchism 
in Spain, and I hope to develop these in the corresponding 
chapter. There is one however which I would like to 
mention here, as I believe it crucial in understanding 
the anarchist success in certain regions of Spain. One 
of the most curious paradoxes of Spanish history is why 
the Socialist movement, in a country where there was great 
class polarisation, and where parliamentary struggle 
was almost non-existent till the Republic in 1931, should 
be of a social-democratic character. Perhaps this was 
"the other side" of anarchism, with its clientele of 
labour aristocrats in Madrid. It did of course organise 
among the Asturian miners and the Basque industrial 
workers, but it often found the radicalism of these 
provinces difficult to control. During the Asturian 
Commune of 1934, the Madrid leadership either hid in 
their houses, or £led. With its bureaucratic centralism 
and centre in Madrid, the contrast could not be greater 
with the anarchist movement, with its commitment to 
local autonomy and federalism, with its centre in 
Barcelona.
By this long circuitous route I almost arrived back 
at my starting-point. For one of the main things which 
had impressed me, in 1978 and 1979, and which forced 
me to question most of the Marxist critiques of anarchism, 
was how contemporary the nature of the debates within 
sectors of the C.N.T. were. For many of the militants 
who joined the C.N.T. had come to anarchism because of 
the inadequacies they felt were inherent to Marxism, 
particularly the political practice associated with 
Leninism. This growing unease felt with Leninist assump­
tions and its form of "politics" was also being felt in 
other countries of Europe, especially since 1968, and under 
the impact of feminist criticism, which my own personal 
political experience reflected. This was allied to a 
recognition of the strength of Western European capitalism.
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and the great differences between the nature of Russian 
society, both economically, culturally and politically, 
and the societies of Western Europe. I remember trying 
to grapple with the various theories put forth on the 
"nature of Soviet socialism" - was it a "state capitalist" 
regime, a "deformed workers' state", or an entirely new 
type of social formation, where the bureaucracy / party 
formed the "new ruling class" ? The obsession with the 
Soviet experience was not fortuitous. For while most of 
us on the left continued to extoll the virtues of a 
system which had brought great material advancement for the 
large majority of the Russian masses, there was no 
denying that this type of "socialism" had no appeal for 
us, nor did we believe, for workers in Western Europe.
The questioning of Leninist assumptions, and their 
practical application in the Soviet Union, came for me 
and for many, through a long history of involvement in 
Leninist politics. We, like many of the militants who 
eventually joined the C.N.T., had been led into a 
theoretical study of Leninism primarily because we found 
the political practice of the Leninist groups deeply 
unsatisfying. This produced in Europe, as in Spain, 
a greater interest in the "non-Leninist" tradition within 
Marxism, and the potential perhaps it contained for an 
alternative type of political practice. But in Spain there 
existed, within the C.N.T., a tradition which had histori­
cally opposed Leninist theory and practice, and I discovered, 
much to my amazement, that its theoretical underpinnings 
were almost identical to the "dissident Marxist" 
tradition which was now viewed more sympathetically in 
Western Europe.
This thesis, in many important respects, is the outcome 
of my own political search. But I do not believe that 
the problems which I was increasingly forced to address
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- particularly the inability of Marxism to incorporate 
"personal" politics - were problems which were purely 
the result of my own "subjective" experience, as 
developments in Spain and other countries of Europe 
s&em to prove. In this political quest I discovered 
that anarchism could "fill the gaps" where Marxism 
seemed lacking, and likewise, that some of the most 
glaring inadequacies of anarchism can be "made good" 
by the use of Marxist method. This need for a "fusion" 
of Marxism and anarchism was one that was perceived by 
many of the militants who participated in the reconstruction 
of the C.N.T. during 1976-1979. Their inability to 
achieve this was not, I believe, due to the paucity of 
their theory, but largely because of the weight of a 
certain tradition within the C.N.T., and the bureaucracy 
it had spawned, within the context of "psychological 
euphoria" which accompanied the political transition to 
democracy in Spain. Indeed, the re-emergence of anarchism 
in Spain, and the reconstruction of the C.N.T. cannot be 
understood without recourse to Marxist historical method, 
and the "psychological" approach of anarchism. By attempting 
to "fuse" both Marxist and anarchist approaches, I hope 
that my thesis itself will be testii-vemy to the fruitfulness 
of such a union.
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CHAPTER I : THE HISTORIC SPANISH ANARCHIST MOVEMENT: 1868-1939
In this chapter I attempt to refute the most pervasive and 
erroneous approaches to Spanish anarchism - primarily the 
"classical" Marxist and messianic interpretations - and lay 
the basis for an approach which centres the anarchist success 
in Spain in the relationship between capitalist development, 
the state and the political process, and takes into account 
the ideology and political practice of anarchism's main 
opponent, Marxism.
The millenarian/religious interpretation of Brenan and Hobsbawm 
rests on the notion of sporadic, messianic anarchist activity and 
insurrections, often prompted by some new idea penetrating the othe 
wise inert and uneducated day-labourers of the southern latifundio, 
who, forsaken by the Church, turn to the anarchist saints and 
prophets for redemption. Neither writer pays much attention to 
Catalan industrial anarchism, which, I believe, is of greater 
historical importance. Indeed, Brenan sees the radicalisation 
of Catalonia taking place through the constant influx of 
Andalusian immigrants who kept the flames of anarchism alive 
in this otherwise "moderate" trade union ambience.
As the work of Temma Kaplan has shown, for North Cadiz province 
at least, the anarchists in that province considered their main 
task as organising the workers in trade unions and developed 
a strategy and tactics which were by no means "irrational" in 
the context of the south. Insurrectionary activity did of course 
continue, but this type of action has to be seen in the light 
of a more modern, extremely popular and vigorous political
movement, Republicanism, which had made considerable inroads 
in the south and Catalonia. Indeed, one of the "millenarian" 
insurrections cited by Hobsbawm, that of 1861 at Loja, 
was one in which the Democrats had played an important 
part. Insurrectionary politics, with its secret societies 
and feverish conspiratorial activity, was not limited to 
Spain in the nineteenth century, but engulfed most of 
Europe, particularly France and Italy, and was part of 
a general European attempt to bring about democratic change.
Undoubtedly it was Bakunin's attempts to link-up with 
this tradition and establish a whole network of contacts, 
which was important in founding the first anarchist section 
in Spain. If this insurrectionary tradition survived longer 
than elsewhere in Europe, then it has to be located, not 
in the religious feelings of the Spanish masses, nor to 
anarchist thinking, but in the nature of the Spanish state 
and capitalism, with its moribund political system, which 
resisted all attempts at reform until the coming of the 
Republic in 1931. More than any other country of Europe, 
Spain in the 19th. century was affected by the prosecution 
of war : the Independence Wars in Latin America and 
Civil War in Spain itself. Moreover, political crisis 
was almost continuous throughout the nineteenth century, 
but unlike other countries of Europe, a new "equilibrium" 
was not achieved through an extension of democratic rights. 
On the contrary, the 1874 Settlement, an attempt to end 
the political turmoil of the earlier part of the century, 
was an alliance of all the ruling groups, under 
the leadership of the capitalist latifundists whose 
political system of patronage politics, "caciquismo", a 
system inherited from the seventeenth century, assured 
their position of power and privilege. This system however, 
contained certain weaknesses : with its bureaucratic and 
political centre in Madrid, located in Castille, a region 
in decline since the seventeenth century, it was frequently
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contested by the more dynamic peripheral regions, parti­
cularly Catalonia, from the turn of the century. Although 
it weathered this political storm until 1931, the system 
continued to be characterised by political instability and 
crises throughout these years.
Political crises and the war : Radicalising factors for 
the Spanish workers' movement.
The almost continuous political 
crises and the prosecution of war greatly radicalised
the embryonic workers' movement in nineteenth century Spain. 
This was particularly the case in those regions which 
registered a new social dynamic, with a commercial and / or 
industrial bourgeoisie, the ports of Cadiz, in Andalusia, 
and Barcelona in Catalonia. These regions were particularly 
affected by Republican insurrectionary attempts to bring 
about political change in the nineteenth century, aided 
by the popular masses, whose role within this process increa­
sed dramatically as the century progressed.
The greater role which the popular masses played in Spain 
was due to the extreme weakness of the Spanish bourgeoisie, 
and its lack of a democratic and independent tradition, 
whose earlier opposition was easily silenced by the new 
share-out of the spoils in the Restoration Settlement of 
1874. Moreover, the development of the Spanish bourgeoisie 
in the nineteenth century coincided with the development of 
the workers' movement, increasingly under the leadership 
of the Federal Republicans, the radicalised petit bourgeoisie. 
The fear of workers' power which was demonstrated in these 
developments can account for the intransigence of Spanish 
employers, whether urban or rural, to the demands of the 
labour movement, even the basic right of association, and 
also meant that it opted for compromise with the traditional 
elites, safeguard against revolutionary change.
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Indeed, against the "millenarian" notion which sees the 
backwardness of the Spanish workers' movement, particularly 
in Andalusia, as the reason for the success of anarchism, 
a "backward agrarian" creed, I argue that it was
the development and growth in consciousness of that movement 
which assured anarchism's success in the nineteenth century, 
especially in Andalusia. For the latter region had been 
one of the principal centres of Republican activity throu­
ghout the nineteenth century, and had a long history of 
craft organisation. The changes brought about by capitalist 
exploitation of the land, a process which lasted throughout 
the century, and its accompaniment by increased state coercion, 
particularly the creation of a special force to safeguard the 
landowners' property, the Civil Guard, were further radicali­
sing factors, as was the continuous drain on popular 
human resources, conscripted to fight the almost endless 
wars which Spain was involved in during the century.
Trade Union organising and state repression.
As Kaplan has shown in her work on North Cadiz, in Andalusia, 
the growing concentration of the wine industry and the 
decline in handicrafts (which followed the influx of 
foreign manufactured goods) which occurred during the 
nineteenth century were contested by petty producers and 
skilled and unskilled workers forming political trade 
unions. The main aim of these unions was to re-establish 
workers' control over production, and many of them grew out 
of the old guilds which had been strongly organised till the 
late 18th. century. Unlike these older forms of organisation 
however, the new trade unions could unite petty producers 
and skilled and unskilled workers against the large capitalists 
in a given trade. This 'popular alliance", under the banner of 
collectivism, was a conscious strategy pursued by anarchist 
trade union leaders to counteract the pull of bourgeois 
politics. The alliance was possible however, because of the 
"fluid" nature of social class caterories, and the fact that
most of the population lived in towns where there was 
little distinction between rural and urban proletarians 
and poor small-holders. Kaplan also notes the continuity 
of the union movement as many of the old crafts became 
industrialised, suggesting the great flexibility of the 
movement as it adapted to capitalist production.
Indeed Kaplan and other writers point to the connections 
between government attempts to crush the unions and 
insurrection. Attempts by the government to smash the 
unions seem to be the immediate cause of the insurrections 
of 1873 and 1883. The most important uprising of the 
period at Jerez in 1892, occurred after field hands had 
attempted several times to form a new union of agricultural 
workers, and appeared to have been an insurrection for 
the right to associate. It was this reoeated denial of the right 
of association which would bring about great changes within 
the anarchist movement, and lead it inexorably towards more 
radical and violent tactics.
Catalonia : industrialisation and trade unionism.
If the level of development of the Andalusian popular 
movement can account for anarchisms' success there, then 
that other region where anarchism was to find an important 
resonance, Catalonia, was the most industrialised Spanish 
region, and one moreover which had the most developed trade 
union organisation prior to the arrival of the Anarchist 
International. The failure of the federal revolts of 1869, 
and the role which the Federal Republicans had failed to 
play in these, as in Andalusia, was important in winning 
working class leaders to the anarchist cause. The arrival 
of the anarchist section at this particular time, during 
the euphoria which accompanied the important revolution 
of 1868, was of crucial importance in establishing the first 
generation of anarchist leaders.
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The Spanish Anarchist Federation : from 1870 to 1911.
The first years of the Anarchist Federation were characterised 
by extreme moderation in practice, whatever theoretical 
tenets the leadership held vis-à-vis insurrectionary strike 
action.
Indeed these years of the "scientific" strike were ones 
during which the leadership attempted to control a membership 
which was resorting ever more frequently to strike action.
As the 1873 revolution demonstrated, the leadership was 
aware that involvement in insurrectionary attempts were 
doomed to failure. Nevertheless, the Anarchist Federation 
was caught-up in the proletarian attempts to seize power 
in Alcoy and Sanlucar de Barrameda, towns with a long 
tradition of radical working class activity.
Undoubtedly there were differences within the leadership 
over the tactics to pursue, but these did not surface until 
the organisation was forced into clandestinity after the 
failure of the Federal Republican experiment of 1873. For 
the first time calls to violence were made, though these 
were not carried out by the organisation itself, but by 
groups of workers and peasants in the south, unhappy with 
the legalist trade union orientation of the Catalan leader­
ship. It was also during the clandestine period from 1874 
to 1881 that the notion of "secret groups" began to gain 
ground, and the leadership gave itself new powers.
Government repression had exposed the severe limitations 
of open trade union organising and thus brought into 
question the revolutionary potential of the trade union, and 
the strategy which the federation had pursued till then.
Of course, the conviction that "secret groups" of anarchists 
were needed alongside legal trade unions had existed from
the inception of the movement. Bakunin's idea of leadership, 
that groups of revolutionaries were needed to instill 
"ideas into the masses", was taken-up by the first generation 
of Spanish anarchists who set-up the secret "Alliance" 
prior to the holding of the first congress in Barcelona 
in 1870. Bu.t the expansion and growth of the "Alliance" 
really got underway after the first period of clandestinity 
in 1871, and persuaded even those formally hostile to such 
developments that secret groups were necessary to protect 
the existence of the organisation. This structure of "secret 
groups" and trade union organising was to characterise the 
Spanish anarchist movement throughout its history, and 
reflects not so much Bakunin's thinking, as Spanish 
political reality, and the need for organisational 
continuity.
The adoption of anarcho-communism in the 1880's seemed 
to resolve many of the problems which had beset the 
federation during its early years, graphically demonstrated 
by the reaction of the Catalan reformist leadership to 
the repression of 1883. Undoubtedly the existence within 
the federation of southern landworkers - indeed they now 
formed the majority - who called for the end to legalist 
tactics and a more militant and violent action against 
employers, forced a re-think amongst anarchist leaders, 
many of whom were none too happy about "reformist" develop­
ments both north and south. In North Cadiz province at least 
"the community of the poor", an anarcho-communist tactic, 
was carried-out in order to "resolve" the contradictions 
between a "reformist" trade unionism and the mass of the 
poor community and was designed to put stronger "political" 
pressure on the ruling groups.
Indeed, anarcho-communism seemed to address the two evils 
which had developed within the Anarchist Federation from 
1870, reformism and bureaucracy.
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For the fierce repression which followed the Mano Negra 
incident - a repression totally out of keeping with 
the event itself - reaffirmed fundamental anarchist 
principles on the nature of the state, and led to a 
renewal of anarchist thought, enshrined in anarcho- 
communism. For Kropotkin and Malatesta attempted to call 
attention to the terrible plight of rural workers who were 
undergoing severe recession and being ignored by the 
"reformist" trade unions throughout Europe. Their stress 
on solidarity and democracy, principles which were being 
violated by the Catalan leadership, were those which 
convinced anarchist leaders that there could be no return 
to the bureaucratic and legalist road of the early years 
of the Anarchist Federation.
This "anarcho-communist" component would be of crucial 
importance within the Spanish anarchist labour movement.
Its fear of "selfish syndicalism", with its bureaucracies 
and hierarchies, played an important part in many decisions 
taken vis-à-vis organisation. At the Sans Congress of 1918 
for example, the fear that the development of mass unionism 
would mean a corresponding growth in bureaucracy led to 
the decision to continue the practice of non-remuneration 
of officials, thus ensuring that one of the major obstacles 
to revolutionary change was averted. Moreover, the greater 
importance given to the commune in the anarcho-communist 
schema has meant that anarchist militants have rarely 
limited their activities to the trade union front, but have 
attempted to address other issues of concern to the worker, 
such as housing and education.
Other developments within the workers' movement militated 
against reformist currents within the Anarchist Federation 
in the 1880's and 1890's. Indeed, the adoption of anarcho- 
communism Coincided with the growth of nascent revolutionary 
syndicalism, (with the agitation around the eight-hour day), 
manifested by the growth of long and violent strikes in 
the late 1880's and early 1890's. There is undoubtedly a 
great similarity between revolutionary syndicalism and 
anarcho-communism, as both call for a revolutionary "war
«
to the death" against the bourgeoisie and are implacably 
hostile to legalist methods- Government repression, 
political crises and the intransigence of the employers 
were the principal causes of this radicalisation, and 
led to the development of a "new type" of organisation, 
more egalitarian and democratic in its organisational 
practice, and less inhibited in using violence to achieve 
its ends.
This more militant syndicalism which was germinating during 
these years reflected the changes taking place within 
Spanish capitalism, with the growth of the large bourgeoisie, 
strongly organised in their associations and thus able to 
force workers into subsmission by the tactic of the lock­
out. Increasing mechanisation was threatening certain 
sections of workers and their control over the production 
process, while simultaneously creating new industries, 
particularly public transport, which recruited new and young 
workers who were often at the forefront of trade union 
struggles. This was the period of the growth in consciousness 
of both the bourgeoisie and the working class. - the scale 
and duration of strikes at this time manifest the develop­
ment of the class struggle in Catalonia which would reach 
its zenith during the revolutionary period which followed 
the Bolshevik revolution of 1917.
And it was the development of the class struggle in Catalonia 
from the 1890's which allowed the anarchist tactic of 
militant direct-action syndicalism to achieve a greater 
measure of success, despite anarchist involvement in 
terrorism during the same period. Indeed I u ioa ld argue 
that the Catalan workers' movement was further radicalised 
by almost continuous state repression during the 1890's, 
a repression on occasions made possible by terrorist-acts ;.iaf the 
state itself. The use of terrorism and repression by the 
state brings up the whole question of the relationship 
of the working class movement to terrorism, in the context 
of minimum legal redress and a strongly organised and
intransigent employer class. Certainly these same years 
registered increased support for the anarchists in 
Catalonia, and a decline in the fortunes of their rival, 
the Socialist Party. For the loss of the colonies at the 
turn of the century led to a dramatic development of cons­
ciousness amongst the Catalan bourgeoisie who now launched 
an offensive against the workers' organisations in an 
attempt to resolve their production problems.
And it was in response to this all-out offensive by the 
employers that the tactic of the general strike was used 
by the anarchists. This was not a "millenarian" gesture, 
but the principal reason for the success of anarchism at 
the turn of the century. The 1902 general strike, an 
attempt to halt the employers' offensive in Barcelona, 
reflected the level of development of both the bourgeoisie 
and the working class, and the high level of class conflict 
which obtained.
The defeat of the 1902 general strike in Catalonia led 
to the demise of the workers' movement in Catalonia, and its 
leaders, the anarchists. The scale of this defeat is 
crucial in explaining the turn to "politics" by Catalan 
workers, and the involvement of anarchists in political 
conspiracy. For the years from 1902 saw the appearance in 
Catalonia of regionalism, terrorism and political intrigue 
which reflected the crisis of the central state and its 
inability to enforce its dictates in Catalonia which led 
to drastic efforts to control the province : the suspension 
of constitutional guarantees in January 1908. That this did 
not have the desired effect can be seen in the development 
of a major state crisis in Barcelona in July 1909, when 
labour urest and anti-war feeling combined to produce a 
movement of revolutionary proportions. This situation was 
re-enacted at a national level in September 1911, again
lo
brought into being by massive strike action and anti­
conscription riots. As in 1909, the restoration of order 
was entrusted to the army and the Civil Guard.
The workers' movement, fused in Solidaridad Obrera from 
1907, was the major force behind the revolutionary general 
strike of 1909 in Catalonia, called after the employers had 
refused to negotiate. The general strike was radicalised 
however, by the calling-up of reservists for Morocco, and 
meant that even sections of the middle classes would view 
the strike sympathetically.
The years of 1909-1911 revealed the growing distance between 
the two major working class forces in Catalonia, the 
anarchists and the Socialists. It is by no means a coinci­
dence that the increased support which the Socialists 
received through Solidaridad Obrera from 1907 coincided 
with the development of a revolutionary syndicalist current 
within the Catalan Socialist Party, which laid the basis 
for the revolutionary strike with the anarchists in 1909.
But the direction which the national organisation of the 
Socialists would pursue during the events of 1909 and 
1911 - a direction of extreme moderation and eventually 
electoral struggle - would bring to an end this short 
period of joint endavour, and by way of reaction, radicalise 
the syndicalist leadership of Solidaridad Obrera and con­
tribute greatly to reinforce its anti-politicism.
The Confederación National del Trabajo, founded in 1911, 
and committed to a militant direct-action syndicalism, 
was the organisational expression of the radicalisation 
which had taken place within the anarchist movement from 
the 1880's. For the years from the mid-1880's had reaffirmed 
fundamental anarchist principles on the nature of the state 
and bourgeois parliamentary politics, and had forged a 
syndicalism which could do battle with a bourgeoisie which
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ignored the state's authority over its industrial affairs. 
The anarchists' dealings with the Socialist Party had also 
contributed to this development, and undoubtedly helped 
convince anarchist leaders that the bureaucratic develop­
ments affecting the Socialists should not take place 
within their organisation. Indeed, these dealings and 
strengthened egalitarian and extreme democratic anarchist 
notions vis-à-vis organisational practice, which would be 
of considerable importance in accounting for the anarchists' 
success in Catalonia.
The "Millenarian" and Marxist notions re-visited.
It is in the light of these developments that we should 
re-examine the "millenarian" and Marxist interpretations 
of Spanish anarchism, both of which rest on the notion of 
anarchism as an agrarian, pre-industrial petit bourgeois 
phenomenon, which succeeded in implanting in Spain because 
of the "backward" agrarian nature of Spanish society.
Both these approaches take Western Europe as their reference 
of "development" and equate the "underdevelopment" of 
industry and the predominance of agriculture with an 
"underdeveloped" workers' movement. In the light of 
historical development it is clear that it has not been in 
the "developed" countries of Western Europe where the 
contradictions of capitalist development have been most 
strongly felt, but in those countries, like Russia, with 
a weak industrial bourgeoisie, a small, but highly combatant 
proletariat, and large numbers of peasants and landworkers, 
radicalised by the crisis on the land.
Hie early years of the Spanish labour 
movement did not differ substantially from that of other 
industrialising states in Europe. The growth of associationism, 
trade unions and cooperatives, and the first four years of the
Anarchist Federation itself, showed that the main aim of 
these years was one of "consciousness-building" through 
organisation. But this strategy was slowly undermined by 
government repression, political instability the intran­
sigence of employers and lack of reform, which led to 
the adoption of a militant, and often violent syndicalism, 
extremely democratic and egalitarian in tone. Against the 
Marxist interpretation which sees this syndicalism "out of 
step" with the real historical process, this syndicalism 
was undoubtedly the best, and perhaps the only, tactic 
that could hope to win against the employers.
Indeed, this type of syndicalism made more sense as 
Spanish history unfolded, for this "new" militant syndicalism 
was developed during the period of greater industriali­
sation and changes in the productive process during the 
1890's, and coincided with the growth in consciousness 
and organisation of the Catalan bourgeoisie. Despite the 
absence of the organised anarchist movement from;thé^trade union 
field, from 1911 to 1914, Catalan workers continued to 
form trade unions of a similar militant syndicalist type, 
proof, it would seem, that the syndicalist strategy pursued 
by the anarchists was a response to a particular set of 
social and political conditions.
And it is the failure, of Marxist and liberal historians 
alike, to examine the particular social and political 
reality of Spanish historical development which renders 
them unable to explain the continuing success of anarchist 
syndicalism in Spain, and often leads them, against their 
stated method, to account for this success in terms of 
ideology or imposition, i.e. that groups of dedicated 
anarchists somehow "imposed" their ideas on backward, 
uneducated workers. Underlying these notions is the 
assumption that there were other "superior", more "developed"
theoretical ideologies available, that were not embraced 
by Spanish workers either because they were too uneducated 
to understand them, or because the "anarchists" got in the 
way.
The type of syndicalist practice developed 
in certain regions of Spain was in response to a particular 
social and political reality which differed significantly 
from other countries of Europe. One of the major characte­
ristics of Spanish society which set it apart from its 
European neighbours in the nineteenth century was the 
role the military played in attempts at political change, 
undoubtedly a reflection of the weakness of the Spanish 
bourgeoisie and its lack of an independent political tradition. 
Another significant difference between Spain and other 
countries of Europe was the degree of political instability, 
exacerbated by the waging of two Civil Wars in less than 
a century. Spain moreover, was a declining colonial power, 
and was involved in the Independence Wars in Latin America 
throughout the century. Underlying these developments was 
the extreme weakness of the Spanish bourgeoisie, which was 
unable, or unwilling, to carry through a political 
revolution which would have extended democratic rights and 
values to other groups in society. Indeed, capitalist 
relationships were introduced during the nineteenth century 
without any substant ial political changes, under the 
guidance of an effete and backward landowning class, linked 
by family ties and tradition to the military. And it was 
this "militaristic" landowning class which succeeded in 
maintaining control of the state, in alliance with the 
bourgeoisie from 1874, through the system of patronage 
known as "caciquismo", and coercion, until the coming of 
the Republic in 1931.
The earlier part of the nineteenth century did indeed 
witness struggles over the nature of the Spanish state,
and the direction which Spanish development should take. 
Certainly the introduction of capitalist relationships on 
the land were carried-out by "liberal" reformers who believed 
that these changes would "regenerate" Spanish society, 
and set it on the road to development on Western 
European lines. But the lack of resolution on part of 
the "reformers", who failed to make credit available to 
peasants, meant that land was bought by the old landowning 
elite, or by a "new" landowning bourgeoisie, who relied 
even more heavily on coercion to maintain their position 
of power and privilege. This demonstrates the weakness of 
the Spanish central state, and the ineffectual nature of 
the Spanish political class, caught-up in a web of patro­
nage and "clan" politics, and therefore unable to act as 
a voice of the "general interest of the ruling classes".
The nature of the Spanish state and patronage politics would 
be of crucial importance in the type of development which 
took place throughout the nineteenth century. Industrial 
development was thwarted by the direction of investment 
to the land, which allowed foreign capital to penetrate, and 
even monopolise, certain industries. Indeed, industrial 
development was dependent on the "goodwill" of politicians, 
which developed into a vast system of "reciprocal" favours 
within which "productivity" was a low priority. Undoubtedly 
the enormous strains within the patronage system from the 
turn of the century reflected greater industrial development, 
and the growth of a "bourgeois" consciousness amongst the 
Catalan bourgeoisie, who were finding the restrictions of 
patronage increasingly irksome. But fear of their own 
militant proletariat acted to restrain their "nationalism", 
graphically displayed during the events of 1917, when they 
again threw in their lot with the traditional elites.
This brief look at the distinguishing characteristics of 
Spanish historical development shows clearly the enormous
is
differencesbetween Spain and other industrialising states 
of Europe. Unlike France, the Spanish state had not created 
a peasantry which would have brought stability to the 
countryside, nor like Germany, possessed an enterprising 
landowning elite whose profits were more directly related 
to increases in productivity than the exploitation of 
human labour. The failure to resolve the land problem, 
particularly acute in the south, was a direct consequence 
of the nature of the landowning latifundists, and their 
relationship to the state. The agrarian crisis was a 
continual source of radicalisation, and moreover, meant 
that the towns, such as Barcelona, would receive a constant 
influx of immigrants, escaping from the poverty on the land. 
This would put a great strain on an already crises-riden 
textile industry, which was having to compete with British 
textiles.
This type of social structure had profound consequences for 
the kind of labour movement which developed in Spain, parti­
cularly in the more dynamic peripheral regions with a 
strong tradition of opposition to the central state. 
Political crises, the prosecution of war, the intransigence 
of employers and government repression produced an extremely 
radicalised labour movement, which, given the lack of 
dynamism of either the industrial or landowning bourgeoisie, 
played a more important role in Spanish society than its 
European counterparts. Moreover, unlike other European 
countries, which had succeeded in establishing some sort 
of modus vivendi with labour by the turn of the century, 
the Spanish state, undergoing severe crisis after the loss 
of the colonies, attempted to bolster-up its ailing system 
by an extension of bureaucratic patronage and repressive 
policies towards labour. Unable to carry through national 
unification, like Italy, under a sector of the industrial 
bourgeoisie and an extension of democratic rights, "Spanish 
unity" was henceforth protected by the army. Now relieved
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of its duties in the colonies, the army saw its power 
enhanced considerably under the monarch Alphonso XXII from 
1903, who supported their colonial ambitions in Morocco.
And the persuance of the war in Morocco, and the conscription 
policies which this entailed, was a continual source of 
radicalisation, as the state crises of 1909 and 1911 testify.
And it is in the light of the specific historical development 
of Spanish capitalism, and the kind of radicalised labour 
movement which this engendered in certain Spanish regions, 
that Marxist political strategy and the Marxist theory of 
the state must be seen. Essentially, Marx's ideas on 
revolution were directed towards the industrial nations of 
Europe, a development pattern he believed, which would be 
followed in all of Europe, a theory which paid scant regard 
tO' less developed countries, or those which have subse­
quently been called the "Third World". This analysis equated 
the development of capitalism with a particular form of 
bourgeois democracy, which would give the working class 
a political voice, which would mean that in some countries 
socialist transformation could perhaps be achieved without 
a bloody revolution. It was assumed that this "progressive" 
mode of production would carry through an agrarian reform, 
and eliminate those backward "sacks of potatoes", the 
peasantry, creatinq in the process a large working class 
movement, highly organised, which would be able to give 
battle to the bourgeoisie.
Marx's analysis was based on capitalist development in 
England, a country which had carried through a successful 
agrarian revolution, was the major industrial power in 
Europe, and the world's foremost colonial power in the 
nineteenth century. In the light of subsequent historical
/ 11
development it would seem that the kind of capitalist 
development which England experienced was entirely unique, 
as the growth of fascism in Italy and Germany in the 1930's, 
and the "dependent" nature of capitalism in the "Third World" 
has proved. The development of capitalism
in Spain was not accompanied by political democracy, nor gave 
rise to a "progressive" bourgeoisie. On the contrary, greater 
industrialisation in Spain coincided with the ending of 
the colonial wars and the Carlist Wars, which increased 
the size of the bureaucracy and enhanced the position of 
the military within domestic affairs. Indeed, capitalist 
transformation, particularly in the latifundist regions, 
increasingly relied on coercion to maintain itself.
The introduction of capitalist relationships on the land 
did not bring about any change in agricultural techniques, 
but continued to rely on large numbers of landless labourers 
working long hours for starvation wages. In fact, the loss 
of former privileges which capitalist transformation entailed 
actually increased social tension in the countryside and 
produced a rural revolutionary movement which showed its 
greatest strength during the revolutionary upheavals of 
1918 to 1921, and again during the radicalisation which 
accompanied the Republican pericd from 1931 to 1936.
Given these enormous differences between English and 
Spanish development- it is hardly likely that the type of 
labour movements which developed would be similar, nor that 
the political strategies they would adopt would converge. Yet 
Marx insisted, as did the Internationals which succeeded him, 
on participation within the parliamentary arena, a strategy of 
doubtful validity in Spain, qs even the attempt
at moderate reform during the first years of the Republic, 
from 1931 to 1933, brought about the reaction of the Right, 
and led directly to the Civil War. Certainly the anarchists* 
relationship to "politics" was much more flexible that it has 
usually beencredited with, and they often conspired with 
Republicans and democrats to bring about a more liberal 
regime for labour. But the anarchists*
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insistence on keeping the trade union movement outside of 
the political system was not only to maintain working class 
unity, but due to their conviction, borne out by historical 
development, that no substantial reform would be achieved 
by this strategy. Anti-politicism »as:also designed to keep 
the trade union movement uncorrupted and revolutionary. 
Developments within the Spanish Socialist Party have proved 
this reasoning correct. Socialist participation within the 
mixed juries' system during the Dictatorship of Primo de 
Rivera, and under the first government of the Republic, 
created a whole network of bureaucracy which was one of 
the major obstacles to revolutionary change within the 
party.
The issue of parliamentary participation was one of the 
major reasons for the split between anarchists and Marxists 
in the First International. Underlying the disagreement 
over parliamentary participation were different notions of 
the state. Marx argued that economic development gave rise 
to classes, like the bourgeoisie, who gradually, as in 
England, or through revolution, as in France, gained control 
of the organs of state power. In essence Marx argued that 
economic development preceded political power, indeed, 
political power was the expression of these class forces 
which economic development had brought about. Capitalist 
development in England, for example, took place over centuries, 
almost "autonomously" i.e. outside of state control, and 
the bourgeoisie only gradually succeeded in exercising power 
through the state.
The anarchists, like Bakunin, disagreed with this analysis 
and held instead to the notion of the "conquest" state.
The origins of the state and political power, the anarchists 
argued, have to be sought in subjugation and force. Those 
who held political power could force others to work for them, 
as slaves or labourers. Political power thus created classes
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and shaped economic development. The state and political 
power preceded economic power, for it was through the 
control of the state that the exercise of economic power was 
possible. And it would seem that the anarchists' view 
on the nature of the state and political power had greater 
resonance in Spain because it explained theoretically 
much better than Marxism, the nature of the Spanish state. 
Certainly the capitalist latifundists' power was reflected 
at the level of the Spanish state, as it was this class 
which continued to hold state power until 1931. This was 
possible because of the underdeveloped nature of Spanish 
industry, the "dependent" nature of Spanish capitalism 
vis-à-vis Europe, and its status as a declining colonial 
power.
Bub during the earlier part of the century 
when there was considerable struggle between the ruling groups 
for control of the state, "liberal reformers" had directed 
their energies towards the land, thus diverting investment 
away from industry, at a crucial moment of industrial 
development. Thus, the politicians of the Spanish state 
had actually consolidated landowning capitalism, for their 
lack of resolution in carrying-through their stated objec­
tives - the creation of a middle peasantry - led to the 
consolidation of existing estates and the creation of a 
new landed bourgeoisie. Moreover, these changes in agrarian 
property relationships were not accompanied by changes 
in agricultural technique, especially irrigation, which 
would have increased profitability, thus allowing landowners 
to pay their workers sufficient wages to buy goods, such as 
textiles, which would have created an internal market for 
Spanish goods. Industrial development was stifled from the 
beginning by the need to curry favour in government and 
political circles, which led to highly over-manned and 
unproductive enterprises. The Spanish state and the system
of patronage politics which sustained it therefore 
played a crucial part in shaping Spanish economic development, 
and further exacerbated Spain's "dependent" position within 
Western European capitalism.
The important role which the Spanish state played in the 
development of Spanish capitalism, patronage politics and 
the nature of the Spanish ruling class, raises problems 
as to the universal application of Marx's theory of the 
state. Indeed, it would seem that many less developed countries 
of the world display similar state / political structures, 
and are governed by effete rulers who rely more on force 
than changes in production to maintain their dominance.
Although it could be argued that force has always, everywhere, 
been an integral part of capitalist development, as it is 
by nature imperialist, the greater relevance which the anarchist 
notion of the state has for less developed countries of the 
world reflects the anarchist's greater interest in the less 
developed countries of Europe, and its belief that these 
would be the spearheads of revolutionary change. This, of 
course, was another area of disagreement between Marxists 
and anarchists within the First International, as Marx 
believed that revolution would take place in the advanced 
capitalist countries of Europe, while less developed countries 
would need to pass through a "bourgeois democratic" period 
before socialist transformation would be possible. This 
"two-stage” theory would be applied dogmatically and 
mechanically by subsequent Internationals to Spain, and is 
an important factor in accounting for the failure of Marxism 
to penetrate the most radicalised sector of the workers' 
movement in Spain, Catalonia.
The fundamental correctness of the anarchist notion of 
the Spanish state was therefore of crucial importance in 
attracting radical "advanced" workers to its orbit, and 
maintaining their allegiance, despite the prestige and 
status which the Communist Party acquired internationally 
in the wake of the Russian revolution. But it was the political 
strategy which flowed from this analysis, a militant and 
extremely democratic syndicalism, which allowed it to become 
a mass movement in Catalonia, Andalusia and other parts
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of Spain where the contradictions of Spanish capitalist 
development were most acutely felt. The
major radicalising factors during the early years of the 
Anarchist Federation had been the repressive actions of 
the state, and the unwillingness of employers, whether 
urban or rural, to accept the right of labour to exist.
This pushed workers towards more violent forms of protest, 
such as insurrection and repraisals, forms of protest which 
would have been difficult to contain within the Marxism 
of its time, as the latter was committed to peaceful trade 
union organising and "consciousness-building", a strategy 
which had out-lived its usefulness by the 1880's in certain 
regions of Spain.
Again this demonstrates the Western European bias of Marxist 
thought which rendered it unable to deal with a potentially 
revolutionary movement in a less developed country of 
Europe. And indeed, it was the more flexible nature of 
anarchist thought, and its greater knowledge of less 
developed countries of Europe, which allowed it to support, 
or even espouse, protests not strictly of a trade union kind. 
For the adoption of anarcho-communism in the 1880's followed 
the fierce repression of 1883, and exposed the limitations 
of strictly trade union action, especially in the south, 
in the context of severe recession and mass unemployment.
This emphasis on the plight of rural workers in the 1890's 
was possible because of the anarchists lack of a systematic 
theory vis-à-vis revolutionary change, and consequently 
what sector of the oppressed working class which would 
bring it about. While Spanish anarchism was essentially 
proletarian, it did not, like Marxism, place its revolutionary 
hopes solely in the urban proletariat, but believed that 
the rural masses would also play an important role, which 
again reflects anarchism's greater insight and knowledge 
of less developed countries of the world.
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There were too other aspects of anarchist political 
thought which would be of crucial importance in gaining 
it mass support in certain regions of Spain. One of the 
fundamental tenets of anarchism, which flows from its 
analysis of the state, is the iniguity of power, and its 
belief that power can only be egualised by installing 
a regime of workers' control throughout society. This 
was another point of serious disagreement between Marxists 
and anarchists within the First International, as the 
anarchists contested the Marxist notion of centralised 
organisation on the grounds that this would create a new, 
powerful hierarchy within the workers' movement, which 
would continue to maintain the divisions between leaders 
and the rank and file, thus reproducing the division of 
labour of capitalist society. Instead, the anarchists 
proposed a federal form of organisation, which would give 
the local sections egual power and autonomy of action, thus 
ensuring an equal distribution of power within the organi­
sation. This form of organisation was better equipped to 
prepare workers for control of future society and encourage 
individual responsibility. Indeed, the anarchists argued 
that the type of organisation adopted by workers had to 
"pre—figure" the organisation of future society, a society 
in which the capitalist division of labour, and the power­
lessness which it entailed, would be radically overturned.
Certainly the anarchists' espousal of federalism was a major 
reason for its success in those regions of Spain with an 
anti—centralist tradition,'- such as-'Cátalonia. As Brenan has 
said, the paradox of Spanish political culture was that 
while it was the most regionally diverse country in Europe, 
it had one of the most centralised political systems, 
"caciquismo", where every local official was in the pay of 
Madrid. Federal Republicanism had made
great headway amongst the Catalan and Andalusian popular 
masses prior to the arrival of the anarchist section, and
had succeeded in setting-up a government of an extreme 
democratic type in 1873.
The fact that the petit bourgeoisie, in the form of Federal 
Republicanism, ascribed to such notions of extreme democracy, 
shows the extent to which solutions to Spain's problems 
were seen to lie in a redistribution of power within 
Spanish society. In the context of a militaristic state 
whose power extended to every village, through the local 
bureaucrat and the Civil Guard, and where urban and rural 
employers refused any dialogue with labour, the question 
of power and control were bound to be at the forefront of 
political debate. The authoritarian nature of relationships 
which engulfed Spanish society, made workers, particularly 
in certain regions of Spain, much more sensitive to the 
kind of relationships which obtained within their own 
organisations, and the degree of power they were able to 
exert. This authoritarianism would be especially felt in 
Andalusia, heartland of latifundist power and privilege 
where state repression was frequently and severely felt, 
and Catalonia, home of the largest and most combative 
working class, with a strong "European" sensitivity and 
historic opposition to the Spanish central state.
And it was this continuing need felt by the working class, 
for democratic changes, which would bring about individual 
freedoms, which ensured that anarchism would be the type 
of socialism which would put down deep and lasting roots 
in certain regions of Spain. For anarchism,uhlike Marxism, 
did not break so decisively with its radical republican 
past and Enlightenment heritage, and attempted to hammOAise 
economic egalitarianism with individual freedom of choice 
and expression. And it was this "European" aspect of anarchist 
thought which allowed it such success in the most "Europea­
nised" region of Spain, Catalonia, where the "gap" between
Europe and Spain was most clearly perceived.
The workers' movement in Catalonia 
developed along similar lines as other European workers' 
movements in the nineteenth century, under the leadership 
of Republicanism. Indeed it was in the movements of the 
workers and the petit bourgeoisie that European influences 
were strongest, particularly along the Mediterranean seaboard, 
from Barcelona in Catalonia to Cadiz in Andalusia. It was 
here that a new social dynamic was at play, reflecting the 
growth of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, and 
the working class, both urban and rural. Unlike other 
countries of Europe, however, Spain possessed neither an 
enterprising landowning class, nor a bourgeoisie strong 
enough to carry through a political revolution which would 
have brought about democratic changes in Spanish society.
Thus the democratic revolution was increasingly entrusted 
to the Spanish working class, a class which was radicalised 
by the continuous crises of the Spanish state, the prose­
cution of war, state repression and the unwillingness of 
Spanish employers to recognise labour's right to exist.
The notion of democracy in Spain was directly related to 
production. The Spanish ruling elites, both
landowning and industrial, showed little interest in 
productivity or efficiency, as large profits could be 
obtained by the exploitation of cheap labour, whose protests 
could be stifled by the forces of the military state. The 
urgent need to take control of production out of the hands 
of this elite, and devolve it to the producers, the workers, 
was a deeply-held feeling amongst Spanish workers, particu­
larly in those regions where the Spanish central state was 
felt primarily as revenue collector and force of oppression. 
Thus, the "regeneration", of Spanish society was seen to 
come through workers' control over production, and was 
totally incompatible with the maintainence of the central
state and political patronage. This feeling ran deepest 
amongst the Catalan masses, who had never recognised the 
"legitimacy" of the Spanish state, and where the develop­
ment of the forces for bourgeois revolution had gone 
furthest. As the most industrialised Spanish region, 
geographically close to France and French culture, and 
with links to Europe through port, Barcelona, Catalonia was 
the region which was most aware of the moribund natufe of 
the Spanish state, and the lack of democratic freedoms. 
Indeed, the Catalan bourgeoisie was the only section of 
the Spanish bourgeoisie which developed a strong political 
voice after the bourgeois / landowners' alliance of 1874, 
and even made an attempt, however feeble, to bring about 
political change in 1917. But it had left its "historic 
mission" too late. By 1917 a strong and extremely radicalised 
workers' movement had developed in Catalonia, committed to 
carrying through a socialist transformation which would 
simultaneously fulfill the democratic aspirations of 
Spanish society, and usher in a regime of true equality 
and well-being for all.
Anarchism, particularly in Catalonia, therefore reflected 
a highly developed and radicalised workers' movement, 
which also assumed the tasks of bourgeois democracy, albeit 
in a radically different way, and endowed the abstract 
"individual" of bourgeois thought with social and communal 
connotations. This continuing need felt by the Catalan 
masses for democratic changes which would bring about less 
authoritarian relationships in civil society (while simul­
taneously solving the problems of production), often came 
into conflict with the need felt for a revolutionary trans­
formation for, as Engles correctly said, revolution is 
an "authoritarian" act par excellance. 1^^. It also came 
into conflict with the methods of struggle which the Spanish 
militaristic state and Spanish employers imposed on the 
movement, and forced Spanish anarchists at times to
relinquish their claims to "pre-fugurative" organisational 
forms, and lead them inexorably towards more "authoritarian" 
acts and organisational practices.
It is in this conflict - between the commitment to the 
greatest democracy possible, and the urgent need for revo­
lutionary change - that the history of the Spanish anarchist 
movement should be seen.
This is the paradox which the European Left has been attemp­
ting to address in the last few decades, given the failure 
of centralised "state" socialism in the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe, which seems to suggest that individual 
freedom and decentralisation are intimately related to 
productivity and growth. Moreover, the growth in consciousness 
of other oppressed groups, particularly women, has questioned 
the power relationships which obtain within the organisations 
of the Left itself, and have called for a radical re-think 
of organisational practices and personal conduct. Indeed, 
women have argued, the organisational practice and personal 
relationships which obtain have to "pre-figure" the future 
socialist society, otherwise the old male-dominated power 
relationships will continue to shape the new society, and 
the capitalist division of labour thus preserved.
This dilemna - the need felt to extend and deepen democracy, 
while simultaneously carrying through a successful socialist 
transformation - was one to which the early Socialist and 
feminist movement of the nineteenth century paid particular 
attention. It appeared to have been resolved however, by 
the Bolshevik revolution. The massive participation of workers 
through the democratically-elected Soviets, gave the impression 
that a truly democratic socialist society had at last come 
into being, and a large number of Socialists and revolutionary 
syndicalists throughout Europe led revolutionary strike- 
waves and factory occupations under the Soviet banner.
Many of these militants would later form the nuclei of 
the first Communist Barties throughout Europe.
While the extent of the successes of the Communist Party(2)in Europe seems to have been exaggerated , there is 
little doubt that a large number of erstwhile Socialists 
and revolutionary syndicalists in France, Germany and 
Italy now believed that "revolutionary dictatorship" was 
the only way to achieve a socialist transformation, although 
parliamentary struggle was not relinquised entirely.
In Spain, this did not occur to anything like the same extent, 
and indeed the new Spanish Communist Party had difficulties 
in getting off the ground at all, and was unable to appeal 
to the most able and competent leadership, thus dooming 
it as a serious alternative until the 1930's.
The Repercussions of the Russian Revolution in Spain and the 
failure of the Communist Party.
Undoubtedly one of the major reasons for the failure of the 
Communist Party in Spain in the early 1920's was the lack 
of knowledge which the Bolshevik leaders had of Spain, which 
led them to seriously underestimate the tremendous impact 
that the Russian Revolution had on the C.N.T., especially 
in Andalusia and Catalonia. For the Russian Revolution 
occurred at a time of major state crisis, brought into 
being by army and bourgeois discontent, but in which the 
worker^ organisations, the C.N.T. and the U.G.T., had played 
a crucial role. This attempt by sections of the bourgeoisie, 
particularly the Catalan, reflected the industrial development 
which Spain had undergone during the previous decades, which led 
to the growth of the organised strength and consciousness 
of the Catalan bourgeoisie.
But greater industrial growth and employers' strength 
brought in its train the development of the workers' 
movement and of its consciousness. Indeed, the period leading 
up to the First World War is one in which the workers'
movement makes considerable gains, particularly in 
relationship to the length of the working day, and trade 
union recognition. This was especially the case in the 
northern industrial zones, particularly Vizcaya. Here, 
militant strikes were carried out against the advice of 
the national leadership of the U.G.T., who advised arbi­
tration. It was these kind of militant strikes however, 
whch brought about the quadrupling of the membership in 
Vizcaya.
In Catalonia during the same period, militant syndicalist 
tactics continued to predominate, despite the absence of 
the C.N.T. from the trade union field. For Catalan employers 
refused to recognise the 1900 law regarding women and children 
in the textile industry, and the 1913 general strike was an 
attempt to enforce this law. The success of the 1913 general 
strike, which gave the ten-hour day legal status, was not 
recognised by the employers, and thus forced workers to strike 
again and again_for the same demand. This level of intransigence 
shown by the Catalan employers, and their non-recognition of 
the state, explains the continuing relevance of militant, 
direct action syndicalism in Catalonia, and why Socialist 
Party influence was minimal.
Working class organisation got a further boost by the 
industrial expansion which took place during the First 
World War. But industrial expansion also brought crisis 
to sectors of agriculture, which increased emigration to the 
large cities, and led to high levels of inflation. High 
prices and the continuing refusal of the Catalan textile 
employers to honour the ten-hour day decree, led to another 
important general strike in the textile industry in 1916, 
which was particularly violent with troops being used 
against the workers. Indeed, most industrial regions in 
Spain were affected by strikes in 1915 and 1916, as the war 
had severely affected workers' living standards. The large
-  0f\  -
number of general strikes, and their duration and militancy, 
again shows the level of development of the workers' 
movement, and of its consciousness.
The growing militancy of sections of its membership , 
especially in Asturias, was the major reason for the U.G.T.'s 
agreement to join the C.N.T. in general strike action in
1916, in an effort to get the government take some action 
on living costs. This peaceful, but successful general 
strike by the two labour unions did not however bring about 
any government initiative, despite attempts by the U.G.T. 
to mediate. But the 1916 general strike laid the basis for 
a much more important attempt in 1917, during a time of 
political euphoria, when it seemed that, at last, profound 
political changes were in the offing.
The 1917 crisis in Spain showed striking
similarities to the Russian movement, and many of the forces 
which would converge in the February revolution were present 
during 1917 in Spain. Spain however, unlike Russia, had not 
intervened during the First World War, and therefore did 
not have at its disposal a peasant army, nor a demand that 
could unite the disparate forces for change i.e. peace.
The state in Spain did not collapse, and indeed the gover­
nment had showed a striking amount of cunning in provoking the 
August strike before it had been sufficiently prepared, 
and by acceeding to the demands of the various groups separa­
tely. But the crucial event, and that which decided the 
Catalan bourgeoisie to continue in the ruling alliance, was 
the revolutionary strike waged by both Socialists and 
anarchists in August. Again, the 1917 state crisis displays 
the strength of the landowning / military elite, and its 
power to "assimilate" the bourgeoisie, within the context 
of a highly organised and combative working class, whose 
power and determination had been seen in action in August
1917.
The repercussions of the 1917 strike failure within the 
two Spanish labour unions were dramatic. The Socialists 
believed that the 1917 failure had proved decisively 
that frontal attacks on the state were doomed to failure, 
and committed themselves to a parliamentary strategy. For 
the C.N.T., the 1917 attempt had proved that there was no 
possibility of "reforming" the Spanish state, and thus 
reaffirmed fundamental notions of the anarchist view of 
the state and parliamentary politics, and radicalised the 
C.N.T. in an increasingly anarchist direction. The 
Socialists' espousal of parliamentary struggle further 
reaffirmed anarchist notions of the state, and also contri­
buted to a radicalisation in an anarchist direction.
1917 had also given a taste of what revolutionary power 
was like, and showed that a frontal assault on the state 
was possible.
Therefore the great dilemna posed to the anarchist workers' 
movement - between the commitment to the greatest democracy 
possible, and the urgent need for revolutionary change - 
was posed more forcefully in 1917 than ever before in its 
history. For, given the nature of the military state and 
the power wielded by Catalan industrialists and southern 
latifundists, radicalisation also meant a renewed commitment 
to democratic change, which would bring about a more equal 
distribution of power, and where individual freedom would 
be respected and production boosted by a regime of workers' 
control.
The dilemna appeared to be solved by the successful 
Bolshevik revolution. For Russia, more than any other 
country in Europe, more closely resembled Spain - a large 
peasantry and landworking class, a small but extremely 
combative proletariat, and an authoritarian state where 
the parliamentary process had very little meaning. The 
idea that peasants had seized the land, and that the workers
were running the factories - indeed workers' control had 
been established throughout Russian society - had a tremen­
dous impact on the most radicalised sectors of the 
Spanish workers' movement, in Andalusia and Catalonia.
The fact that a socialist revolution had been successfully 
carried through, and had solved the economic problem - which, 
for Spanish anarchists was the basis for all other freedoms - 
almost totally overwhelmed the C.N.T., and dispelled the 
ideological doubts they had. Moreover, the nature of the 
Russian revolution in its early stages - the crucial role 
played by the trade unions and the popular masses, whose 
radicalisation had "pushed" the Bolsheviks into revolu­
tionary action - seemed to suggest that here was a revolu­
tionary movement which showed striking similarities to the 
anarchists' own vision of the revolutionary process, and 
thus reaffirmed anarchist notions. For the anarchists, 
unlike the revolutionary syndicalists, had always argued 
the need for a "sphere" outside of the trade unions. For 
Bakunin, this "sphere" would be the leadership, which 
would not "lead" in the Marxist sense, but be the repository 
of revolutionary values and action - in essence its role 
would be educational and exemplary. Kropotkin, while not 
totally dismissing the importance of leadership, placed 
greater emphasis on the commune, a "sphere" which, by its 
nature, was more democratic, and which would counterbalance 
"reformist" and bureaucratic "leaderist" tendencies within 
the anarchist movement.
It is not surprising therefore, that the anarchists within 
the C.N.T., who had always pointed to the limitations of 
"pure syndicalism", should view the Bolshevik revolution 
more favourably. This was particularly so in 1917, as the 
August revolutionary strike, and its failure, had posed 
the question of revolutionary power in a more immediate 
manner than ever before. It was certainly with this 
failure in mind that greater centralisation was introduced
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within the C.N.T. unions in 1918, with the creation 
of the industrial unions (the Sindicatos Unicos) in each 
major branch of production. But this measure of centralisa­
tion had also been thrust upon the C.N.T. by the industrial 
growth which had occurred during the First World War, which 
brought with it a massive influx of members, and the growth 
in the strength of the employers. Thus, the question of 
revolutionary power was integrally linked to the consolidation 
of trade union power, a point which united both revolu­
tionary syndicalists and anarchists within the C.N.T.
The continuing allegiance of Spanish anarchists to democratic 
trade unionism, can also be seen in the attempt to harmonise 
greater efficiency in the struggle of the unions against 
the employers - the structure of the Sindicatos Unicos - 
with freedom of action of the individual unions within the 
C.N.T.
Moreover, at the same congress in 1918, where the Sindicato 
Unico was approved, the fear that mass unionism would lead 
to a bureaucratisation of the C.N.T. led to the rejection 
o^ permanent trade union funds, and the remumeration of 
the leadership. Even when the euphoria which accompanied 
the Russian revolution was at its height, at the 1919 
congress when the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was 
approved, the fear of an undemocratic syndicalism had not 
diminished. The U.G.T.'s appendage role vis-à-vis the 
Socialist Party,which was increasingly subordinating the 
trade union struggle to Socialist electoral policy, was 
crucial in establishing the norm that a trade union dele- 
gateship could not be held together with a political post. 
Thus, the development of a trade union and political power, 
in the hands of the few, was still seen to be one of the major 
dangers affecting the workers' movement, as it led, neces­
sarily to the loss of control by the rank and file.
Thus, even at the high point of revolutionary euphoria 
which accompanied the Russian revolution, the anarchists 
within the C.N.T. remained committed to syndicalism, 
despite their suspiciousness of a syndicalism which 
solely dealt with worker's wages and living conditions.
For their disagreements with the revolutionary syndicalists 
was not over tactics, or the crucial role that the trade 
unions should play in the revolutionary process, but over 
the pace of revolutionary change, and the need for an 
ideological definition which would direct syndicalist 
practice towards an anarchist goal. For the anarchists 
within the C.N.T., as workers and workers' leaders, were 
fully aware of the need for a militant syndicalism in the 
context of an intransigent employer class, and the repressive 
nature of the Spanish state. This was reinforced considerably 
by the success of syndicalist tactics during the Canadiense 
strike in January 1919, when Barcelona was practically 
controlled by workers, and the eight-hour day finally 
conceded.
Therefore, by 1919, the anarchists within the C.N.T. had 
accepted the need for a greater degree of centralisation, 
as a result of the 1917 movement and the success of the 
Sindicatos Unicos in the Canadiense strike. But this cen­
tralising trend had to be kept within certain bounds, 
allowing individual trade unions freedom of action, and 
the local federation powers of decision-making. While the 
Russian Revolution seemed to affirm that a "shere" outside 
of the trade unions was needed to carry-out a successful 
revolution, this point was not given much attention by the 
anarchists within the C.N.T., overwhelmed as they were by 
the mere fact that the economic problem had been resolved. 
Thus the relationship between the party and the trade union 
was still an "open" question, and indeed it was on this 
point - the relationship between the Party and the 
trade unions - that the anarchists within the C.N.T. were 
most suspicious of the revolutionary process in Russia.
The central question posed by the Bolshevik Revolution 
- the role of the party within the revolutionary process - 
was therefore "blurred" under the impact of the Russian 
Revolution, a revolution which, in almost all other respects, 
seemed to resemble the anarchists' own vision of revolutio­
nary change. Undoubtedly the greater centralisation 
undertaken within the C.N.T. from 1918 made anarchists 
more sympathetic to the centralising role of the Bolsheviks 
in the Russian Revolution, and contributed to the feeling 
that the revolutionary developments in Russia closely 
resembled their own. But given the other measures taken by 
the C.N.T. - under anarchist pressure - it would seem that 
the role of the Bolsheviks, and the degree of centralisation 
which this represented, would only be acceptable so long 
as the revolution maintained its democratic trade unionist 
character, and the "party" did not consolidate itself in 
a dictatorial manner. For, as we have seen, despite the 
enormous impact which the successful revolution in Russia 
had upon the C.N.T., the anarchists within the organisation 
did not relinquish their belief in the syndicalist character 
of revolutionary change, and their idea that workers' 
control was the only way of bringing about democratic 
change and regenerating Spanish society. Indeed, the 
Russian Revolution was greeted with wild enthusiasm 
precisely because it was believed that a regime of workers' 
control had been established in Russian society, despite 
the reservations many anarchists had vis-à-vis the role 
of the party.
This continuing commitment to democratic syndicalism has to 
be seen in the context of the developments in Spain, 
particularly in Catalonia, from 1917. For the Russian 
revolutionary events coincided with the growth of mass 
unionism, when workers' struggle was not just about wages 
and working conditions, but about the granting of trade 
union recognition.
The Canadiense was, above all, a strike for trade union 
recognition. Thus, the class struggle in Catalonia was 
integrally linked to democratic demands.
the C.N.T. was even willing to postpone 
its economic plans for Spanish society, when it unofficially 
adhered to the Left alliance of 1917. This reflects, I 
believe, the great importance the Spanish masses, parti­
cularly in Catalonia, placed on democratic change, a change 
which would allow labour organising and bring about changes 
in the power relationships within society. But the attempt 
at political change in 1917, like many similar attempts 
throughout the 19th. century, failed, and its failure 
produced a reaffirmation of fundamental anarchist notions 
on the nature of the state and the political process. And 
this renewal of anarchism also reinforced its extreme 
democracy, as the democratic demands of 1917 had not been 
fulfilled and were therefore still on the political agenda. 
Indeed, these democratic demands must surely have been 
reinforced considerably during these years of intense class 
warfare, when the Catalan employers engaged in revenge 
killings, and kept blacklists of all those known to have 
taken part in syndicalist activities.
The failure of the Spanish bourgeoisie to bring about 
democratic changes in Spanish society therefore placed 
the democratic aspirations of Spanish society in the 
working class movement. In its hands, democracy would 
take on a broader meaning, but would retain a commitment 
to plurality, and an abhorrence of "one-party" rule. As we 
have seen, the notion of democracy - workers' control - 
was directly related to production. Given the unenterprising 
nature of the Spanish elites, both rural and urban, the 
task of regenerating Spanish society was seen increasingly 
to come from the workers themselves, by their control over 
production.
For one of the major reasons for Spain's crises, both 
agrarian and industrial, was the role of patronage politics, 
where two parties, with very little to distinguish one 
from the other, alternated in power and shared the "spoils 
of office", creating in the process a whole network of 
corruption and bureaucracy which impeded production and 
growth. The Spanish workers' movement, particularly in 
Catalonia where the burdens of this mismanagement of 
production were most acutely felt, had a "first-hand" 
knowledge of the problems of party control of the state, 
where lack of democracy led inevitably to inefficiency 
and corruption. Therefore in 1920, when news began trickling 
into Spain about the nature of the Russian revolution, 
essentially that the "dictatorship of the proletariat" was 
increasingly becoming the dictatorship of the party 
"over the proletariat", there was an immediate distancing 
of the Catalan workers' movement from the Russian experience. 
Of course there was an ample dissemination of this news by 
both Socialists and anarchists alike, which shows, I believe, 
that neither wing of the Spanish workers' movement was 
enthusiastic about a party dictatorship. But more importantly 
for the C.N.T., was the fact that revolutionary change, 
the conquest of power, was no longer on the agenda. The 
dilemna - between the commitment to the greatest democracy 
possible, and the urgent need for revolutionary change - 
which presented itself so forcefully between 1917 and 1919, 
had, by 1920, lost much of its raison d'Stre. For the 
industrial growth of the First World War, which underlay 
the mass unionism of the C.N.T., was now giving way to 
severe economic crisis, while the consolidation of the 
Soviet regime brought forth a concerted reaction from the 
state and the employers to end the revolutionary turmoil 
of the previous years. The draconian repression unleashed 
by Martinez Anido from September 1920, would seriously 
weaken the C.N.T., and lead it inexorably towards "revenge" 
killings and shoot-outs, in an escalating three-cornered 
struggle with the employers, the state and the "yellow" 
union, the Sindicato Libre.
1920 : The ending of revolutionary hopes.
Anarchism in Crisis.
Thus, when the revolutionary strike wave had receded, in 
1920, and the anarchists realised that their former 
intoxication with the Russian Revolution had been proved 
illusory, Spanish anarchism underwent a severe crisis.
It now seemed, indeed, that the revolutionary syndicalists 
had been proved correct, and that any "sphere" outside 
of the trade unions had the potential to subjugate workers 
and create new types of hierarchies. Moreover, despite the 
enormous impact the Russian Revolution had upon the 
C.N.T., this had not seriously threatened the revolutionary 
syndicalist character of the organisation, nor had any 
ideological "revision" taken place within the C.N.T.
The decline in anarchist fortunes was further exacerbated 
by the economic recession begun in 1920, which dictated 
a "syndicalist survival" strategy for the trade unions, in 
an attempt to protect workers' wages and living standards, 
and maintain the existence of the C.N.T.
But alongside the development of the C.N.T. into a mass 
union, and the growth in prestige of syndicalist leaders 
such as Segui and PestaTia, was the development of anarchist 
action groups, composed mainly of young radicals who had 
been deeply impressed by the Russian Revolution. Their 
position within the C.N.T. had been strengthened by their 
ability to deal with certain intransigent employers, in 
a "gun to the head" type trade union bargaining. While the 
economic recession of 1920 dictated a "syndicalist survival" 
strategy on the trade unions, employer intransigence and 
their policy of "revenge", aided by state repression, 
continued to keep anarchist influences alive within the 
C.N.T., even during the period of greatest crisis for the 
anarchists within the C.N.T., from 1920 to 1922.
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The anarchist decline begun in 1920 was reversed after the 
re-establishment of constitutional guarantees in April 1922, 
when a massive strike wave was launched by workers. This 
was contested by increased employer repression and a
growing reliance on the Sindicato Libre to eliminate the 
C.N.T. Undoubtedly the important part the action groups 
played in the armed warfare which took place daily on the 
streets of Barcelona, enhanced their prestige within the 
C.N.T., as did the assassination of their foremost "reformist 
opponent, Seguí, in March 1923. The C.N.T. was further radica 
Used by the climate of political crisis which prevailed 
during the few years which preceded the dictatorship of 
Primo, and is reflected in the committees of the organisation 
which, by 1923, were dominated by the anarchists. But despite 
this radicalisation, and the revolutionary proposals of 
"Los Solidarios", the organisation was too weakened from 
the repression of the previous years, and unable to carry 
through any of its revolutionary plans. The "moderation" 
of revolutionary syndicalist leaders such as Peiró, therefore 
prevailed, and the C.N.T. unofficially adhered to the Leftist 
coalition headed by the Catalan leader Maciá.
The "Nature" of the C.N.T. : the "reformist" and "radical" 
split.
The military dictatorship of Primo de Rivera was installed 
in September 1923, and finally brought to an end the 
revolutionary period begun in 1917. Despite the severe 
weakening of the C.N.T.'s trade union organisation by 
1923, the major forces within it - revolutionary syndi­
calists and anarchists - had seen their revolutionary 
visions confirmed. For while the events from April 1922 
had radicalised sectors of the C.N.T., and shown that a 
revolutionary solution was needed, the serious weakening 
of the organisation after the fierce repression imposed
a "moderate" strategy of alliance with other forces on the 
Left. Curiously, Spanish historical development from 
1920 had strengthened both anarchism and revolutionary 
syndicalism, and reinforced their revolutionary conceptions. 
Moreover, this took place against the backdrop of the 
"failure" of the Russian revolution, which seemed to prove 
decisively, to both tendencies, the fundamental correctness 
of their revolutionary strategies.
And it is against this background - the reinforcement of
revolutionary syndicalist and anarchist conceptions -
that the subsequent division of the C.N.T. in 1932 should
be seen. These divisions also reveal the nature of the
C.N.T., and its relationship to Spanish historical develoment.
Undoubtedly the divisions within the C.N.T. reflect divisions
within the rank and file, between old and young members,
between different industries, and the attitude of the
employers, and their ability to organise in the face of(3)labour pressure. .It could also be the case, as in the
1890's, that the most militant workers, those who would
support anarchist positions within the trade unions, were
new, and frequently young workers in expanding industries,
who were fighting for trade union recognition in previously
( 4 )unorganised sectors. .
The revolutionary syndicalist sector could be said to 
represent workers who had achieved some degree of trade 
union recognition, in sectors where the employers had been 
unable to organise. This was certainly the case with 
Sabadell, centre of "reformist" power in the 1930's, which 
had, by 1920, achieved a non-contributory pension scheme 
from the employers. However, if Spanish historico-political 
development reinforced these divisions at times, at others 
it blew them apart. For example, the onset of economic 
recession in 1920 dictated a "syndicalist survival" strategy 
on the trade unions, but the continuing "revenge" tactics 
of the Catalan employers, and state repression, kept the 
tempo of class warfare at a high level, and assured the 
continuing presence of armed anarchist groups within the 
C.N.T.
It would seem that clandestinity and illegality, given 
the nature of the Catalan employers and the Spanish state, 
engendered both "pure syndicalism", i.e. retreat tactics by 
the trade unions, and small groups of anarchists engaged 
in armed struggle. These types of divisions would be 
shattered however, when legal organising allowed workers 
to engage in strike activity, as from April 1922. A strike 
"explosion", stimulated by the climate of political crisis, 
was contested by employers' revenge actions, and led the 
action groups to increase their armed defence, in an esca­
lating spiral of violence and conflict. At these times of 
open and violent class conflict, even unions without a 
grievance of their own would strike in solidarity, outraged 
at the treatment . meted-out to their fellow workers, and 
thus extend and deepen the conflict.
Undoubtedly the structure of the C.N.T., based on the local 
federation where workers from different trades were repre­
sented, heightened this solidarity, and halted the develop­
ment of a "corporate" consciousness. The easy accessibility 
to positions of leadership, which allowed "radicals" and 
"reformists" to come to the fore at different times, was 
also an important factor in maintaining the "flexibility" 
required of an organisation which at times was engaged in 
“survival", and at others in massive revolutionary strike 
action. This can be seen in the dominance of a "reformist /
political" leadership towards the end of the Primo dicta­
torship, which was overthrown by the "radicals" in 1931 
under the pressure of the revolutionary strike wave which 
accompanied the first year of the Republic.
The C.N.T.'s trade union structure was therefore uniquely equipped to deal with the conditions which Spanish historico- 
political development imposed, for it kept it within the 
organisation "reformist" sectors which could be potentially 
revolutionary, in the context of state and employer repression. 
Certainly this is the reason why the anarchists within the 
C,N.T. always defended the local federation as the revolu­
tionary unit, against the federations of industry proposed
by the revolutionary syndicalists, seeing in the latter 
the development of a "corporate" trend already clearly 
visible within the U.G.T. But there was always the 
danger that the "reformist" direction which the organisation 
was forced to take at times would end up implanting itself 
firmly, and lastingly within the C.N.T. For while state 
and employer repression radicalised sectors of the C.N.T., 
it also "wore workers down", and bred disillusionment and 
"reformism". Undoubtedly the fierce repression from 1920, 
particularly under Martinez Anido, corresponding as it did 
to the disillusionment felt at the failure to bring about 
any substantial political change in Spain, must have taken 
a heavy toll on C.N.T. militants, and led many to seek 
alliances with other forces on the Left, in the context 
of a strong military right.
Certainly the existence of a strong "syndicalist" current 
was evident within the C.N.T. in the 1920's, although this 
development had of course accompanied the rise of the C.N.T. 
to mass union status. But it was the "political notion" 
approved in 1922, which called on the C.N.T. to engage in 
"responsible" action, and to take its place in national 
politics, which really began to worry the anarchists within 
the C.N.T. For, with the founding of the Communist Party 
in 1921, syndicalism as integrator of the diverse tendencies 
of the working class had patently failed, while the anarchist 
content of the C.N.T. was also threatened by ex-cenetistas 
who wanted to win the rank and file to Communism. It was from 
then onwards that the notion of a "specifically anarchist 
workers' movement" was put forward, to protect the anarchist 
character of the C.N.T., and in thus doing prevent the 
organisation from becoming a purely defensive organisation 
under capitalism.
Anarchist "renewal" in the 1920's.
Despite the crisis which Spanish anarchism underwent in the 
early 1920's, it had, however survived, and in so doing,
/
renewed itself. The renewal of Spanish anarchism in the 
1920's took place with reference to the Russian revolutionary 
experience and its failure, which suggested that fundamental 
anarchist principles of democracy and the importance of the 
masses' spontaneity had been proved historically correct.
Thus, specifically anarchist notions i.e. those which 
differed most fundamentally from Marxism, were now stressed.
The "humanist" and moral content of anarchism was emphasised, 
as opposed to the restricted "economistic" nature of both 
Marxism and syndicalism. Kropotkinism, with its extreme 
democratic principles and exhaltation of the commune, was 
a major source for this renewal. With its strong moral tone, 
and its suspiciousness of trade unionism, anarcho-communism 
seemed to address the problems which were now besetting the 
Spanish anarchist movement. It is to this period that we 
detect the growth of an anarchist "orthodoxy", opposed both 
to the limitations of syndicalism, and to the purely 
"materialist" and undemocratic aspects of Marxism. This 
"orthodoxy", centred around the magazine "Tierra y Libertad", 
had of course always existed within the C.N.T., but its 
influence had been circumcribed by the factthat most anarchists 
up till then had never seriously questioned the "syndicalist" 
character of the C.N.T., and the growth of pro-Bolshevik 
groups from 1917 had further weakened its appeal. The 
anarchists of "Tierra y Libertad", essentially Kropotkinist, 
argued that in view of the failure of the Russian Revolution, 
anarchist activity should now centre around education, and 
engage in a critical opposition. While not totally hostile 
to trade unionism, this current would attempt to address 
more "general human interests" than that of class, and 
laid great emphasis on the importance of "personal"" 
change within the revolutionary process.
These trends which developed within the “orthodoxy" 
affected, to a greater or lesser extent, the whole of the 
Spanish anarchist movement in the 1920's. Indeed, it is
during the 1920's that a certain "flowering" and diversi­
fication of anarchism took place in Spain, with the creation 
of "naturist", nudist and vegetarian groups, and a reinforcement 
of the belief that "anarchism is a way of life". Despite 
these developments, the experience of the Russian Revolution, 
and its impact upon the C.N.T., did not wholly disappear.
The legacy of the Russian Revolution and the 1917 revolu­
tionary period in Spain is seen most clearly in the thought 
of the group "Los Solidarios", led by Garcia Oliver and 
Durruti, members of the action groups who had gained much 
prestige from their gunfights with the employers and the 
Sindicato Libre, and had helped to sustain the infrastructure 
of the C.N.T. by robberies, during the terrible repression 
of the organisation from 1920 to 1923. It was during the 
years of political crisis which preceded the coup of Primo 
that "Los Solidarios" developed their revolutionary credo, 
essentially an attempt to carry through a revolutionary trans­
formation while avoiding a dictatorship on the Soviet model.
It was to forstall the impending coup that "Los Solidarios" 
centralised their activities, and proposed the setting-up 
of a centralised trade union militia, a revolutionary 
army which would carry through the revolution, and guarantee 
the success of the C.N.T. They also proposed the penetration 
of army ranks, which, they believed, was imperative for 
revolutionary success. They believed that this "dictatorship" 
would avoid the pitfalls of the Russian experience by being 
transitory and insurrectional, non-statist and syndicalist, 
which would keep the masses' involved through a network 
of federal revolutionary committees. Above all, however, 
they stressed the importance of the "kind of leadership" 
which would oversee these revolutionary changes - a leadership 
imbued with libertarian ideology which would encourage 
popular participation, and work together with other forces 
on the Left to bring about a "regeneration" of Spanish society.
Thus, the success and failure of the Russian Revolution 
produced a renewal of Bakuninism within the C.N.T. Certainly 
the events of 1917 were crucial in developing a specifically 
Spanish "synthesis" of revolutionary syndicalism, and 
aspects of Kropotkinism and Bakuninism, a hybrid 
"anarcho-syndicalism" which would characterise large sections 
of the C.N.T. For while anarchists within the C.N.T. were 
increasingly aware of the limitations of "pure syndicalism", 
which strengthened their Kropotkinist and Bakuninist beliefs, 
Spanish anarchists, as workers, continued to see the need 
for trade unions and militant syndicalist tactics in their 
struggle with the employers. Undoubtedly the Russian revo­
lutionary experience reinforced their belief that the 
democratic organisations of the working class were an 
important guarantee that the revolution would retain its 
democratic character. The crucial question was of course 
the relationship between the trade unions and the "sphere" 
outside of it, the question which had remained "open" from 
1917, but which, during the crisis of the C.N.T. which Primo' 
dictatorship unleashed, now became imperative for the 
survival of anarchism to answer.
The Primo Dictatorship : the state's changing relationship 
to labour.
While the solution to the problems within the C.N.T., the 
problems of "syndicalist" deviation and Marxist penetration, 
were increasingly seen by anarchists to lie in the creation 
of a "specifically anarchists' workers' movement", it was 
the setting-up of state arbitration in labour disputes 
under Primo in 1926, which finally led to that goal being 
realised in 1927, with the founding of the Anarchist 
Iberian Federation (FAI). The search for an ideological 
definition for the C.N.T. had of course begun in 1917, in 
response to the Russian Revolution, and had led to
"libertarian communism" being declared the goal of the 
C.N.T. in 1919. The revolutionary syndicalists had always 
opposed a precise definition of the C.N.T., believing 
that all workers "whatever their ideology" had a place 
within the C.N.T., as it was within the trade unions that 
education and preparation for future society took place.
But the respite from trade union work which the dictatorship 
imposed gave both tendencies the opportunity to develop 
their positions, and by 1925 the battle lines were clearly 
drawn. Any attempt to legalise the organisation, the anar­
chists argued, would mean a revision of the anarchist nature 
of the C.N.T. Undoubtedly there were real fears that sectors 
of the organisation would use the machinery set-up by the 
dictatorship to resolve disputes, as one of the foremost 
syndicalist leaders, Pestaña, was urging precisely that 
strategy. It was in response to these developments that 
the FAI, protector of the anarchist content of the C.N.T., 
was founded in 1927.
The growing division and demarcation of positions within 
the C.N.T. during the years of Primo's dictatorship have 
to be seen in the context of the relative boom of the early 
Primo years, and the changing relationship Ofirthe state to 
labour. For while Primo's dictatorship was installed to 
put an end to the "syndicalist menace" in Barcelona, and the 
massive upheavals in the south the strength of the
labour movement shown during these years,and the need for 
some "dialogue" with labour to carry through industrial 
expansion, underlay the comités paritarios initiative.
The unique character of the Primo dictatorship is seen 
in the fact that Largo Caballero was the Socialist Minister 
of Labour, and the machinery of arbitration was largely 
run by UGT members. Undoubtedly one of the main motives 
for Largo's collaboration was to undermine the C.N.T., and 
this fact was not lost on C.N.T. members, who argued that if
they did not use the machinery at their disposal, the 
UGT would do it, and anarcho-syndicalist influences would 
suffer a serious reversal within the trade unions. While 
this was a minority sentiment within the C.N.T. at this 
time, the recognition of the legality of the state which 
this implied would form the basis for the division within 
the organisation in 1932.
Again, illegality and clandestinity reinforced these 
divisions, but now in a much more heightened fashion. For 
the boom of the early Primo years must surely have led to 
an increase in workers' standard of living in some sectors, 
which reinforced their "syndicalist" approach, while in 
others who were not so lucky, a "syndicalist survival 
strategy" was deemed the best way to protect their unions 
under the restrictions imposed by the dictatorship. But 
it also led to the creation of small anarchist groups, and 
indeed there was a steady growth of these until the crack­
down in 1928. The decimation of the anarchist groups in 
that year led to a strengthening of the "syndicalists" 
within the C.N.T., who now formed groups within the trade 
unions set-up by the dictatorship.
The Founding of the FAI. 1927.
While the founding of the FAI in 1927 was in large part 
to halt the growing "syndicalist" consciousness of sectors 
of the C.N.T., it was also the culmination of a process 
which had begun in 1917, but which was seen to be even more 
necessary after the "failure" of the Russian Revolution.
The isolation of the Spanish anarchist movement interna­
tionally after 1920 was exacerbated by the growing distance 
from other working class organisations in Spain. Although 
little result was achieved, the Communist Party had 
participated electorally in 1923, while the Socialist
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Party was junior partner in a dictatorship which had 
been installed primarily to eliminate the C.N.T. This 
growing isolation led Spanish anarchists to establish 
contacts with other anarchist movements, such as Argentina 
and Portugal, countries which economically and culturally 
were closer to their own. This only served to further 
strengthen their resolve that anarchism, to survive 
this onslaught, had to organise its own forces, (which 
gave to sections of the FAI a missionary character), and 
to engage in "putschist" tactics within the trade unions, 
tactics hotly condemned by other libertarians within the 
C.N.T.
The Republic and the C.N.T.
Indeed, it is often claimed that it was the "putchist"
tactics of the radicals within the C.N.T. which led to the
overthrow of the "syndicalist / political" leadership in
1931, and led to the reversal, the facto, of the
federations of industry proposal, approved at the 1931
congress. But it would be difficult to see a leadership,
which argued for a dialogue with the Republican regime,
continuing in its post during the radicalisation which
took place during 1931. The massive strike wave of
1930 and 1931 was greatly radicalised by the maintenance
of the mixed juries system, again under Largo's tutelage,
who continued to believe that this was the way to
undermine the C.N.T. The repression used against the
in 1931,C.N.T. during the Telephone strike^clearly showed the 
nature of the Republican / Socialist coalition, which 
aimed to carry through a "bourgeois revolution" in Spain.
The difficulties of this task without the support of the 
bourgeoisie, and in the context of severe economic crises, 
led to a great radicalisation of both Socialist and anarchist
workers, and increased the determination of the right 
to totally reverse the Republican reform programme and 
bring the "chaos" to an end.
The divisions within the C.N.T. were brought clearly to 
the surface during the first Republican years. The radicals, 
such as Garcia Oliver, argued that the Republic should 
not be given time to stabilise itself, nor the right the 
opportunity to organise itself,, and therefore proposed 
a theory of "revolutionary gymnastics" to keep up the 
revolutionary tempo. The syndicalists, such as Peiro, believed 
that the C.N.T. should strengthen its trade union organi­
sational efficiency, and accept Republican legality, as 
revolutionary change was not on the agenda. These different 
strategies were highlighted when the FAI led an insurrec­
tionary attempt at Alto Llobregat in January 1931. The lack 
of solidarity shown by the Treintistas during the repression 
which followed was the direct cause for their expulsion in 
April 1932.
Undoubtedly the Treintistas represented sectors of the 
C.N.T. whose situation may even have improved during the 
first years of the Republic, or older workers who had been 
active for many years, and whose fighting energies had been 
somewhat depleted. Certainly the industrial towns where the 
Trientistas had their power base in Catalonia did not suffer 
so severely the effects of the acute agrarian crises, which 
kept a steady stream of immigrants coming into Barcelona, 
which, moreover, had a strongly organised employer class.
For, while the whole of Spain was affected by the radica- 
lisation of these years, it was in the latifundist region 
in the south, and in Barcelona where this process went 
furthest. As Preston has pointed out, the years of class 
warfare in the south, the "Trienio Bolshevique" from 
1918 to 1921, left such a legacy of bitterness that 
"reformist" solutions were impossible in the 1930's. I 
would argue that the years of terrible repression, and
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the gunfights on the streets of Barcelona, would leave 
a legacy of bitterness here too, which would greatly 
impede "reformist" solutions. It was in these regions 
especially that the employers refused to recognise the 
reformsdecreed by the first Republican government, and 
thus ensured that class conflict would remain at a high 
level. The continuing use of state repression against 
the labour movement, despite the presence of Socialists 
in the government, was a further source of radicalisation, 
and led directly to the downfall of the first Socialist / 
Republican coalition in 1933.
It was the failure to resolve the land problem which 
sealed the fate of the first Republican / Socialist 
government. The acute agrarian cirses was exacerbated 
by the refusal of landowners to plant crops and abide by 
the reforms in working conditions, which created an insur­
rectionary situation in many parts of Spain. There is no 
doubt that the response to the FAI's call to insurrection 
in 1932 went far beyond what they had expected, and undoub­
tedly strengthened their belief that an insurrectionary 
strategy was correct. For their insurrectionary strategy 
was primarily addressed to rural workers, and was designed 
to keep the "land problem" to the fore. For there was a 
real danger during the first Republican years, that the 
divisions within the C.N.T. - between workers who had 
improved their standard of living and those whose living 
conditions had seriously deteriorated - would erode the 
solidarity so necessary for revolutionary change. Certainly 
the Treintistas within the C.N.T. represented more closely 
the vision- of sectors of industrial workers, and the FAI 
feared, with good reason, that the plight of the agricultural 
labourers in the south would be forgotten, and an "economic 
consciousness" steadily gain ground.
It was the lack of resolution of the land problem which 
led to the radicalisation of the Socialist movement during 
these years, as the UGT 's growth was primarily in the 
south amongst landless labourers. By 1933, when it was 
evident that even moderate reform was unacceptable to 
landowners, who were now organising their forces effectively 
to reverse the tide, revolutionary sentiments were increasin­
gly voiced by Socialist workers, which forced Largo
and the Socialist bureaucracy to echo these sentiments, 
ever fearful of a loss of membership. This radicalisation 
within Socialist ranks took place, as with the C.N.T., 
mostly amongst landworkers, the youth, and in industrial 
regions particularly affected by the economic crisis and 
the employers* unwillingness to recognise reform. The inroads 
that the C.N.T. and the Communists were making in the 
northern industrial zones, particularly Asturias, was 
undoubtedly worrying the Socialist bureaucracy, who increa­
sed their calls for revolution, a rhetoric which merely 
increased the fears of the middle classes and helped 
polarise the situation.
Revolution and the C.N.T.
The increasing realisation that bourgeois reform was 
impossible in Spain, and that a revolutionary solution was 
necessary, prompted C.N.T. militants to ask their leaders 
what form that revolution should take. The revolutionary 
schemas put forward by different sectors of the C.N.T. from 
1932 shows the heterogeneous nature of Spanish anarchist 
thought, and the changes taking place within international 
anarchism from the late 1920's. Despite the divergent nature 
of these revolutionary plans, all these visions retained 
one fundamental anarchist organisational principle - 
federalism, and all saw their plans in relationship to
Marxism, and the lessons to be drawn from the failure 
of the Russian Revolution.Moreover, all these "utopias" 
accepted modern technology as their bases, and indeed it 
is in rural ""utopia" of Urales and Esgleas that the 
benefits of modern technology is most highly stressed, 
as it would bring to an end the division between town 
and country by a rural industrialisation plan.
The fundamental differences between these projects lay in 
the nature of "this revolutionary change, whether urban 
or rural, and what should be the basic organising unit, 
the municipality, the trade union or the factory committee. 
All, except Urales, had by now accepted the need for the 
federations of industry, reflecting the changes within 
the international anarchist movement, which approved this 
organising measure at its congress;: in 1928. Moreover, 
anarchists such as Leval argued the need for a "minimum" 
programme, while Santillan, the anarchist most influenced by 
Marxist thought, called for planning and accepted the need 
for a unitary economic command during the first phase of 
revolutionary change.
One of the most interesting projects was the one put 
forward by Besnard and Cornellisson, a model based on 
the Bela Run Revolution in Hungary in 1919. Besnard argued 
that libertarian communism was a transitionary period, like 
the "dictatorship of the proletariat" in Marx and Engels,which 
would lay the basis for free communism, anarchism. Despite 
the important role which the trade unions would play within 
this process of transition, Besnard argued however that the 
basic cell should be the municipality, which, like the 
trade unions and the national federations of industry, would 
be federated, and would complement these economic organi­
sations. These two types of organisations would work 
together,and take decisions and carry through a programme 
of large works. This project was not dissimilar from Orobon
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Fernandez' notion of revolutionary working class unity, 
based on the Bavarian Republic of workers' councils of 1919 
where all working class tendencies participated. Like 
Besnard, he argued for a parallel structure of municipalities 
and trade unions, federated to the national level, which 
would carry out socialisation of the entire economy.
While Gaston Leval defended the federations of industry 
against the notion of the free commune, he too, like 
Besnard and 0rob<5n Fernandez, feared the effects of "total 
syndicalism", which, he argued, would lead the C . N . T .  to 
develop along similar lines as the Soviet State. But the 
problems thrown up by the Russian Revolution could not be 
ignored, he argued, which led him to propose different 
organising bodies for different functions : the trade unions 
in industry, the municipality in agriculture, while the 
cooperatives would control exchange.
But it was the thought of Abad de Santillan, proponent of a 
"less material" type of anarchism in the early 1920's, which 
clearly reflected the changes taking place within inter­
national anarchism in the late 1920's, and the greater 
importance now being given to economic questions. Santillan, 
like Peiro, believed that the factory committee would form 
the basis of the new society, although regional organisations 
would be important. While continuing to propose a federal 
organisation in place of the state, Santillan's thought in 
all other respects places him close to "orthodox" Marxism, 
particularly his rejection of localism and his belief that 
the productive method would not be changed in future socialist 
society, despite the change in social property.
The revolutionary schemas of Besnard and Cornelisson are of 
the most important historical interest, I believe, as they 
attempt to map-out a plan for immediate post-revolutionary
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society which breaks decisively with the Kropotkinist 
notion of instantaneous libertarian communist success.
Their acceptance of a transitional "libertarian dictatorship" 
is redolent of the plan put forward by "Los Solidarios" 
in the early 1920's which shows that these anarchists, 
like Leval, were not simply "reacting" to the Russian 
revolutionary experience, but have studied it in depth 
in order to avoid its errors. It was not on the question 
of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" that these 
anarchists disagree with Marxism, but on the organisational 
question. For Besnard, like Orobon Fernandez, had been 
deeply impressed by the workers' council experiment of 1919, 
and therefore proposed both municipal and trade union 
organisations as a way of limiting the power of the trade 
unions and halting the development of a "trade union / 
political" leadership on the Soviet model. These plans 
imply that a degree of delegation is needed to carry 
through the economic transformation, although this would 
be controlled by the rank and file. This type of revolu­
tionary schema places this anarchist tendency close to 
the "dissident" Marxism of Pannekoek, a Marxist who in 
many other respects had come to conclusions very similar 
to the anarchists. .
Again, as in 1919, the development of a revolutionary 
situation in Spain placed the dilemna - between the 
commitment to the greatest democracy possible, and the 
urgent need for revolutionary change - to the forefront 
of debate within the C.N.T. By the 1930's however, the 
revolutionary situation had developed considerably, reflec­
ted in the radicalisation taking place within the Socialist 
Party, and the establishment of "the dictatorship of the 
proletariat", de facto, by the FAI during their attempts 
at insurrection in 1932 and 1933. But the class struggle 
taking place in Spanish society was also reflected within
the working class organisations themselves, and exacerbated 
the uneveness of development of the revolutionary forces 
in Spain. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than 
during the Asturian commune of October 1934, when 
Socialist, anarchist and communist workers held out for 
two weeks against bombing raids and artillery, while the 
Socialist leadership in Madrid either hid or went into exile.(7).
The Impact of Asturias on the C.N.T.
The experience of the Asturian commune had a profound effect 
upon the C.N.T. The notion of workers' unity was now seen by 
the C.N.T. as possible, and the idea of the workers' front 
approved at the Zaragoza Congress in 1936 was a recognition 
of the revolutionary nature of the Socialist rank and file, 
displayed at Asturias in October 1934. Indeed, libertarian 
communism was renounced as the exclusive revolutionary 
ideal, and the federal socialist republican formula implicitly 
accepted. For the growth in the strength of the Right, shown 
by their electoral success in November 1933, and the severe 
repression suffered by the organisation after the insurrec­
tion of December 1933, had changed dramatically the thinking 
of the C.N.T., and ended the insurrection strategy of the 
FAI, begun at the onset of the Republic in 1931. The opposition 
trade unions within the C.N.T. had too undergone great changes 
in their thinking and strategy. Their disgust at the 
ending of all activities of the Workers' Alliance in 
preparation for the February elections brought home to 
them very forcefully the nature of "electoral politics", and 
their anarchist reflexes were further triggered^l^y the 
founding of Pestaha’s Syndicalist Party in 1933. More 
importantly perhaps was the realisation that the rank and 
file of the C.N.T. did not want their trade union to partici­
pate within the electoral arena, and the Treintistas were 
thus prevented from evolving in a more "political" direction.
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But their dealings with political parties through the 
Workers' Alliance had however convinced them of the need 
for a "political sphere" outside the trade unions, a need 
which they had already recognised "de facto" by setting­
up their own specific organisation, the FSL, to control 
the trade unions within the opposition, thus playing the 
same role as the FAI.
The thought of Santillan, a leading "faista", and Peiró, 
the ideologue of the "syndicalists", shows to what extent 
both tendencies had altered their thinking by 1936. Both 
recognised the need for a "political sphere" outside the 
trade unions, so long as it respected the plurality of 
parties and tendencies and allowed each to carry through its 
own preferred social system. Peiró however took this analysis 
one step further, and, like Cornellisson, recognised the 
existence of the state after the proletarian conquest of 
power. These unprecedented ideological changes within sectors 
of the C.N.T. did not wholly find an expression at the 
Zaragoza Congress of 1936, despite the huge ideological leap 
undertaken vis-à-vis workers’ unity and the adoption of 
the federal socialist republic. For the rural revolutionary 
model of Urales was approved as the definition of libertarian 
communism, and the free commune declared to be the basis 
of future society. The libertarian communist motion dealt 
in great detail with the organisation of future libertarian 
society, while the imminent fascist threat was simply 
ignored, as was the call from Santillan for at least an 
"hypothesis" programme. The approval of this motion has 
been seen as a victory for the "purist" tendency of the 
FAI, and the weight of the Textile trade union of Barcelona 
and the individual action of Urales' daughter, Federica 
Montsefty. ^ .
There is little doubt as to the increasing power that the 
FAI was wielding within the C.N.T., through its place on 
the prisoners' committees and defence committees. The role 
of the national defence committee, composed of FAI and 
C.N.T. members, and the blurred boundaries between these
two organisations, was demonstrated during the uprising 
of January 1933, when the Levante and Andalusian regions 
followed the call from the national defence committee of the 
FAI, believing that this had been issued by the C.N.T.
Greater centralisation had also accompanied the FAI ' s 
ascent to power within the organisation, as displayed 
during the January'33 insurrection, when all regions were 
asked to follow if one of the regions rebelled. Moreover, 
during their brief taste of power, when insurrection had 
led to the establishment of "libertarian communism", the 
FAI had shown no hesitation in setting-up small scale 
"dictatorships of the proletariat", although these were 
given the anarchist title of "committees for the defence 
of the revolution".
These developments were not recognised at Zaragoza, 
nor could they be, for the sole rraison'etre for the 
founding of the FAI in 1927 had been to guard against the 
Marxist menace and reformist deviations which were 
threatening the anarchist character of the C.N.T. Undoubtedly 
the increasing strength that the FAI was displaying within 
the C.N.T. was greatly aided by the split within the 
organisation in 1932. Certainly the Treintistds call for 
a dialogue with the Republic, its attitude towards strikes 
and its lack of solidarity was considered by large numbers 
of C.N.T. members as "reformist" during the first Republican 
years, and the faista call to insurrection had found good 
response in the rural zones. It was in this battle with 
the "reformist opposition" that the FAI leadership gained its 
revolutionary "mystique", and was forced, like the Trein- 
tistas, to increasingly rely on the "specific" organisation 
to control the trade unions within its orbit. The prestige 
which the faista leadership gained from its contest with 
the reformists led to the development of a "revolutionary 
orthodoxy unparalleled in C.N.T. history, which would continue 
to see its main task as preserving its own definition of
anarchism, enshrined at the Zaragoza Congress of 1936, long 
after that definition had any real meaning.
There were however, other factors which influenced the 
approval of the libertarian communist model of Urales.
For the alternative model of Peir6 was based entirely on 
the organisation of a highly industrialised society, a 
model of limited applicability in 1930's Spain, still over­
whelmingly agrarian. The resolution of the land question 
continued to be the most urgent problem in Spain, as the 
development of a revolutionary rural movement of these 
years bears out. Urales' plan, for all its limitations, 
did try to address this problem, which other sectors of 
the C.N.T. had either ignored or given limited attention.
But the fatal flaw of the Zaragoza Congress was its 
inability to deal with the fascist threat. Sections of 
the FAI, the anarcho-Bolsheviks of García Oliver and 
Durruti, were those most aware of this development, and 
called for urgent action from the C.N.T. This call was 
ignored. Instead, much of the time at the Congress was 
taken-up with outlining the nature of future libertarian 
society and the "new type" of personal relationships which 
would obtain. Never before in the history of the C.N.T. 
had such time and attention been given to this question, 
and it would seem that May 1936, was the most unlikely 
occasion to discuss it. But I would argue that, given the 
enormous changes in C.N.T. thinking - towards workers' 
unity and the acceptance of the federal socialist republic - 
it was now more important than ever to maintain libertarian 
communism as the goal of the C.N.T., just as in 1919 when 
the dictatorship of the proletariat was approved, the anar­
chists within the C.N.T. urged the C.N.T. to define itself 
by its libertarian communism.
However, the detailed description of "life in the new 
society" which the libertarian communist definition had 
acquired by 1936 demonstrates the changes which had taken 
place within the C.N.T. since 1919, when libertarian 
communism was simply stated as the goal of the C.N.T., 
and no attempt was made to define it, or limit it to any 
one particular anarchist conception of it. This does undou­
btedly reflect the importance which the Kropotkinist 
leadership had acquired by 1936, through its increasingly 
centralised control of the organisation through the FAI.
But the control which this "orthodoxy" was able to exert 
over the C.N.T. was still limited, as the motion on 
workers' unity and the acceptance of a federal republican 
socialist form of government demonstrates. For the class 
struggle taking place in Spanish society in the 1930's 
was also taking place within the C.N.T., and is especially 
reflected within the FAI itself. The FAI of Urales and 
Montseny was increasingly contested by the "activist" FAI 
of Oliver and Durruti, which undoubtedly enjoyed great 
prestige within the organisation. In view of the development 
of this "alternative FAI" leadership, and the ideological 
"revision” implied at the Zaragoza Congress, it was more 
important than ever for the Kropotkinist FAI to buttress 
its power ideologically to maintain its position of 
leadership.
The nature of the class struggle in Spain certainly contri­
buted to the victory of the extreme democratic schema of 
Urales,: and would mean that the disciplined militia proposed 
by the "Nosotros" group would have little resonance within 
the organisation. The continuing repressive nature of
the Spanish state towards the C.N.T., supported by the 
Socialists in government during the first Republican years, 
and the intransigent nature of the employers' class, parti­
cularly in Barcelona and Andalusia, continued to radicalise
the C.N.T. in a democratic direction, thus reinforcing 
the Kropotkinist aspects of Spanish anarchism. But the 
Republic had also led to the improvement of workers' 
living standards in certain sectors, and was, after all, 
the first major attempt at reform since 1873. These divisions 
are reflected in the split within the organisation in 1932.
The growth of the Right and the severe repression against 
the C.N.T. from 1933 undoubtedly highlighted the need for 
profound economic and democratic change, but also contri­
buted to a more ’realist" strategy of workers' unity and 
the establishment of a regime where all working class tendencies 
would be represented. Thus, the divisions within the C.N.T., 
which the Republic had exposed and developed, were based 
on two models of democracy, again displaying the lack of 
enthusiasm felt by workers in parts of Spain for a party 
dictatorship.
The example of the Socialist Party during Asturias must 
surely have reinforced these extreme democratic feelings 
within the C.N.T. For while the Asturian Commune convinced 
the C.N.T. of the revolutionary nature of the Socialist rank 
and file, the shameful role of the bureaucracy during these 
events, which displayed the emptiness of its revolutionary 
rhetoric, undoubtedly contributed to the "anti-bureaucratic" 
notions of the free commune gaining ground. But, given the 
increasingly centralised role which the FAI was playing 
within the C.N.T., the "free commune" notion was primarily 
for public consumption, to ensure the dominance of the 
Kropotkinist FAI, a "duplicity" which would characterise 
the C.N.T. during the years of Civil War and the long years 
of exile during Francoism. For by 1936, the C.N.T. had within 
its ranks currents which based their analysis of society 
on a libertarian vision which went further than merely 
"reacting" to the deformations of Marxism, and indeed were 
arguing for a greater "openness" between these two currents
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of socialism. However, the development of a leadership 
whose very existence depended on a dogmatic and unchanging 
view of anarchism, by its nature anti-Marxist, which 
exploited to the full the extreme democratic and anti-state 
feelings of its members, would continually prevent these 
currents from gaining expression within the C.N.T., and 
contribute greatly to the dramatic decline of anarchism 
in Spain in the late 1940's.
If it was in the struggle with the "reformists" within the 
C.N.T. during the Republic that a "revolutionary orthodoxy" 
was created, then it was the events of the Civil War which 
led to its increasing bureaucratisation and centralisation.
The great dilemna facing the C.N.T. when it had insured that 
Catalonia was saved from the military insurgents, was whether 
to establish a "dictatorship" or collaborate with other 
Republican forces. The decision to collaborate, while simul­
taneously carrying through socialist revolutionary change, 
reveals the underlying dilemna posed :te__the anarchist movement 
in Catalonia, and the unevemess of the development of the 
revolutionary forces in Spain. For Largo Caballero had not 
answered the C.N.T.'s call for a revolutionary working class 
alliance, showing that, despite his revolutionary rhetoric, 
Largo was thoroughly committed to the Comintern line of a 
"popular front against fascism". As Andalusia had fallen 
almost immediately to the military insurgents, the C.N.T. 
was isolated within Catalonia, and any attempt to set-up 
an anarchist "dictatorship" there would certainly have been 
seen as a secessionist act, and unlikely to have been tole­
rated for long. Internationally too, the anarchists were 
viewed with hostility by the Western democracies and the 
Soviet state, both of whom were trying to "hold off" the 
fascist threat and whose policies towards Spain were therefore 
seen purely in terras of "foreign policy". Indeed, the great 
tragedy of the Spanish Civil War was that the revolutionary 
forces in Spain had developed at a time when almost everywhere 
in Europe, excluding France, the workers'movement had 
already suffered an enormous defeat, and was now within a 
defensive alliance with the democratic forces against 
fascism.
/
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This international context would bear heavily on the 
Civil War, especially after the "missed opportunity" 
of the first days when workers could have ended the 
"military uprising" and avoided it becoming a full- 
fledged civil c o n t e s t . . The nature of the Spanish 
Civil War, which had been preceded by five years of intense 
class conflict, is well-summed up by the dilemi*e, "war or 
revolution", a dilemma which affected the anarchist movement 
particularly. For it would seem that the C.N.T., like the 
Socialist Party and the UGT, was deeply divided about the 
ability to sustain revolutionary changes within the inter­
national and domestic context which obtained, and was 
propelled towards collectivisation by its own rank and file. 
Simultaneously, large numbers of C.N.T. members wished for 
collaboration with the other forces of the Popular Front, 
believing this to be the only way to achieve victory 
over the military Right, a right increasingly indentified 
with the Axis powers. These divisions within the.C.N.T. 
reflect the great differences between regions which led 
to the uneven development of the revolutionary forces in 
Spain, and the enormous difficulties of success in the 
context of a strong Right and the growth of fascism in 
Europe.
It was indeed in Catalonia, particularly Barcelona, where 
the revolution "went furthest". But the collectivisation 
experiment and the popular militia, supported by the C.N.T., 
were viewed with alarm by Stalin, fearful of the effect 
this would have on the Western democracies, particularly 
France, and the consequences for Soviet foreign policy 
which it implied. The Communist Party therefore proceeded 
to build-up its basis of support within the Catalan small 
peasantry and the middle classes, who increasingly opposed 
the collectivisation measures decreed by the C.N.T. within 
the Generalitat. The C.N.T.'s collaboration within both 
the Generalitat and the central government was thus
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the major subject of debate and source of division within 
the Spanish anarchist movement. For Horacio Prieto, and 
the writer C.M. Lorenzo, government collaboration was not 
a great ideological "leap", but the culmination of a process 
which began on July 19th, when the C.N.T. led the struggle 
against the military insurgents. The various bodies which 
the C.N.T. dominated, such as the Council of Aragon, and the 
Committee of Public Safety in Malaga, reflected the power which 
the C.N.T. had in Spanish society, which would lead it 
inexorably towards government participation. They believe 
that the C.N.T. had no other choice but to collaborate, 
given the isolation of the anarchist movement internationally 
and on the domestic front. However, they argue that the 
C.N.T. should have developed a more coherent "political" 
strategy to deal with the Communist threat and protect 
the libertarian gains, and severely criticise. the "ad 
hoc improvisation" which characterised the C.N.T.'s colla- 
borationsit period. The centralisation undertaken within 
the C.N.T. during the Civil War is seen by Lorenzo as proof 
that a degree of centralisation .is inevitable, and necessary, 
and that libertarian ideology should recognise this, and 
not maintain the "fiction" of extreme democracy.
Indeed, Lorenzo argues that it was the "purists" within 
the C.N.T. who often went furthest in their bids for centra­
lisation, for example the founding of the executive committee 
at the war's end. Therefore, both Lorenzo and Prieto argue 
for a "revision" of libertarian philosophy which takes into 
account the experience of the C.N.T. throughout its history, 
particularly the experience of Civil War. Lorenzo argues that 
the C.N.T. did in fact recognise this need at the national 
plenum of September 1937, when it rejected the Zaragoza 
Congress resolutions and called for nationalisations, economic
centralisation, the need to recognise the small and medium(12)bourgeoisie and agreed to political participation.
For others, however, the experience of C.N.T. collaboration
proved how erroneous that strategy was. José Peirats and
Vernon Richards argue that the C.N.T., lacking "political"
experience and thus unable to "play the political game"
would have been better served to continue in areas of
struggle within which it had traditionally excelled -
in the factories and neighbourhoods. By concentrating on
these arenas, and deepening the social revolutionary aspects
of the Civil War, the C.N.T. would have prevented the whole-
scale disillusionment which invaded the Republic after the
May137 events, and which was an important factor in the( 13)defeat of the Republican forces. . For collaboration meant,
in practice, that the C.N.T. had to continually restrict 
the social revolutionary gains of the war in exchange for
(14 )ministerial power, a power which turned out to be illusory.
Very close to this perspective is the "revolutionary war 
strategy" of Camilo Berneri, a thesis sustained more recently 
by Noam Chomsky ^5) ^  Berneri argues that the Republican 
war strategy was wholly lacking in imagination and foresight, 
and was a crucial factor in accounting for the victory 
of Franco. Berneri points to the importance of Morocco in 
sustaining the military uprising, and argues that an uprising 
could easily have been incited here, thus creating difficul­
ties for the military insurgents in terms of men and equipment. 
Similarly, calls to the French working class, then undergoing 
one of the largest strike movements in its history, under 
the Popular Front, would have certainly found good response.
In Spain too, support could have been achieved by calling 
"across- the lines" into Francoist territory, and a "Fifth 
Column" would have kept troops pinned down, and limited 
the Nationalist gains. Collaboration with a weak, and wholly 
inept bourgeois Republic was the most disastrous policy 
the C.N.T. could have followed, which led it inexorably 
towards stagnation and bureaucracy. ^  ^ .
These were the kinds of debates I encountered within the 
C.N.T. during my field-trips in 1978 and 1979, reflecting
/
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the importance of this period in C.N.T. history, and 
indeed in Spanish history itself. Certainly the Civil War, 
and the defeat of the Left, has been the main point of 
reference for all the anti-Francoist forces, and left a 
legacy of bitterness and disunity which greatly hindered 
any attempt to develop a coherent strategy against Franco.
But the C.N.T. was the most affected by thisrperiod,?as 
it had renounced one of its fundamental principles, 
anti-politicism, and gained little in exchange. It is 
certainly surprising that an organisation which prided 
itself in its activism and daring should not have 
contemplated "irregular" guerrila warfare, or attempted 
to carry through a more thoroughly revolutionary strategy, 
which, with hindsight, probably has as much chance of success. 
For such was the strength of working class forces in Spanish 
society that had the workers been armed in the first days, 
the military uprising would have been immediately defeated, 
and a workers' regime installed under C.N.T. / U.G.T. tutelage. 
It was the fear of this prospect which led Republican 
leaders to try to come to some "deal" with the military
insurgents, thus wasting crucial time which allowed the
(1*7 ’)Nationalists to advance. ' . I
I can only suggest that the support for a legal Republican
government which they had helped to install, ran deeper
amongst workers within the C.N.T. than is generally
recognised, despite the existence of a large "radical"
sector opposed to this course of action. For even here, the mostamongst^revolutionary and "advanced" sector of the working 
class, those who had spontaneously collectivised their 
industries and land in Catalonia and Aragon, "capitalist 
categories and institutions" persisted, reflected in the 
"revision" of many of the C.N.T.'s postula^g^ at the Enlarged 
Economic Plenum at Valencia in January 1938. The collectives 
had shown tke difficulties of installing immediately the 
libertarian communist dream of a totally egalitarian society, 
difficulties exacerbated by the regional and localist 
feelings of C.N.T. workers and their lack of administrative 
capability.
If revolutionary syndicalist notions appear to have been 
vindicated by the collectivist experiment, then the 
anarchists' fear of "total syndicalism" was also proved 
to have been justified, as "syndicalist" notions were 
a major stumbling block to creating more democratic 
and egalitarian relationships.
The limitations of the collectivist experiment have of 
course to be placed in the context of war, which dictated 
a policy of "war communism". Shortages of war materials 
and the hostility of the central government to initiatives 
which would have allowed the collectives to remedy some 
of these defects were crucial in retaining their "ad hoc" 
and improvisory character. For despite their serious 
limitations, the greatest achievement of the collectives 
had been their ability to create and improvise, and in so 
doing succeeded in sustaining the war effort for three 
years. This was no mean feat when it is remembered that 
workers had to rely solely on their own efforts, and were 
constantly under threat from the central government, the 
Western Democracies and Stalin's Russia. That they were 
able to produce in this hostile environment does seems 
to prove the anarchists' notion of the "creative spontaneity 
of the masses", and would leave a legacy, as we shall 
see, which would greatly contribute to the re-birth of 
anarchist thought in the early 1970's.
But alongside this important "creative" legacy of the 
Civil War period lay another - the bureaucratisation and 
centralisation which the C.N.T. had undergone, exacerbated 
by the years of exile in France. For the C.N.T., as we 
have seen, had contained within itself many different 
and diverse ideological currents, and these would again 
come into play, in a somewhat modified form, during the 
reconstruction of the organisation in 1976. What the C.N.T. 
had represented "historically" was one of the major 
reference points for these tendencies, which coincided 
with the role that the C.N.T. was seen to be best able
to play in the late 1970's. The struggle for definition 
of the C.N.T. was invariably waged with reference to its 
history, particularly the developments which took place 
during the Republic and Civil War. But the "revolutionary 
orthodoxy" which had grown within the C.N.T. during that 
period wished to simply erase the Civil War years from 
C.N.T. history, and return to the "status quo ante" of 
the Zaragoza Congress of May, 1936. This struggle, between 
an anarchist "orthodoxy" and those who wished to construct 
a "new type of C.N.T.", is, I believe, of important 
historical interest, as it reflects not just the continuing 
relevance of anarchism in Spain, but also the fact that 
all ideologies, even those considered the most "revolu­
tionary", can be "used" to maintain positions of power. 
Again, this seems to prove the libertarian notion of 
"power", which is not always and everywhere related directly 
to economic interests of a crude kind, although these 
interests do seem to have been present in some measure 
in the "orthodoxy's struggle for control.
The "political" nature of this bureaucracy, and the type 
of "clan" in-fighting which characterised it during the 
years of reconstruction from 1976 to 1979, cannot be 
understood without a look at the years of exile in France 
from 1939, when the legal existence of the organisation 
often came in conflict with its declared aim of the struggle 
against the Francoist dictatorship. It is this conflict 
which would determine the nature of the C.N.T. in 1976, and 
finally lead to the demise of the organisation In 1979.
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CHAPTER Oj •
THE C.N.T. : 1939 - 1951
As Paul Preston has said, there is a case for dating the end 
of the Civil War to 1951, as the tone of these years continued 
to be of an overwhelmingly military character. 1^ ^ . Certainly, 
though more systematic and -institutionalised, the repression 
carried-out by the Francoist regime in the 1940's was a 
continuation of the terror tactics employed by the Natio­
nalists during the Civil War itself. While trade union 
organisation always formed part of the oppositions1s strategy, 
resistance of a military nature, in the rural and urban 
guerrilla, was the logical response to this systematic-:, 
terror of the Francoist state. The withdrawal of the guerrilla 
in 1951, and the increasing stability of the Francoist state 
within the international context of Cold War, meant the end of 
all hope of defeating Franco by military means, and ushered 
in a new period of anti-Francoist struggle.
Spain in the aftermath of the Nationalist victory could be
summed-up in two words : hunger and terror. Franco had refused
to negotiate with the National Defence Council, the sole
remaining representative of Republican Spain, and called for
unconditional surrender. Franco was to show no mercy to the
vanquished ; it is estimated that 250 executions took place
daily, many more were sent to concentration camps, or organised
in work battallions, while others were sent away from their
own localities to others where they were kept under constant
i o )police surveillance. . One of the most horrific incidents 
took place at Alicante, where 30,000 fleeing Republicans were 
stranded when ships to transport them failed to arrive. Many 
preferred to commit suicide rather than submit to the terror 
of the victors. The rest were taken to the concentration camp
of Los Almendos, where they were kept without food and shelter, 
where they resorted to eating leaves and grass in order to 
survive. This, clearly, was not seen to be sufficient 
punishment : in the night, Falange firing sguade would come 
and pick out those they wanted. ^^ .
While all those with Republican sympathies suffered the rigours
of the newly-constituted authoritarian state, the greatest
repression was unleashed against the working class organisations,
the C.N.T. and the U.G.T. Workers were forced to eat their
trade unions cards, and vetted continuously by the Falange,
who issued a "good conduct" pass for those they considered
worthy of employment. Massive sackings, detentions and
executions awaited all those who had belonged to either trade
union, despite Franco's assurances that those who had not
(4 \ not,"shed blood" would be pardoned. . It is^surprising that the 
C.N.T.1s strategy during this period was primarily one of saving 
as many lives as possible, either by hiding them, giving them 
false documents, or getting them out of Spain. Added to the 
terror and humiliation was the devastation caused by the war 
itself, and the difficulties of getting production going again. 
Most of the population lived on potatoes and onions. Black 
market activities flourished, as did prostitution and robbery, 
exacerbated by the regime's policy of employing only workers 
untainted by any "red" past. Many of the most compromised 
militants took to the mountains to form the guerrilla, which 
reached enormous proportions : it is estimated that between 
25,000 and 30,000 guerrilleros were active in Spain during 
these years. ^ . It was one of the ways to escape from the 
terror of the death squads, and to avoid the humiliations 
meted out to those loyal to the Republican regime.
In this context, as Paul Preston says, it is remarkable that 
there was any resistance at all. . For the C.N.T. reorga­
nisation took place in the prisons, where the most experienced 
and well-known militants were to be found. The first national 
committee was formed in the prison camp of Albatera, with
Pallarols as secretary, whose principal task was the 
falsification of documents. Many well-known militants were 
saved either by bribinq prison quards or by supplying 
false documents. By September, just six months after the 
Nationalist victory, escape routes to France had been esta­
blished, the border crossed, and communication with the exile 
organisation set-up. The C.N.T. tried to impress on the delegates 
of the J.A.R.E. and the S.E.R.E. the desparate situation 
in Spain, and the need for more funds, as bribery was one of 
the major ways of saving lives. ^ . Little help was forthcoming, 
however.
During these early years of the immediate post-civil war,
committees were set-up and functioned simultaneously,
unaware that the others existed, declaring themselves( 8 )representative of the organisation. '. Despite the almost 
constant detention of committee members, re-organisational 
efforts continued, and by spring 1940, a clandestine infras­
tructure of publications and falsifications of documents 
had been set-up, contacts throughout the regions established, 
and regular contact with the exile organisation undertaken.
The Young Libertarians were important in this process.
Experienced, yet less well known, they refurbished the cadres
of the parent organisation, and were invaluable in sustaining
(q \organisational efforts. . While groups from the exterior 
came to Spain to help in the reconstruction, it is important 
to stress that the organisation emerged from the interior, 
spontaneously, and was almost exclusively manned by militants 
from inside Spain. Indeed, many of the members of these groups 
complained of the passivity shown by the exile organisation 
in France, so that once in Spain they were forced to establish 
contact at an individual level, with militants they had 
previously known. Not surprisingly, the organisation
functioned on the basis of personal contact, of elites formed 
before or during the Civil War, and committee members were 
elected because of their well-known merits. It was not until 
1943 that the national committee was elected by normal organi­
sational means, in a national plenum of regionals. .
So
One of the most spectacular forms of resistance action against
Franco was that of the urban guerrilla. C.N.T. militants
were at the forefront of guerrilla activities in Barcelona,
and their aim was not just to act as defence groups for
trade unions and confederal committees, but more importantly
to create a climate of fear and demoralisation amongst members
of the Francoist institutions. These groups were ephemeral,
with members coming and going, and groups were created and
dissolved. They were created on a neighbourhood basis, mostly
by Young Libertarians, without any organisational link with 
(121the C.N.T. . They carried-out bank and factory robberies,
revolutionary "expropriations", and assaults on offices and
buildings of the regime. Miguel García explains why such
actions were necessary : "The weekly stamp (from the trade
unions), was more a means of building morale than covering the
cost of the organisation. We had to raise funds for printing
presses, arms, aid for prisoners and innumerable families.
So we had to organise bank raids on a large scale." .
Revolutionary "expropriations", though less frequent, were
another source of fund raising. Industrialists, whose factories
had been collectivised, were presented with a bill to compensate
the workers for the good care they had taken of their factories
in their absence, which had often doubled in value under the
regime of workers' control. As a gun was put to their head,(14)they had little option but to accede to the demand.
Undoubtedly, the general atmosphere of war and revenge meant 
that many operations were carried-out by individuals on their 
own initiative, without the knowledge of other members of the 
groups. The fact that they were not done in the name of the 
movement gave the impression that they could more or less 
do as they wanted. . They could also be seen as mere
adventurism, such as the Casita Blanca night-club hold-up, 
carried-out by Facerias, one of the most legendary figures 
of the urban guerrilla. . However, their role as morale
booster should not be underestimated, as an imprisoned militant 
of these years explains :
"Okay —  so the 'boys' (of the action groups) were a 
bit hot-headed —  maybe some people got killed that didn't deserve it - though they usually picked their targets well. But the people they helped in the prisons - we'11 not forget them - they were our only hope. While those bastards settled-down to a comfortable life in France (i.e. the exile organisation), we were rotting in rat- infested holes, while our families almost starved. Who was going to employ the wife or son of X ? That's when there was work. You can't imagine the hunger of that time. At one point my family were eating leaves. One of my daughters died. You've no idea the joy and relief I felt when I heard that the "boys" had sent them 10,000 pesetas.I wasn't so bothered about myself so much, it was that they were doing that for them. For if they (i.e. the action groups) killed the odd innocent person, that was nothing compared to what the Francoists had done to thousands upon thousands of innocent people. What crimes had my wife and children committed ?"
Barcelona , 1979.
Certainly, the robberies and hold-ups which took place were 
seen as acts of justice, and in most cases were a means of 
survival. But the urban guerrilla also saw itself as the 
embryo of a future army of liberation (as did the rural guer­
rilla) . For the main reason why there was such widespread 
resistance, even within the context of terror and starvation, 
was the hope that the Allied victory would inevitably lead 
to the liberation of Spain. For it was the support of the 
Axis powers which had guaranteed Franco's success in the Civil 
War, and the Falange were now calling for intervention on the 
side of the fascists in the Second World War. It was in 
this spirit of anti-fascism that hundreds of thousands of
Spaniards took up arms in the French resistance, and many(17)thousands of them interned in concentration camps. . When
France was occupied in mid-1940, these Spaniards were faced 
with a difficult choice : if they stayed in France they would 
be persecuted by the Gestapo, which collaborated with the 
Spanish Embassy (in fact 40,000 had been sent back to Spain 
by the Vichy government). Given this situation, many preferred 
to go back to Spain clandestinely, and take up the struggle 
there. The C.N.T. thus received an influx of militants which
-  t o  -
would greatly help in the reorganisational efforts taking. (18) place.
The feeling of optimism grew when the Allies landed in
Normandy in the summer of 1944. The liberation of France meant
that 10,000 Spaniards from the French resistance were available
to attack Spain. The Union Nacional Española, which controlled
the Republican army, moved its forces along the entire Pyrenean
border. Interpretations of this invasion in the Valle de Aran
differ widely. For Paul Preston, a conventional military
incursion had no hope of success against Franco's well-equipped
army, and the snow-bound Pyrenees were the most unlikely place
to pick-up support. It was moreover, badly organised and
ill-timed : morale was low and people were not even awarethat it(19)had taken place .
Alberto Hernando however, believes that the timing could nob 
have been better. France was in a euphoric revolutionary mood, 
and the Republicans had large quantities of arms and well- 
trained cadres. If they had managed to control even a small 
part of the territory and set-up a Republican government in 
exile, the Allies may have been forced to intervene, and 
French public opinion may have reacted favourably and called 
for intervention. He believes the major error was a political 
one. The venture was doomed because there was no legal Repu­
blican government in existence, and the Communist Party's 
role alienated much support. 2^0^. Certainly the disorientation 
of the Communist Party, pressured by different warring factions, 
and in the last instance a victim of the Kremlin-Allied
Pact (in which Spain remained within the Anglo-Saxon zone of
(21)influence), meant numerous political and military errors.
The Communist Party leader, Santiago Cartillo, witlt express 
orders from the executive, arranged a retreat. The attack had 
lasted ten days and had cost the lives of between 3,000 and 
4,000 guerrillas. 2^2^.
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After the failed invasion the remaining guerrillas found
their way to other Spanish regions, to join-up with those
already there. The Communist Party were the predominent
force within these units, although important guerrilla nuclei
of the C.N.T. were active in Andalusia and Gallicia, and certain(23)parts of Catalonia. . The rural guerrilla carried-out
similar actions as the urban guerrilla, attacking Civil Guard
stations, Falange locals and cutting power lines. Although
unable to carry through actions on a broad scale, they were
however important in pinning down large numbers of troops,
which Gallo believes was one of the reasons why Franco did not(24)intervene on the side of the Axis in the Second World War.
As the end of the Second World War approached, and the Allied
victory assured, a broad alliance of the Republican forces
was created in October 1944, the A.N.F.D. (National Alliance
of Democratic Forces), in which the C.N.T. played an important(25)part. . Hopes were further raised after the issuing of
the Tripartite Note, in March 1946, signed by the United States, 
France and Britain, which called for the creation of a 
transitional regime which would supervise a constitutional 
referendum. It was during these years that the C.N.T. built- 
up an important trade-union network, which appeared as one (26)militant of the time said, as if trade union freedom existed.
This was, of course more widespread in Catalonia, although
certain regions, such as Gallicia, Alicante and Murcia, had(27)all their ft«^ 'o*vaX and local federations functioning.
The reorganisational process was greatly helped by the
unification of the various regional committees in operation
in Catalonia, at the beginning of 1944. The txCeaS of
Badalona, Sabadell, Mataro, Grenollers, Bajo Llobregat,
Villanueva y Geltru and Igualada del Penedes, were organised,
as were the provincial committees of the four Catalonian
provinces. Even factory and neighborhood committees were
set-up. The number of trade union members varied, but by
1945, it is estimated that 30,000 due-paying members were
enrolled in the organisation, which rose to 60,000 in 1947.
Badalona alone had 6,000, and the leading libertarian newspaper,(28)Solidaridad Obrera, had an estimated readership of 6,000.
In the years immediately following the Civil War, with the
massive sackings, detentions and executions, it is^surprising
that there was little workers' resistance. Action was primarly
defensive, limited to acts of sabatage and go-slows. But as
the workers, and their organisations, slowly recovered, and
with hopes that liberation was at hand, there was' a dramatic increase
in protest actions and strikes, primarly over food shortages
and super-exploitation, which on a few occasions, ended in( 29)victory for the workers.
This level of organisation was achieved under the three 
most effective regional committees, that of Peris, July 
1945 - June 1946, Felix Carrasquer, June till December' 46 
and that of German Estevez, February 1947 - May 1947, and 
the national committee of Enrique Marcos Nadal, June 1946 - 
May 1947, was important in establishing regular contact 
between the regionals, between the different political 
groups within the A.N.F.D., trade unions and guerrillas. 
Regional and national plenums were held, and committee 
members elected in more representative forums. .
Certainly this degree of organisation did not go unnoticed by 
the police. Repression was continuous in Catalonia, especially 
as it was here where the greatest urban guerrilla activity 
took place. Almost as soon as a regional committee was orga­
nised, it fell. Few regional committees lasted more than six 
months. The members who hadn't been detained would immediately 
organise yet another committee, taking over the tasks which 
the previous committee had begun. From the unification of 
committees in 1944 till July 1946, five regional committees 
were detained. One of the greatest round-ups took place in 
November 1945, when the regional committee was detained, 
together with the printing press and much valuable material. 
However, Catalonia was better equiped to deal with police 
repression than other regions. The great sympathy which the 
Catalan proletariat felt for the C.N.T. allowed militants a
(31)
greater degree of protection than in other provinces. Bars
were often used for collecting dues, and militants hidden
in "safe" houses. The proximity to France meant that arms,
printing equipment and paper were more readily available, and
the organisation replenished by cadres and militants from the
neighbouring country. Moreover, the Catalan organisation was
further strengthened by C.N.T. members escaping from their own
provinces to find anonymity in Barcelona. Some of the most
important militants in the reorganisation process were the
groups from Aragon (Cesar Broto and Félix Carrasquer) and(32)the Levante (Peris and German Estevez). . But it does
seem extraordinary that such a level of organisation was
tolerated in Catalonia, for the police at all times had their
informers working within the organisation. This was the period
when the opposition's activities were at their peak, and
Carrasquer believes that the instability of the regime was
such that both capitalist employers and members of the Francoist
regime gave financial help and information to the C.N.T. in
order to gain some democratic credentials. In fact, Carrasquer's
committee supplied special cards which credited those who gave
such help. . Antonio Tellez seems to suggest that the
organisation was allowed to function so that it could be
informed on, and its actions and members controlled in this (3 4)way. . A  fuller explanation will not be possible until
police and state files of this period are available.
Despite this remarkable reorganisational achievement, all 
was not well within the C.N.T.. The C.N.T.'s actions during 
the Civil War, with anarchist ministers in government and 
the ideological changes which had taken place, i.e. the calling 
for a federal socialist republic which recognised other socia­
list currents and postponed the anarchist ideal, brought 
about a major re-think amongst some of the leading militants 
within the organisation. As C.M. Lorenzo says, these could 
be divided into two tendencies:those who believed that the 
revolution had been lost because of the abandonment of anarchist 
principles, and those who felt that it was these principles
-  Î Ù  -
which had caused the failure of the anarchist project during 
the Civil War. (35).
For Garcia Oliver and Horacio Prieto, the trade union was not 
suitable either for the seizure of power or political inter­
vention, and therefore the C.N.T. should remain apolitical.
The experience of the Civil War, however, had demonstrated 
the need for a political instrument. For Garcia Oliver that 
instrument should be a political party, dedicated to the seizure 
of power. Prieto also believed that the libertarian
movement should create a political party, but not for the 
seizure of power. This political party should intervene within 
the apparatus of the bourgeois state, and thus extend liberta­
rian influence and power. . Both believed that continuing
political collaboration was necessary, and Oliver was one of 
the first to call for a broad alliance of Republican forces 
before the end of the Second World War, to agree a common
programme for the installation of a democratic government, of(37)a revolutionary socialist persuasion.
Others were embittered by the kind of treatment they had 
received from the other "political" forces during their brief 
spell of political participation in the Popular Front gover­
nment of 1936 - 1939. Jose Peirats believed that the C.N.T. 
should have continued to act in arenas in which it had tradi­
tionally proved effective i.e. in the factories and neigh­
bourhoods, and consolidated its power base there. This was
the kind of action which the C.N.T. did best. In the political(38)world, the C.N.T. was always at a disadvantage. ' . Many
other militants, among them Germinal Esgleas and Federica
Montseny, held a similar view. Participation in government
had failed to protect libertarian conquests and had proved
the validity of traditional anarchist tenets. These years were
seen as a sort of interregnum, as the exception which proved(39)the rule, and needless to say, should never be repeated.
For the C.N.T. militants inside Spain, suffering continuous 
repression, such ideological questions did not arise. The 
majority were committed to a common front with other Republican 
forces to bring an end to repression and allow freedom of 
association. Indeed, the libertarians were one of the most 
important forces within the A.N.F.D., even supporting the 
"monarchist option" when it became clear that the Allied powers 
would only contemplate an alliance which would include the 
monarchists. . Others believed that some kind of unders­
tanding could be reached with the more "workerist" section 
of the Falange , thus "liberalising" the regime and avoiding 
more atrocities. Certainly the regime was in need of experienced 
syndicalists to run its huge union network, the C.N.S., and 
some members of the Syndicalist Party, and ex-Treintistas,
such as Sebastian Ciará, José Corbellá, Corronz and Ricardo(41)Fornells, accepted posts within it. . It is remarkable,
given the hunger and brutality of the time, that so few
militants collaborated preferring, like Juan Peiró, to give(42)up their lives rather than submit. . According to
C.M. Lorenzo, the political / apolitical split within the 
organisation did not appear until the beginning of 1945. Up 
till then the libertarian movement had been united behind the 
republican alliance policy initiated in July 1936, and rati­
fied at a regional plenum in Toulouse in October 1944, and 
inside Spain at the national plenum of March 1944. Dramatic 
changes took place however, at the beginning of 1945, when 
it seemed inevitable that the Francoist regime would not be 
tolerated after the defeat of the Axis powers. It is hardly 
surprising, Lorenzo says, that in this state of optimism many 
libertarians believed that the revolutionary conquests of 
July 1936 should be restored in their entirety, and all 
alliances with the moderate republican forces severed, as 
they saw the latter as those most responsible for the military 
uprising and the anti-fascist defeat. The dissident voices 
against the "political" line of the organisation were such 
that the secretary of the time, Juanel, called a congress 
in an attempt to heal the differences. The outcome was
ambiguous in the extreme : while the "radicals" won the
motions on direct action, anti-parliamentarianism and the
revolutionary tradition of the C.N.T., the moderate motions
which called for a return to the Popular Front actions of
1936 - 1939 were also approved, as were others which sanctioned(43)the resolutions of the economic plenum of January 1938.
But the leadership now passed to the "radicals", who won an 
overwhelming majority, while the "political" faction 
immediately set about creating their own secret national 
sub-committee. The C.N.T. was now divided, with two sets of 
leaderships and policies which would be duplicated within 
Spain itself, with "committees of both factions competing for 
power and influence. As Lorenzo says :
"The political / personal differences were to lead to the disintegration of the C.N.T. "de jure" without taking into account the common interests of anti-francoism and the freedom of the Spanish people, just as its sister trade union, the U.G.T. , had been split between a U.G.T. of communist persuasion and a social democratic U.G.T., itself divided "de facto" into various belligerant factions. The crisis of the libertarian movement must be seen within the general crisis of the Spanish left. Defeated, and ailing, it was unable to take advantage of the occasions which may have allowed it to recover."
Lorenzo, Paris, 1969.
Certainly, the C.N.T. was not alone in being beset by
fractional strife. The internal / external split affected all
the parties within the Republican alliance, and none moreso
than the Communist Party, which executed one o f . its leaders,
Trilla, in 1945. The struggle between the exile leadership,
who obediently accepted Soviet policy, and those within Spain
who wished to persue a more independent strategy, was(44)particularly acrimonious. . As Paul Preston says,
"It could only have been demoralising for the militants in
Spain to see their comrades and leaders denounced as traitors
and provacateurs, as agents of the Gestapo and of American(45)imperialism, by leaders in exile."
Indeed, division and fractional strife were to characterise 
the attempts by the anti-francoist opposition to bring about 
some sort of democratic change for Spain. The Republican 
government in exile, was set-up late (January 1945), and 
obstinately held to the 1931 Republican formula when it was 
patently obvious that the Allies, in their Tripartite Note 
of March 1946, would only consider a broad alliance which 
would include the monarchists. The A.N.F.D. too was committed 
to a return to the Republican legality overthrown in 1939, 
but having to suffer the repression, was more pragmatic, and 
realised that the Republican government in exile was not 
going to play a major role, given that the Allies had refused 
to recognise it. The Socialists of Indelecio Prieto were in 
favour of a plebescite , in Spain this position was upheld by 
Juan Jose Luque, representative of the C.N.T. on the national 
committee of the A.N.F.D.. It is not known to this day whether 
Luque was a monarchist infiltrator or a sincere libertarian, 
but whatever, he played an important part in the negotiations 
between the monarchists and libertarians, a n d helped convince 
the latter of the monarchist cause. .
At the end of 1945, the British Embassy contacted the A.N.F.D.
to sound-out their views on a monarchist restoration
(apparently supported by the French and the U.S.), and
called on the Socialist delegate of the Alliance, Orche, to
see them. Not being authorised to agree, he transmitted the
message to the Alliance. The C.N.T. sent out the proposals
to be studied to the different regionals and guerrilla groups.
Before a decision could be reached, however, Luque had
already reached an unilateral agreement with the monarchists.
Although the C.N.T. denied this and denounced Luque1s action,
they sent García Duran to see Giral and his government
(this action was supported by the rest of the Alliance), to
see what they thought of the option. In fact, the C.N.T.
delegates in the alliance, supported by Sevilla, a Republican
and Orche, a Socialist, were the ones who favoured the
"restoration" and consistently urged the Alliance to accept(47)the idea of a plebescite.
Of course, many within the C.N.T. were not happy with the
discussions with the monarchists, especially in Catalonia.
However, they allowed the national committee in Madrid to
carry-on the conversations. But with the publication in the
C.N.T. newspaper of the Pretender's manifesto, there was an
important split within the Young Libertarians, at the end
of 1945 or the beginning of 1946. Also there is evidence which
suggests that the Esgleist faction was trying to ¡'^ stir-up
discord within the organisation. . From then on, they
would use this group of Young Libertarians to echo their ideas (49)within Spain. v ' .
The history of the A.N.F.D. from the beginning of 1946 until 
its disappearance at the end of 1948 is one of sectarianism 
and total lack of strategy. At first the Socialists would not 
negotiate with the monarchists, but after the Tripartite Note 
the A.N.F.D. were unanimous in calling for monarchist parti­
cipation. But the Giral government continued to call for the 
restoration of the Republic and left the A.N.F.D. no option 
butto call on the monarchists to participate within a wide 
coalition to overthrow Franco, and conversations finally took 
place in July 1946. However, the A.N.F.D. wasted its strength 
negotiating with two monarchist factions; Aranda in the interior, 
and Gil Robles in Portugal. Towards the end of 1946, Robles 
gained the upper hand, and won Santamaria, political secretary 
of the C.N.T. and general secretary of the A.N.F.D., to his 
notion of a Restoration on the lines of 1876. Santamaria was 
then removed by the C.N.T. and replaced by Lugue, who broke 
off negotiations with Robles and speeded-up negotiations 
with Aranda, considered more of a "liberal". .
The United Nations resolution, which condemned Franco and 
withdrew ambassadors, helped to accelerate the négociations 
with the monarchists. The Pretender called on the C.N.T. to 
negotiate with him in Lisbon, and was replied by Lugue in his 
famous "Mensaje al Predendiente", which refused a deal without
eU
the rest of the opposition. Don Juan never replied personally 
and didn't answer Luque's note until February 1947. The monar­
chists were playing a waiting game, realising that the anti- 
francoist opposition was split into numerous factions and 
had no international support. If they waited long enough, it 
would simply disintegrate of its own accord. . It is
doubtful if the monarchists ever seriously considered joining 
the anti-francoist front, and much more likely, as Preston 
says, that after financing Franco's effort, they were trying ( 52)to show him that their loyalty could not be taken for granted.
In an attempt to have the Republican government in the hands of 
someone who would embrace the monarchist option, Giral was 
ousted and replaced by the Socialist, Llopis, in January 1947.
But this was to little avail, and the next period saw the 
total eclipse of the A.N.F.D. and any semblance of anti- 
francoist unity. Both the C.N.T. and the Socialists negotiated 
separately with the monarchists, meeting Gil Robles, and 
conceding more and more ground to him. He succeeded in con­
vincing many libertarians, such as José Pineda, Leiva, and above 
all Juan LtSpez, who met Robles in June 1948, that the monarchist 
option was the only hope. . These separate negotiations
embittered relations between the Socialist Party and the C.N.T. 
Each one tried to eliminate the other, while accusing each 
other of bad faith. By the beginning of 1948, the A.N.F.D. no 
longer existed. By the time the Socialists finally reached 
agreement with the monarchists, Franco had already agreed a 
solution with the Pretender in the summer of 1948. As always, 
Franco had acted with his customary skill, an4satisfied the 
monarchists by introducing the Law of Succession, in July.' 1947, 
by way of referendum. He retained the right to elect the 
king of his choice, if not Don Juan, then his son Juan Carlos.
He renewed his promises from time to time, until finally, in (54)July 1967, he chose Juan Carlos as the future king of Spain.
Resistance during these years remained at a high level, and 
indeed, the C.N.T. reached the zenith of its organisational 
efforts between 1946 and 1947. 1947 was a year of increasing
protests on the labour front, which culminated in a general
strike in the Basque provinces on the first of May. In Bilbao 
some 50,000 workers struck, which was followed by strikes 
throughout the provinces. In Catalonia, the strikes affected 
all the major industries, above all textiles, which registered 
a 75 % turnout. This time the forces of the regime intervened 
directly, detaining and sacking massive numbers of workers.
There were 14,000 sackings in the Basque provinces, and even 
some employers were fined or detained who had refused to 
give a list of the strikers. .
The May solidarity strike in Catalonia was carried-out under 
the aegis of German Estevez' committee, in operation from 
February till May 1947. The coordination between the trade 
union at this time was excellent, as the response to the Basque 
strikes demonstrates. Indeed, preparations for the May strike 
had begun in January. German was determined to end the disor­
ganisation of the armed groups, by coordinating the trade 
union and armed struggle. Force was conceived of as a tactical 
weapon, to be used to support trade union struggles as well 
as attacking Francoist installations. The idea of this plan, 
named 1,001, came from the exile organisation, which had been 
trying to put it into practice for over a year. Although 
based on the guerrilla methods used by the Americans during 
the war, it was conceived in wider terms. It was hoped that 
it would form the basis of a confederal army, which would later 
become the army of liberation with the other opposition forces. 
Once Francoism would be overthrown, it would become the 
organisation of civil jurisdiction, under the auspices of/ cc\a coalition government. 1 ' .
This plan would have had more possibilities of success a year 
earlier. The offensive against Franco had abated somewhat, 
while armed resistance was slowly being worn down. The Francoist 
regime was beginning to stabilise itself, now that it had 
managed to bring dissidents within the army under control, 
and its political survival now seemed possible in the atmosphere 
of approaching Cold War. . The C.N.T. was aware of the
limitations of the 1,000 plan, and reduced it to the creation 
of two or more armed groups (which could be placed in the 
mountains or the city), which could launch an effective 
assault when needed. To carry it out, they counted on the 
arms brought from France, and the information collected by 
Carrasquer's committee on military installations. v ;.
When all seemed to be going well, an unfortunate incident
brought the whole edifice down. Franco was due to visit
Barcelona on May 20th 1947, and the organisation had suspended
its activities as the entire city was surrounded by police.
Marcos Nadal, the national secretary, and Estevez, the regional
secretary were detained on their way to a regional plenum.
Borras, a member of the regional committee, had been seen
contacting German Borras' address had been found when they
had detained Dominguez, legal secretary of the provincial (59)committee. . The police did not realise the extent of their
"catch". The whole of the local federation, the provincial 
committee and numerous comm reals were dismantled. In fact, 
practically the whole organisational infrastructure was left 
in ruins - only a few militants in Tarragona were saved. There 
were 300 detentions, 50, 000 pesetas were lost, as well as 
many locals, printing presses, while the trade unions were 
left in a state of total disorganisation. In the commarcal 
of Vic, forty people were detained, one of them dying in police 
custody after severe torture. This was connected to the finding 
of an arms cache crossing the border, apparently to arm the 
Esgleist groups. . Detentions extended throughout Spain
and was the decisive putsch which sentenced the C.N.T. to 
extinction. A further wave of detentions at the end of 1947, 
which included the new national committee and many provincial 
committees, destroyed what was left of its trade union base.
From then on, the organisation was reduced to a few disconnected 
working class groups, armed groups without any strategy, and 
symbolic committees in which the members elected one another. 
Undoubtedly this putsch could have been avoided if greater 
clandestine precautions had been taken. It would seem extremely
unwise to hold a regional plenum when Franco was due to
visit Barcelona, and to keep addresses of other comrades.
A similar lack of precautions led to the decimation of
the armed groups in October 1949. An eighteen year old,
Jaime Albana, was arrested while trying to sell an unusual
gold watch to a police informer. Albana was found to be
carrying a pistol and hand granades. His identification
papers were out of date, and indeed his Falangist membership
card had been withdrawn from circulation shortly before as/ c. o \a result of numerous forgeries emanating from Toulouse. ' .
This triggered off a whole series of arres.t3 and assassinations 
of libertarians in Barcelona.
It is certainly true that the police were becoming more 
vigilant and had increased their numbers since the attack 
on the police chief Quíntela, in February 1949. . The
action groups did not let up however. In fact they increased 
their activities. May 1949 was an especially active month. 
Facerías entered Spain only to be caught in an ambush. He and 
two other comrades narrowly escaped death. . At this
time the United Nations was again discussing the position 
of Spain. Bolivia, Peru, Brasil and Columbia had proposed 
that the agreement of December 1946 (that no member country 
should accredit representatives to Spain), should be annulled. 
The action groups did not think much of United Nations 
resolutions, but, seeing that the exiles were taking it 
seriously, decided to organise a series of protests to bring 
Spain to public notice. Bombs were placed in the various 
Latin American embassies which had proposed the annullment. 
This increased activity of the action groups brought not 
only greater numbers of police to Barcelona, but also much 
more efficient organisation. The police were also receiving 
very exact information s they were aware of a meeting which 
one of the Sabaté brothers held, and were able to locate 
precisely where an arms dump was. In August, 1949, the 
Anarchist Defence Commission in Exile, along with militants 
of the action groups, decided to reorganise the infrastructure 
of the groups inside Spain. . This done, they began a
massive infiltration into Catalonia, especially Barcelona. (67)
However, the Francoist Intelligence knew of this 
infiltration, and launched a massive wave of repression
against all known or sympathetic libertarians in Catalonia. v 
Therefore the repression and increased police vigilance had 
begun well before the detention of Jaime Albana in October.
Yet this did not lead the action groups to tighten their 
security or change their methods. At any time it was unwise 
to allow a raw, eighteen year-old to wander through Barcelona 
with arms, carrying an out-of-date identification credential, 
and with an enormous amount of information about the other 
members. In October 1949 it was sheer lunacy.
Paul Preston believes that the lack of separation of the armed 
groups from the industrial front was one ofthe^major reasons/ £ g\for the high level of detentions of trade union militants. 
Certainly the action groups themselves were aware of the 
problem. Sabat§, one of the most courageous of the guerrillas, 
attempted to tackle the problem on his return to Spain in 1945. 
As Tellez says :
(68
"In March 1947, the Spanish Libertarian Resistance Movement in Barcelona (M.L.R.) was formed with the idea of separating all organisation and propaganda activities from the purely guerrilla actions. From now on it was intended that the M.L.R. should be the military wing of the Libertarian Movement. The idea came from the comrades in the 'interior', and was agreed to by a new delegate from France. Later, however, the movement in exile (the 'apolitical' faction) disavowed their delegate and disagreed with this decision. Nevertheless, the movement in Spain decided to act on its own Initiative and received the support of many excellent and experienced comrades, including the group of Manuel Pareja. This 
collaboration bore fruit."
Tellez, London, 1974 p. 65.
This decision marks the beginning of a long and tortuous 
relationship between the urban guerilla and the exile orga­
nisation. Unwilling to finance the political / trade union 
movement in the interior themselves, they reproached the 
guerrilla Tfbr doing so. .
Certainly the urban guerrilla was crucial in creating the 
necessary infrastructure of the trade union organisation.
More importantly perhaps, was their concern for libertarian 
prisoners, a concern deeply felt by Sabaté and Facerias, 
who launched many projects in aid of them. Indeed, the 
increased activism in 1949 was specifically related to 
renewed attempts to help prisoners. A libertarian, Francoisco 
Ballester Orovitg, released from prison in January 1949, had 
prepared a comprehensive census of all C.N.T. prisoners, 
addresses of their families and lawyers who had defended 
them. Sabaté, and his brother, José, agreed to undertake 
all the expenses for legal aid. . As Tellez says s
"As usual it was a question of money. Once more, the activist 
groups had to fall back on the banks for forced contribu­
tions ; they had no other source of income and it was for
this reason that robberies played an important role in the(72)resistance movement."
The lack of support from the exile organisation caused the 
action groups to recur time and time again to robberies 
and raids which were becoming increasingly risky, as police 
and intelligence perfected their methods. The relationship 
between the action groups and the exile organisation is 
summed—up well by Tellez :
"The Spanish Libertarian Movement never adopted a clear position in the struggle against Franco, and neither did it attempt to separate the activities of the political and guerrilla wings within its ranks. People took part in the planning of guerrilla actions who had not the remotest intention of participating in the operations themselves. They controlled the formation of the armed groups - stubbornly ignoring the fact that within its ranks were to be found informers, charlatans and hypo­crites of every shape and size ; while the administration was in the hands of political bureaucrats — a lunacy of the highest order, even ignoring for the moment the obvious dangers such a situation could, (and did) give rise to - as the 'committee' men had a predilection for inventing what they called 'methods of action' and 'activities' which led inevitably to inaction and inac­tivity. These errors cost the movement dear. They weré paid for with the blood and lives of some of its most outstanding comrades. The members of the action groups argued continuously, but unsuccessfully, hoping to rectify this sorry state of affairs and create an autonomous
resistance organisation through which the men and groups involved could claim responsility for their actions and avoid, among other things, the effects of repression felt by those comrades involved in propaganda and industrial action. The M.L.E., however, never compromised itself in regard to the action groups, it had become a servant of legality in exile. Within the Spanish Libertarian Movement nothing was totally authorised and nothing totally condemned - the standing of the action groups was in a constant state of flux. For example, men who at any given moment belonged to the urban guerrilla groups could pass to occupy respons i.ble positions within the organisation, and vice versa. This'problemperhaps the most important of all, was never faced openly, in spite of the disgraceful events which resulted with increasing frequency as the years passed - bringing with them demoralisation and confusion."
Tellez, London, 1974 p. 49 - 50.
It is debatable whether either Sabaté and Facerías, whose
activity spanned almost two decades, would have continued their
actions if there had been an alternative strategy worked-out
by the organisation in exile. For example, at the Second
Congress of Local Federations in Toulouse (May to October 1947)
members of the M.L.R. were refused delegate status and not
allowed to discuss the future role of the resistance movement.
Facerias, disgusted by the bureacratic manoeuvres and "paper"(73)resolutions, decided to take his group back to Spain.
Sabaté, restricted to France from 1949 till 1955, had repea­
tedly attempted to get the organisation to undertake some 
concerted action and fill the organisational vacuum. Given 
that this was not forthcoming, he decided to act on his own 
initiative, without involving the organisation. He formed 
the "Iberian Federation of Anarcho-Syndicalists", but 
subsequently renamed them the "Federation of Anarcho- 
Syndicalists Groups" after discussions with the Inter­
Continental Commission of the C-N.T./F.A.I. ("apolitical" 
organisation in exile). He had no desire to cause a split 
within the organisation, but felt something had to be done.
Even after the name change and discussions however, the. (74)exile organisation still disowned and attacked them. .
The Anarcho-Syndicalist Groups ceased to function in the 
winter of 1956/57, as a result of severe repression. Forty- 
three militants were arrested throughout Barcelona.
During their brief period of activity they managed to 
publish a newspaper "El Combate"# and one is deeply impressed 
by Sabatfe's attempts to incite resistance. He fired projectiles 
out of a sort of mortar bomb, which sent propaganda hurling 
about two hundred yards, and recorded speeches which he would 
play in factory canteens or anywhere where there were groups 
of workers. After the dismantling of the Anarcho-Syndicalist 
Groups, SabatS spent the next few years trying to get the 
exile organisation take some action in Spain, and indeed was 
hopeful that the Tenth Congress of the C.N.T./ M.L.E. in 
1959 would bring about reunification and some sort of stra­
tegy. . But again, nothing was done.
In a desparate bid he took his group back to Spain, in 
December 1959, but never even reached Barcelona. He had totally 
underestimated the growing efficiency of the Spanish Special 
Branch and International Police co-operation across fron­
tiers. . The five men in blue overalls, mountain boots
and ruck-sacks were a complete anachronism in Franco's Spain 
in the late 50's. Spain was now integrated within the Western 
sphere of influence, and, with the signing of the Pact of 
Madrid in 1953, had begun to receive the economic and 
military backing of the United States. The period which 
opened in 1936 was well and truly over.
The 1950's mark the end of a whole period of Spanish 
anarchist history. Never before had the state been able to 
smash so completely a movement which had shown great capa­
bility in clandestine struggle. While C.N.T. militants were 
important in the 1951 transport boycott, and many workers 
still retained great sympathy for the organisation, the 
historic anarcho-syndicalist movement never managed to emerge 
during the dark years of Franco's rule. The experiences of the 
Republic, but particularly the Civil War, had left their mark 
upon the organisation in exile, now split irrevocably in a 
"political" and an "apolitical" wing. Anarchist orthodoxy had 
been questioned, and militants, such as Garcia Oliver and 
Horacio Prieto, had called for the establishment of a 
libertarian party alongside the traditional trade union 
organisation of the C.N.T.
Others had collaborated with Falange chiefs within the 
vertical trade unions, while some practiced an "entrist" 
tactic within them, secretly agreed to by the exile organisa­
tion. d l ) ' L0ng and cherished anarcho-syndicalist practice 
was unable to be adhered to in the context of severe 
repression. Those who held committee posts controlled the 
organisation, and the gap between leaders and the rank and
/ 7 o \file widened inexorably. ' ' . Under Franco's increasingly
efficient police state, little remained of the revolutionary 
elcin which had characterised the Spanish anarchist movement 
for some eighty years.
Certainly the anarchist movement had always had to contend 
with clandestine conditions in the unstable political world 
of Spanish society, and had to resort to "authoritarian" 
measures during periods of repression to save the organisation 
from oblivion. Moreover, perhaps more than any other European 
anarchist movement, it had shown great ideological flexibility 
and diversity, calling for the "dictatorship of the proletariat" 
under the influence of the Russian Revolution, and the setting­
up of a federal socialist republic during the years of 
Republican government from 1931 to 1939. The ideological 
development of some of its leading militants during this 
period, I believe, is of important historical interest, and 
belies some of the assumptions about the immutability of 
anarchist thought. This development was thwarted however, by 
the exigencies which the Civil War imposed, and began a process 
of centralisation and bureaucratisation which culminated in 
the setting-up of an executive council of the libertarian 
movement at the war's end. This trend was exacerbated during 
the years of exile, when, as we have seen, the exile orga­
nisation strove to maintain control of all activities of the 
interior C.N.T., and refused to openly discuss strategic 
questions out of fear of its own legal existence in France. 
Removed from happenings within Spain, and without the pressure 
which only an active movement can give, Spanish anarchist 
thought stubbornly clung to anarchist tenets which had 
frequently been questioned during the C.N.T.’s long involvement
- (o o
within the workers' movement, and "ossified" to an extent 
unheard of in Spanish anarchist history.
But the years of Franco's rule would create other forces, 
forces which would claim a heritage which they believed 
would regenerate the sleeping body of the anarchist movement, 
and thus claim a place within the newly-emerging, but powerful 
workers' movement towards the end of the Francoist period. 
These "new" anarchists would find their way blocked at every 
turn by the entrenched bureaucracy of the organisation in 
exile, and it was this struggle which would ultimately 
condemn the organisation to impotence and eventually lead 
to its demise. The strategies and projects which these groups 
expounded are incomprehensible without reference to the 
politics of the last years of Franco's reign, and the type 
of workers' movement which had developed. It is to this that 
we must now turn our attention.
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Chapter 3
THE FRANCOIST REGIME AND THE WORKERS' MOVEMENT
Although the major Western powers had allowed the Francoist 
regime to survive, massive economic aid and diplomatic 
recognition was denied it till 1951. ^  . However, the
division of the world in two hostile camps in 1945 was 
bound to favour a regime which boasted that its raison 
d'etre had always been to save Christianity from the 
Communist menace.
President Truman ratified the first large-scale credits 
in August 1950 and this process of rapprochement initiated 
in the late 40's, culminated in the "Past of Madrid" in 
1953, which consisted of agreements on military and econo­
mic aid and mutual defence. In exchange for the construction 
of American air bases, a naval base and a radar system, Spain
was to receive military aid and equipment, plus 2,000 million
(2)dollars in economic aid over a period of seventeen years.
While American pressure was crucial in the substitution of
a free market economy for the economic autarchy which had
reigned since 1939, it was becoming increasingly clear that
(3)a change of direction was desperately needed. . Lacking
foreign exchange and credit, without foreign trade and dogged
by galloping inflation, Spain was evidently tottering towards
bankruptcy. Factories were working at a quarter of their
capacity through lack of raw materials and machinery, while
agricultural production plummetted owing to the scarcity of
fertiliser. Official figures estimated a 35 % unemployment
level, while in reality that figure was closer to 50 %. Those
in work were forced to do two or three jobs in order to
survive, given the inflationary level of prices. Ration cards
black market and corruption were juxtaposed with a diet of(4)boiled grass and thistles in some provinces.
Inflation and soaring prices reached an all-time high 
in 1950 and in the first months of 1951. Government attempts 
to re-establish! control over certain products ended 
in failure and prices continued to rise. As Gallo says,
Spain was suffering the first effects of postwar industrial 
"take-off", in the context of corruption, product shortages 
and the absence of real control, which meant that price 
rises were favoured, as working class responses to this 
attack on their living standards could be controlled by 
the government. . But industrial expansion also meant 
an increase in number«of the working class, as m chanisation 
of production in this first phase of industrialisation was 
still very limited. Moreover, the working class was being 
renewed ; those Born in 1936 were now fifteen years old.
As Gallo says j "It is true that the working class was 
still politically controlled, but it began to have conscious­
ness of its exploitation and its reaction in the Spring 
of 1951 showed that something was beginning in Spain." . 
The "Hot Spring" began on the first of March in Barcelona.
A bus boycott was maintained until the sixth, despite 
torrential rain. The boycott had been carefully prepared s 
the first leaflets were distributed on the eighth of 
February, followed by student and worker demonstrations 
at the end of the month. While the Catalan Communist Party 
and C.N.T. militants were active in organising the boycott, 
Gallo argues that Catalan industrialists also favoured its 
development as it strengthened their criticism against a 
corrupt and archaic administration. ^ , It was certainly 
becoming clear that there were limitations to the degree 
of exploitation. Even the official vertical syndicates, 
in their National Congress of Workers on the sixth of
/ Q \February, called for better working conditions. . On 
the same day, the bus fare rise was rescinded. This victory 
and the official demogogic recognition of social injustices, 
blamed on corruption and speculation, did not halt the 
movement. On March 12th, 300,000 workers came out on general
strike, paralysing Barcelona. Despite severe repression
and promises that cereals were on their way, the movement
spread. Students demonstrated in Madrid against transport
fare rises, while workers in Catalonia called for bonuses
to compensate for price rises. But the most serious movement
occurred in the Basque provinces. Despite 2,000 detentions,
workers in Bilbao and San Sebastian struck for two days,(9)followed by demonstrations in Victoria and Pamplona.
Although the movement was blamed on Communist and Masonic 
subversives, the point was taken : a few months later the 
first massive credits arrived from the U.S., and free market 
policies were put into motion. . Coinciding with this
change in economic direction, Franco issued a series of 
decrees reorganising the central administration, and 
announced important ministerial changes. While the new 
cabinet contained representatives of all the political 
groups which supported Francoism, the position of the 
Falange was strengthened. The "Cold War" climate allowed 
Franco to use the Falange as a conterweight to the monarchists 
and the rabid Falangist, Fernández Cuesta, was named as 
secretary of the "Movement", while the narrow-minded 
Francoist, Arias Salgado,headed Information and Tourism. 
Attempts were made to sever the regime's connections to 
Nazism, and a liberal, Ruiz Gimánez, was appointed Minister 
of Education. ^ ^ ^ .
The reasons for these changes are fairly clear. The need
to acquire international respectability was great, but this
had to take place within the limits of an authoritarian
2)and controlled system. . "Liberalisation" was particu­
larly necessary within Education,„ if Spain was to provide 
the technicians and professionals needed to service economic 
development. Therefore, as Gallo says, the university had 
necessarily to enjoy a certain degree of freedom, if students 
were to acquire an efficient knowledge of their subjects. 
Greater freedom within the Universities, and growth of
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student numbers meant that the Universities would become 
one of the main centres of political opposition under 
Franco. However, that this "Liberalisation" should not 
go too far, either in Universities or beyond them,
Information was entrusted to a man who "was to elevate
the preliminary censorship provided by the old press law
of 22 April 1938, to the level of a national institution."^14^
Changes had also to be made in the field of labour relations. 
José Maravall has succintly summed-up the three major 
institutional elements which underscored labour relations 
from 1939 to 1955, but which were now coming under conside­
rable strain : "The corporativist organisation of the 
working class in the 'sindicatos verticales' (membership 
of which was compulsory, and the structure of which was 
rigidly hierarchical, with appointment to representative 
posts made by political designation), the prohibition of 
strikes (article 222 of the Penal Code defined strikes as 
acts of sedition), and the attribution to the Ministry of 
Labour of the entire responsibility for regulating conditions 
of work, wages, productivity and industrial relations, 
excluding any participation of the workers or of management 
(according to the 'Fuero del Trabajo of 1938 — which is a 
constitutional law — and the law of 'Reglementaciones de 
Trabajo of 1942)." . Limited attempts at some degree
of worker participation had been initiated in 1943, with 
the holding of trade union elections, but the most important 
did not come into effect until ten years later. 1^6 .^
Certainly it was becoming increasingly clear that strict 
regimentation on the labour front would not help the bid for 
greater productivity in the context of industrial "take-off", 
and as Maravall points out, some managerial groups had been 
pressing for some degree of démocratisation of the official 
trade unions for some time. 1^7  ^. The "jurados de empresa" 
introduced in 1953, a sort of shop stewards' committee, which 
allowed for some genuine workers' representation, and a 
system of collective bargaining, introduced in 1958, were 
closely linked : "In order to negotiate an agreement there 
was a need for genuine representation of the workers.
/ 1/2
Unrepresentative delegates would hinder the compliance
with and the effectiveness of any agreement, and the
growth of productivity would be hampered." . wage
rises had been granted in certain sectors with employers
viewing the wages recommended in the "Reglamentaciones
de Trabajo" as the minimum conditions which they could(19)improve when needed. .In 1954, this phenomenon was
finally given legal expression.
The major change in economic direction introduced in 1951
achieved some success.While the 1940's registered a negative
growth rate of 1.02 % , with two major production crisis
in 1945 and 1949 (in fact in 1950 real income was still
below the pre-war level), the growth rate between 1951
and 1960 was 3.3 % (20)  ^ indeed it was the new economic
policy initiated in 1951 which was to lay the basis for
the Spanish "miracle", and, as J. Esteban points out,
subsequent plans (the Stabilisation Plan of 1959, and
the Development Plans of 1964-7 and 1972-5) merely up-dated
guidelines to achieve the goals set in 1951 rather than real
(21)changes in directions. . Many of the factors which
would characterise the whole Francoist period appeared, 
embryonically, in 1951 s tourism increased, the rural exodus 
speeded-up, while emigration multiplied the number of 
permanent workers in France by ten. Between 1950 and 1960 
those engaged in agriculture fell from 49 % to 42 %. (22 .^
Among the many successes of Francoism was the signing 
of the Concordat with the Vatican in August 1953, a month 
before the Pact of Madrid. The Church gained great advantages. 
The Catholic Church would become the state religion, and 
would have control over education at all levels, while the 
state would propagate the faith through its organs of 
propaganda. Official censorship would be in the hands of 
the bishops, who could forbid any book, film or play which 
did not conform to Catholic doctrine.
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In return, the state would provide for the clergy, and
all subsidies would be exempt from taxation and tied to the
cost of living. . But this "fusion" between Church
and state heralded new dangers. The identification of the
Church with the state created problems for young priests,
particularly in the Basque provinces where the clergy was
anti-Francoist and close to the people. It was also
difficult for these priests involved in the evangelisation
of the poor, and who were most aware of the great inequalities
of wealth under the Francoist regime. Therefore, in sectors
of the Church, there was a certain uneasiness with the
complete identification of the Church with the Francoist
regime, which would lead, inexorably, towards their invol-
(241vement with the opposition. '.
An important clause of the Concordat allowed the hierarchy
to organise Catholic Action independently in all matters
concerning its apostolate. This meant that religious
periodicals were exempted from Arias Salgado's strict
censorship. It also allowed Catholic Action to carry-out
its activities without state intervention. Thus, when Catholic
workers' associations were created outside the official trade
(251union, their legal status placed them in a unique position.
Tire three workers' organisations formed in 1947 were HOAC 
(Hermandades Obreras de Acción Católica), JOC (Juventud Obrera 
Católica) and VOJ (Vanguardias Obreras Juveniles), were 
part of an offensive by the Vatican to regain influence 
within post-Second World War Spain. . But, as Fernandez
de Castro explains, this attempt to control, through 
evangelisation, somewhat backfired s
"We can situate the first effective presence of the HOAC in the life of the country in the fifties. Inspired by Malagon and Robirosa, the latter a man of a strong mystical persuasion, the HOAC spread through certain sectors of the working class quite quickly. As all the traditional working class organisations were prohibited and persecuted, Catholic Action remained the only possible organisation not controlled by the state.Á group of old socialist and anarchist militants, con­verted in prison to Christianity, placed their long
experience as fighters at the service of HOAC. They used old methods and old arguments : the misery of the masses and the scandalous exploitation to which they were subject, taking advantage of their condition as losers, was the argument for the mobilisation of the class, as is also the Christianising argument : the revolutionary strength of the Gospel. A whole curious process of new adaptation of the doctrine to the interests of the working class took place within 
the closed circle of the HOAC, which created, or attempted to create, a Christian xorkers' ideology which would substitute Marxism. (27). The Church hierarchy, which had looked on the growth of the new movement with hope that it would be successful in its missionary task among the working class, soon began to realise the difficulties, complications and dangers. The 'new Christians' were class enemies of the 'old ones', and the new adaption of the doctrine was incompatible with the old, that which had served as the banner in the 'Crusade'. The HOAC, which began by denouncing the injustice of the situation of the working class, ended--up by attacking the social order 
in which the Church has powerful means for its missionary action and even by confronting the Church itself for the complacency and complicity in this same order. Christianity became, through the new missionaries, a banner of discordancy and struggle, no longer was it 
a message of peace and an enemy of the class struggle. (28) .
F. de Castro, Paris, 1366.
Another policital organisation which was important in the
50's was the Spanish Communist Party. The Party's clandestine
organisation had been almost completely destroyed between
1943 and 1951, due not only to police repression, but to(29)internal dissent. . The Communists had already switched
their attention to the infiltration of the official syndicates 
in 1948, but did not make much headway until 1951. 1951
marked the beginning of a certain renewal within the 
Communist Party. (30)^
"Destalinisation", from 1954, led to the reinstatement of (3certain expelled militants, and recognition of past errors. 
While major changes were not made within the organisation 
to remedy these defects, there was a greater representation 
of militants from inside Spain within the higher echelons 
of the party, after the 1956 plenum. Correspondingly, there 
was a decline in representation of older exiled militants,
although this had as much to do with their reluctance to
endorse the new CP policy as with a desire for greater
( 3  2 )démocratisation. . Guy Hermet gives some idea of the
new CP policy ratified at the plenum of August 1956 :
"In terms of tactics, the plenum ratified the orientation put forward for the first time in June, in the decla­ration of the Central Committee over the policy of national reconciliation and the substitution of the dictatorship by peaceful means. This policy has not been abandoned since then, despite certain vacillations at the time of the May '68 events. It amply drew on the themes of antifrancoist unity and the use of legal means put forward since 1948. But the undeniable novelty of the new policy was the adoption, after 1958, of the new theme 'reconciliation of Spaniards', divided since the Civil War. This concept tried to overcome the very narrow limits of the union of just the workers and Republican forces. Another new element in this policy was the great importance it gave to the 'peaceful road', which meant a preference for legal as opposed to illegal methods of struggle. There is no doubt that this change was not the fruit of an isolated evolution of the Spanish Communist Party. It is evident that it was situated within the line of recognition of pluralism, affirmed by the USSR for the first time in June 1955, thus sealing the reconciliation with Yugoslavia and reaffirmed at the XXth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. (33).
G. Hermet, Paris, 1972,
This policy was based on the Communist Party's analysis
of Francoism. Fernando Claudfn has called this analysis(34)the "explosive" theory of Spanish society. '  . According 
to this theory, a small group of Francoist monopoly capitalists 
were taking the Spanish economy to ruin. No capitalist 
development was seen to be possible in this context, as 
the monopoly structure of industry exacerbated the "feudal" 
elements in Spain, the countryside in particular. What was 
needed then was a wide front of democratic forces (including 
the non-monopoly capitalists, the army, small and medium 
businessmen, peasants, workers and students) to overthrow 
this clique. Although this was theoretically incorrect, 
it undoubtedly appeared feasible, as Spain had tottered on 
the edge of bankruptcy throughout the forties and fifties.
Even the development which had begun in the mid-fifties was 
accompanied by soaring inflation and balance of payments 
deficits. There were also positive aspects of this policy, 
such as their overtures to Christians and Left Falangists. 
However, their belief that no development was possible 
under Franco and that the "people" as a whole were against 
it had serious consequences. For example, each strike wave 
or student disturbance was heralded as the beginning of 
the end of the regime. It also understimated the social 
basis of support for the regime. The large bureaucracy, 
at all levels, whose existence depended on the survival of 
Francoism, along with groups of the "new middle classes", 
especially technicians, who owed their continuing social 
status to the regime, were ignored in the Communist Party 
analysis. .
Moreover, their strategy during this period was to foster
this sort of "explosion". The call for a "Day of National
Reconciliation" on the 5th of May 1958, followed by the
"The National Pacific Strike" on the 18th of June 1959, although
patent failureswere greeted in the party press as great 
(3 6 Tsuccesses. '. It also understimated the gulf which the 
Civil War had brought about, and its attempts to attract 
moderate support is assessed by Lorenzo Torres ;
"At the height of the Cold War, the moderation of the 
Communist Party influenced those whom it was supposed to attract a good deal less that its character as an undisguised satellite of Moscow. For large numbers of the democratic bourgeoisie all Communist Parties, including the Spanish, were the enemy. Moreover, the moderation was hardly understood among the rank and file of the Spanish Communist Party, or among cutain working class groups politically close to it. There was, at this period, in the Communist Party as well as among the other exiled parties, a vigorous sentiment of antl-Francoist revenge which had partly replaced the traditional spirit of revolutionary organisations, and which accorded ill with the new line of moderation." (37).
Torres, London, 1966.
This moderation would lead eventually to splits to the 
Left of the CP from about 1963 onwards, However, the relative 
strength of the Communist Party vis-à-vis other opposi­
tion forces and its exemplary attitude in the face of 
repression, gave it an unparalleled degree of prestige. .
The international climate also helped the CP stage a 
come-back inside Spain. The Cold War had influenced the 
political atmosphere within the exiled organisations, and 
the anti-communism which reigned there meant that the CP 
was isolated from the rest of the exiled opposition and 
had therefore to direct its energies towards the interior 
opposition. The Socialist party had been discredited by 
its agreement with the Monarchists and its belief that
the Western powers, especially the U.S., would help install(39)a democratic regime. ' .
Certainly the change of direction within the CP between 
1956 and 1960 coincided with an important political trans­
formation in Spain which opened-up new areas of action and 
recruitment. Although the regime was not seriously 
threatened by the student and worker opposition in 1956, 
as the CP claimed, it was however criticised by growing 
sectors of the population, who were finally beginning 
to shake-off the lethargy which had characterised the 
years since the Civil War. . Nowhere was this more
apparent than in the Universities, whose changing intellec­
tual environment, during the "liberalisation" under Ruiz 
Gime'nez, greatly helped the growth of the Communist Party. 
From 1951, with international recognition of the regime, 
and the growing contacts with Western Europe and the U.S., 
as Elias Diaz says, greater contacts with more critical, 
scientific philosophies were made, and a dialogue esta-/ 4i \blished with Spanish exiles, . This generation of univer­
sity students, who had never known the Civil War, began 
to put forward more rational criticismsof the official 
ideology, and greater demands for freedom. ' . There 
were moreover other factors which placed the Universities 
at the centre of Intense political activity and discussion 
during the 195Q’s. In the 1930's the Universities had
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been one of the main recruiting grounds for the Spanish
Falange, and it was the militants of the fascist trade
union, the S.E.U., who continued to take the populist(43)demogogy of the Falange seriously in the 1940's. .
This opposition to the "conservative-monarchist-clerical" 
coalition, led to a number of crisis in the 1940's, which 
finally led to a purging of the most political and 
"revolutionary" Falange militants in 1945, when "de- 
fascisisation" took place at all levels of the regime. 
Franco's heterogenous coalition of monarchists, clerical 
conservatives and blue-shirted Falangists had certainly 
allowed for victory over the Left forces, but it was 
a tension-ridden alliance, and nowhere is this more clearly 
demonstrated than in the political organisation of the 
universities. While the Falange were allocated the students' 
union, and the 1943 University Act stipulated that all 
University Rectors' should be Falange militants, it was 
clear that Catholicism was to be the principal means of 
ideological control. 4^4^.
In any case, the Falange never succeeded in controlling
the Universities, as they had wished, as the majority
of those professors kept on or appointed were from Catholic (45)backgrounds. . This was important for two reasons.
Firstly, some members of this group would later hold 
political views which could loosely be described as 
Christian Democrat, and would become an important influence 
within the Universities. Secondly, this allowed the Opus 
Dei to penetrate the Universities more easily, which they 
did at an astonishing rate during the 1940’s. 4^®^.
While the struggle between the Falange and Opus Dei was not 
limited to the Universities in the 1950's (both sought greater 
power and influence within the government and the direction 
of the state), the situation was much more complex in this 
sphere. On the one hand, we find the S.E.U. bureaucrats 
(on the whole purged of "revolutionary sentiments”) 
fighting a rearguard battle against the relentless Opus 
Dei, over control of the universities. On the other,
"liberal" Falangists and more open Catholics, openly
supported by the government minister, Ruiz Giménez, were 
calling for greater démocratisation of student life and 
intellectual freedom. Republicans too, encouraged by the 
timid liberalisation, now became more active. They were 
aided in this by a relative easing of censorship, as
Republican writers and non-orthodox literature and(47)philosophy began to circulate. . Indeed, these years
could best be characterised as ones of "cultural poli­
ticisation", as film and theatre societies, poetry readings 
and discussion groups became arenas for political and 
intellectual debate. It was within this atmosphere that 
the Communist Party's strategy proved to be very effective.
It's non-sectarianism and intellectual open-mindedness 
gained it many sympathisers and recruits. .
Dissident Falangists played an important role in this
political and intellectual "re-birth". Novelists, cinema
directors, economists and playwrights made their debuts
in the pages of the Falangist magazines "La Hora", "24",
"Alcala" and "Haz”, which often overstepped the limits of(49)the official censor. . As Jose Carlos Mainer points
out, many of those who would become important in the 
opposition after the 1950's were to find their "first 
ideological step in the idea of social Falangism, renovating 
and even Left-wing, and their first means of expression 
were the magazines which circulated between 1945 and 1955".^°^
Amongst the student body too, similar processes were at 
work. As A. Pena has shown, within some of the Falange 
S.E.U. groups at the universities, orthodox Falangism 
of a right-wing nature was being questioned, and the 
more "popular" aspects of Falangism gaining ground. From 
these "populist" notions - agrarian reform, nationalisation 
of the banks etc... - it was easy to move towards a pure 
syndicalist radicalism, or a deviation to the Left. As Pefla 
says s "Thus we find the paradox that a large part of
Left-wing students, in the last years of the fifties,
(52)
came from groups that we could classify today as extreme 
right-wing." (51).
It is against this background that the events of 1956 
must be placed. Between the years 1954 and 1956, the 
tensions between cliques intensified. In the first 
municipal elections since the Civil War, the Monarchist 
candidates for seats on the Madrid council gained 28 % 
of the votes, despite violent opposition from the Falange.
In 1954, Calvo Serer put forward the first theoretical 
treatise of the Opus Dei, which heralded the definitive 
push of that group to gain a predominant influence within 
the centres of government decision-making. . An organised
"spontaneous" demonstration against the British presence in 
Gibraltar, in January 1954, ended-up by being a demonstration 
against the government, after the police had fired on the 
crowd. As the S.E.U. had been given the task of organising 
the demonstration, the union was duly purged, while many 
disgruntled Falangists took to the streets in successive 
days of demonstrations. In 1955, the death and funeral of 
the Spanish philosopher Ortega Y Gasset was the scene of 
liberal demonstrations, while Falange and Monarchist students 
clashed at the Madrid Ateneo. .
The situation in the Universities was beginning to seriously
worry the Francoist government, especially as it reflected
the changes taking place within the whole socio-economic
edifice of Spain. The fears that this redicalisation would
extend to the workers were real in the catastrophic economic
situation of 1956. Harsh weather conditions had exacerbated
the still undeveloped agricultural sector, while balance of
payments deficits, soaring inflation and price rises was
affecting both peasants and workers, with a consequent fall(55)in living standards. . The Francoist government responded
to this situation characteristically. It multiplied its 
declarations on the need for social justice and initiated 
a National Housing Plan. Works' Committees (Comités de 
Empresa) were extended to companies with more than 500 
workers. On the other hand, it began a crack-down on the 
uniyersities.
A Congress of Young Writers had been planned for the end 
of 1955, with the agreement of the authorities. It was 
however, not allowed to take place and many of the student 
organisers were detained. A great wave of indignation swept 
through the Universities which reached its peak in February
On the first of February a manifesto was widely distributed 
throughout the universities and colleges calling for the 
holding of a National Congress of Students and the démocra­
tisation of the S.E.U. The S.E.U. chief of Madrid agreed to hold 
elections for course delegates, but this order was cancelled 
by the government the day they were to be held. Outraged, 
the students defied the ban and held elections. For the first 
time non-Falange delegates won posts. Invalidated, the 
students went on to destroy the S.E.U. offices which brought 
hundreds of Falangists, armed with truncheons and pistols, 
to the scene. Several demonstrations and counter-demonstrations 
followed, which resulted in a young Falange militant, Miguel 
Alvarez, being wounded. Although it was never established who 
fired the shot, the Falange issued a warning that in the 
event that he would die of his wound, a hundred intellectuals 
would be killed. (57).
The government acted swiftly : Ruiz Giménez, accused of 
having instigated the whole liberalisation process, was 
relieved of his post, as was the secretary general of the 
Falange, Fernandez Cuesta, who had been unable to keep his 
followers in check. Article 14 and 18 of the "Fuero de los 
Espafioles" were suspended ; from now on any Spaniard could 
be detained for more than seventy two hours without trial.
Seven student leaders were arrested, among whom were
/ c  Q \Ridruejo and Tamames. 1 ' .
The great purge of the University did not end the "student 
troubles", however. On the contrary, it made patently clear
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the limits of the official liberalisation. Those students 
who had been hostile to the monopoly of the S.E.U. and 
censorship now became fervent anti-Francoists ; many who 
had previously been undecided were now pushed to the Left.
Certainly a radicalisation of student politics occurred 
after the 1956 events. The move from a more diffuse "cultural 
politics" towards an attempt to clarify, define, "take sides" 
as it were, began amongst the most active and politicised 
students after 1956. The first political student groups 
began to appear : the Asociación SocialistaUniversitaria 
(Socialists) was one of the most important of that period.
The Unibn Democrática de Estudiantes, which attempted to 
unite social democrats, liberals, Christian-democrats and 
Socialists, was also active. The Communist Party had its own 
organisation in Madrid (ECM) while the first signs of a 
radical-revolutionary alternative appeared in the founding 
of the F.L.P. ( 6 ® ) , a Christian-Castroite group, whose student 
body, N.I.U., was to become increasingly active in the 1960's. 
The CP continued to have considerable influence, but it 
was increasingly contested by other groups to the left, a 
"contestation" which would reach enormous proportions in 
the 60's. (61) .
1956 also witnessed the first mass movements since 1951.
The continual rise in the standard of living provoked
strikes in Pamplona, Bilbao and Barcelona, calling for a
minimum wage. Despite lock-outs and numerous detentions,
the movement spread. Workers in the larger firms struck(62)in Barcelona and Bilbao. .To contain the movement,
the government, presided over by Franco, conceded wage (63)rises of between 25 % and 70 % at the end of the month. ' . 
While the strikes were sporadic and uncoordinated, they 
were proof that the fear of taking strike action was finally 
being eroded. Certainly the Francoists were aware of this 
danger, especially as they took place in a context of 
increasing politicisation among students and intellectuals. .
(2i
Concessions seemed the best way out at this time, as 
denunciations of "Communist activity" were difficult to 
uphold, as both the Church hierarchy and vertical syndicate 
chiefs were expressing support of the worker's case. .
The wage increases only served to fuel the inflationary 
spiral, which reached drastic proportions by the end of 
1956. The Commerce Minister called for strict measures to 
halt the flight of capital, improve foreign exchange and 
depreciation of the peseta, otherwise a possible return 
to rationing would occur. In this situation of impending 
bankruptcy, and with a good deal of American pressure, 
the day of the Opus Dei technocrats had arrived. In December 
1956, Carrero' Blanco's protégé, Lopez Rodôr was named 
Technical Secretary of the presidency. What would seal their 
victory however, and finally determine the government change 
in February 1957, were the dramatic events of January 
and February 1957.
( 66 )
A particularly violent bus boycott took place in Barcelona 
in January, when buses were stoned and overturned. This 
was followed by student disturbances when busts of Franco 
and José Antonio were overturned. A bomb exploded and there 
was talk of groups of guerrilleros being formed. In February 
the agitation spread to Madrid in solidarity with Barcelona. 
An almost complete boycott of all public transport took 
place, while students stoned buses and demonstrated. .
The government change in February 1957, showed how the 
situation was to be dealt with, and indeed would continue 
to be dealt with during the whole Francoist period. All 
the "technical" ministeries were given to Opus (Industry, 
Agriculture, Public Works, the Treasury and Commerce} while 
the army took over six ministries. Liberalisation of the 
economy was not to be accompanied by any liberalisation in 
the political sphere. To assure that order would be maintained, 
Alonso Vega, a hawk even by Spanish standards, and a faithful
friend of Franco, was placed in the Interior Ministry.
To ensure that the Falange would not make any more bids (68)for power ', the more doctrinaire and demogogic leaders 
were removed. . From now on, the only Falangists trusted
with government policy were unconditional Francoist 
supporters. The Opus technocrats soon made their presence 
felt, as their long-term goal was entry into the European 
Community, recently created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957. 
Indeed, in 1958, Spain joined the major European financial 
institutions, and the following year, the "New Economic 
Order", in the form of the Stabilisation Plan was announced.
The object of this plan was clear : "to create an insti­
tutional environment in line with Western European economies 
in all respects but the labour market." ^ 0 )   ^ Measures were 
taken in all sectors. A fiscal plan was drawn-up, foreign 
exchange rates unified, and wage freezes announced. The 
economy had to be "cleaned-up” and inflation halted, while 
guarantees offered to foreign capital. In the latter endeavour, 
it was immediately successful. Soon after the announcement of 
the Plan, in July 1959, the U.S. opened credits worth more 
than 5 million dollars, in exchange for the construction 
of bases, while the Washington Import Export Bank conceded 
loans of up to 17 million dollars. . simultaneously,
and with the struggles of 1956 in mind, the regime tightened up 
its judicial apparatus. Among the most draconian of these 
measures were the setting-up of military tribunals (which 
even further reduced the rights of defendants), and the 
"very urgent summary proceedings" law, which allowed the 
defence (an appointed army officer) four hours to prepare 
his case. .
The regime was no doubt aware of the dangers inherent An its 
"development" strategy, as the events of 1956-1957 had 
demonstrated. These dangers were even more graphically 
illustrated by the strikes in the Asturian mines in March 
1958, which spread to Vizcaya, Giupuzcoa and Catalonia 
later that month. While the wage freeze was not broken 
by the strikes, their scale was proof that the labour front
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remained the principal stumbling block to "controlled (82)development". . The haw of Collective Contracts, issued
in April 1958, attempted to channel this phenomenon within 
the bounds of the policy of the regime. No longer would it 
be possible to decree across-the-board wage increases, which 
only fuelled inflation. Wage rises would now be limited to 
sectors, or even firms, and closely linked to productivity. 
While this narrowed the field of struggle to an extent, it 
also gave a concrete focus to demands. The periodic "cenvenio" 
(agreement) was discussed and debated in meetings and forums, 
while the posts for "jurados de empresa" (works' committee 
delegates) gave a platform to political militants, and yet 
another forum for discussion and debate.
These new mechanisms for workers' representation were to 
take on greater meaning as the working class increased 
in size and confidence, and created the most important 
organisational endeavour of the period, the Workers' Com­
missions. The first mention of the Commissions was made 
during the Asturian mining strike of 1958, although this
type of organisational practice had been used in an "ad(83)hoc" manner for some time. ' ’. But coordination of the
Commissions did not get underway until after the 1962 
strikes. For the intervening period was one of great hardship 
for the working class, suffering the drastic effects of the 
Stabilisation Plan, which led to high levels of unemployment, 
and an enormous increase in emigration.  ^ ,
But the upsurge in mass struggles begun in 1956 gave a
great boost to political organising in the trade union
sphere particularly. Militants of the C.N.T. and the U.G.T.
contracted an alliance in 1956« the Alianza Sindical Obrera
(A.S.O.), which carried out some activity during the 1958
strikes. 1 ' . More importantly however, were the Catholic
Workers’ organisations, the HOAC and the JOC, which were
the most important forces during the 1958 strikes and which(86)began to seriously worry the Church hierarchy. ' '. A trade
union, the Federacion Sindical de Trabajadores (FST) developed 
out of these groups in 1958.
THE FST called for a socialist democracy with workers' 
control and affiliated with the International Confederation 
of Christian Trade Unions. . Later, in the early 60's,
militants of the JOC would form the "Union Sindical Obrera", 
which would become an important force in the trade union 
field in the late 60's, and which similarly was committed 
to socialist democracy and workers' control. The SOC in 
Catalonia was also a development from the Christian Workers' 
movement, as was the AST. . All these groups gave great
importance to popular participation and control, with pre­
ference for broad-based trade union organisation as opposed(89)to a tighter party type. '. Undoubtedly the desperate 
plight of workers, suffering the effects of the Stabilisation 
Plan, and the stepping up of repression, were radicalising 
factors for Christians in the late 50's. For it was becoming 
patently clear that the "development" which Spain was 
undergoing was actually increasing inequalities. While 
the drive to bring down inflation was being felt acutely 
in many sectors of the economy, with loss of overtime and 
lay-offs, the banks registered enormous profits in 1960, 
while the combination of social calm, high interest rates 
and a healthier balance of payments favoured the import of 
foreign capital, capital concentration and the beginning of 
the great tourist "boom". . The OEEC report on the
Spanish economy in autumn 1960, was glowing. Stabilisation,(91)it said, had proved an unqualified success.
These dramatic changes within Spanish socio-economic life 
had profound effects on all sectors of Spanish society, 
but nowhere vuere they greater than within sectors of the 
Church, and amongst the "Europeanists" within the govern­
ment. From 1960 there began a process of "distancing" of 
sectors of the Church, particularly in the Basque provinces,
from the regime, which often went beyond what the hierarchy i 921could tolerate. . The "Europeanists" within the gover­
nment viewed the integration within Europe as unleashing a 
process which would inevitably lead to some sort of 
démocratisation, however meagre, of political institutions.
The Law of Collective Contracts, passed in 1958, had been
an attempt to keep workers' demands within the limits of
"controlled development", but had not been used due to the
restrictions which the Stabilisation Plan had placed on the
economy. Massive emigration and increased repression had
further curtailed workers' protest, and halted the
development of genuine workers’ participation which was
needed if productivity targets were to be met, and stored-
up dangers of a "wage explosion", a danger of which the
( 93 \"Europeanists" were undoubtedly aware.
( 9 4 )It was in this context of stepped-up repression ,
political crisis, and a working class subdued by unemployment,
emigration and lowered living standards, that terrorism(95)erupted on the scene. . Undoubtedly the victory of
Castro in Cuba had profound influences within Spain, espe­
cially amongst students, who quickly made the link between 
that Hispanic nation and their own, both under the umbrella 
of U.S. "protection". The DRIL (Iberian Revolutionary
Directory of Liberation) carried-out a few bomb attacks in 
Madrid in February 1960, while in June bombs were placed in
the Barcelona-Madrid train and left-luggage offices in(97)San Sebastian, Barcelona, and Madrid. . A s  usual, this
upsurge of violence resulted in increased repression, and 
a DRIL member was executed for his part in the Madrid attacks, 
although these had not involved any loss Of life. It was 
clear that the politico-social brigade was becoming increa­
singly effective. In 1960 alone, 146 persons were sentenced 
to 1,007 years imprisonment, reflecting the severe limitations 
of "liberalisation". . it is to the years 1960-1961
that we can trace the beginnings of the present nationalist(99)movements in the Basque provinces and Catalonia. .
ETA, the armed wing of the Basque nationalist movement, 
carried-out its first action in 1961, which led to massive 
arrests, and the use of torture against ETA for the first 
time. Even the "maquisards" reappeared briefly in
1961. The Communist Civil War veteran, "El Campesino", led 
a group in an attack on a power plant, and killed a Civil
guard. As Gallo says, however limited these actions were, 
they were an indicator of the deteriorating situation in 
Spain. ( 101 )
Certainly, the 60's were years of increasing politicisation, 
especially amongst students and the intelligensia. The 
cultural re-birth, began in the 50's, now reached a wider 
audience and its representatives took a firmer and more 
committed political stand. . The opposition slowly
came out into the open and in so doing achieved "de facto" 
some degree of freedom of expression. *103^. one of the most 
important achievements of the early 60's was the recovery 
of the Spanish past, particularly the period of the Republic 
and Civil War, as publishing houses in Buenos Aires and 
Paris published writers prohibited within Spain. *104^.
The extent of this growing contact and unity amongst exiled 
and Spanish intellectuals can be seen in the holding of a 
European Conference for political amnesty, demanding justice 
for all prisoners in Spanish jails. Even the syndical chambers 
of several faculties in Barcelona adhered to it. .
This greater unity in the intellectual sphere was rarely 
present within the political opposition, despite pleas from 
inside Spain for a broad unified front to overthrow the 
regime, or at least to achieve certain gains. . Pre-war
and Civl War memories continued to keep the exiled leadership 
divided. This was particularly the case with the Socialists 
and anarchists vis-à-vis the Communist Party. Undoubtedly 
this continuing division was a manifestation of frustration 
and impotence faced with the successes of the Francoist 
regime. For the Spanish "miracle" was not a mere propaganda 
exercise s the G.N.P., based on an average of 1953—54, stood 
at 142.4 in 1959, then rose to 157.5 in 1961 and to 166.8 in /
1962. Indeed, by 1964, the Industrial index was 141.1, which 
would place Spain in first place in terms of Industrial 
development in the world, before Japan (139.2), the U.S. 
(121.6) and the Soviet Union (121.1). (107) *
But the increasing integration within Europe, and the 
very real development that was taking place, heralded new 
dangers for the regime. This danger was all the greater 
in 1961-1962, as the gap between workers' expectations and 
their reality was increasingly evident. In 1961, productivity 
reached an all-time high, while workers' wages remained 
static. . The response to this situation came in the
Spring of 1961, with a series of strikes and student protests. 
Though as yet localised, this renewal of mass protest brought 
about a re-grouping of the opposition. . The C.N.T. the
U.G.T. and the S.T.V. (the Basque trade union) constituted 
the "Alianza Sindical" in May 1961, while the rest of the 
non-Communist opposition, the Left Christian Democrats, 
the PSOE and the Basque nationalists, formed the Unión de 
Fuerzas Democráticas, whose programme consisted, as always, 
in calling for a transitional government which would supervise 
elections. The Communist Party, after the fiasco of yet 
another attempt at a National Pacific Strike in July 1961, 
said it was prepared to reach an agreement with any activists 
within Spain in order to lead the anti-Francoist movement.
The Francoist government was certainly aware that the 
situation was reaching crisis point. For the long-cherished 
desire of the Opus' technocrats, entry into the Common 
Marked, was being stymied on various fronts, which reflected 
the nature of the regime, and the contradictory development 
process itself. One of the major stumbling blocks to change 
was the agricultural sector. As E. Guzman has shown, despite 
the adoption by the regime of an ideology of “peasant soverei­
gnty" during the previous period, state policies regarding 
wheat production and irrigation had only served to reinforce 
the position of the large estates. . In an attempt to
produce quality produce for European export, the methods used 
by the latifundists would need to be changed, and an 
improvement was needed in working conditions. 1^12^. In order 
to fulfill these tasks, agriculture was now to follow the 
same laws as industry. With the setting-up of the Commission 
for the First Develoment Plan in 1961, and the adoption of
the,
"agrarian industrialism", emigration to the towns was now 
actively encouraged. This was merely a recognition of 
an existing state of affairs, as the rural exodus, constant 
from the 1940's, was spreading to the lower middle sectors 
of the peasantry in the early 1960's. *113 .^ Simultaneously
with this attempt to transform agriculture, the government 
announced a bank reform associating public and private 
banks to encourage investment and modernise the mining and 
industrial sectors. It then made its bid for Common Marked 
entry in 1962. (114).
But if Spain was to take its place within the advanced 
industrial nations of Europe, representative trade unions 
would be needed in the modernisation process, to allow 
planning and avoid the explosions which occur when workers 
are not adequately represented. It is certainly no coinci­
dence that the first Union Congress held since 1953 took 
place in March 1962, with a plan of reform from leading 
"Europeanists" within the Falange unions. The "old guard", 
led by Fernandez Cuesta, waged a successful battle however,
and ended the possibility of renewal within the state-run. (115)syndicates.
As Max Gallo says, the Spanish state had reached an impasse 
in 1962. The impossibility of reforming the Falange syndicates 
as was the case with agrarian reform, was a consequence of 
the nature of the Spanish state itself. As Gallo says s 
"Clan rivalry allowed Franco to remain mediator, while the 
coalition of landowners, Falange bureaucrats and industrial 
capitalists had allowed for development along authoritarian 
lines. But to continue it could not seriously upsetl any of 
the components, and was thus severely limited in its bid to 
integrate Spain within the advanced capitalist world.” ,
Proof of this inability to integrate Spain within Europe 
was the postponement of Spain's Common Market bid, as the 
member states were not unanimous on Spain's entry. .
It was against this background that the greatest strike wave 
since the Civil War took place.
Asturias, home of the 1934 Commune, began the strike on 
April 7th., which was quickly followed by strikes in the 
Basque provinces, Catalonia, Madrid and parts of Andalusia. 
Within a few days, 300,000 workers had struck. Despite the 
declaration of a state of emergency On May 6th., the strike 
continued. Indeed, other workers struck in solidarity with 
the Asturian miners. University students in Madrid and 
Barcelona demonstrated in solidarity, meetings were held, 
and collections taken. Even a hunger strike was staged in 
support. Strikes which had begun spontaneously, demanding 
wage increases, now became increasingly political. Demands 
for an amnesty for political prisoners, especially impri­
soned strikers, and for representative trade unions, inter­
mingled with calls from students for an end to Opus domination 
of the Universities,
The increasingly political nature of the 162 strikes was 
heralded by the main opposition political groupings as the 
beginning of the end of the Francoist regime. The Left 
Christian Democrats, the FLP and the CP all issued communi­
ques to that effect, and called for a transitional government 
. The Communists especially were convinced that "the 
Spanish people would never accept an imposed monarchy". 
However, the 1962 strikes, though of considerable importance, 
were not the "missed revolution". They quickly became 
political because of their significance within a repressive 
dictatorship. But the dictatorship was able to grant some 
concessions, such as wage rises and a "de facto" recognition 
of the Workers' Commissions, while continuing to use its 
"normal" means of control, repression. .
The massive detentions which followed the strikes decimated 
the movement. Communists, Socialists, anarchists, FLPers 
and ordinary strikers, especially the Asturian miners, were 
rounded-up in hundreds, and sentenced to long terms of 
imprisonment. While the "official" political groups suffered 
a serious set-back in the period following the strikes, 
the prestige of the Workers' Commissions was strengthened 
considerably. These "anonymous" and "ad hoc" organisational 
forms had played an important part in organising and
coordinating the 1962 actions, and had shown their efficacy 
in resisting repression. Moreover, 1962 had shown the 
importance of the use of collective bargaining as a useful 
tool to exert pressure. Indeed, most of the firms which 
struck had an unresolved collective contract pending. *122* .
Another important feature of the 1962 strikes was the degree 
of solidarity displayed by students. Indeed, workers and 
students had much in common as both groups sought a more 
representative body to channel their interests. As A. Pena 
has shown, the fundamental objective within the student body 
during the period 1956-1962, was the struggle against the 
official students' union, the S.E.U. 1^23). in an attempt 
to give an air of "organic democracy" to the union, the S.E.U. 
was restructured in 1958, which set-up course councils in 
the universities and trade union Chambers in the colleges.
The students then used these bodies to launch their attacks.
At the same time, a whole number of trade union services 
were introduced in an attempt to bureaucratise and insti­
tutionalise the S.E.U. During 1960 and 1961, strikes and 
professional conflicts took place on an ever increasing 
scale, which demonstrated the inability of the S.E.U. 
to deal with them. As Pena points out, these professional 
struggles were of extreme importance in forging a mass 
student movement with a consciousness of its own strength, 
and the failure of the S.E.U. to resolve these conflicts 
led the student body increasingly to demand a truly 
representative trade union to defend its interests. 1^2*^.
Many of the S.E.U. delegates, in both universities and colleges 
could be loosely described as "syndicalists", and were 
important in putting forth the workers' case and showing 
the common nature of their struggle. Certainly, the strikes 
in Asturias in 1958 were followed by solidarity strikes 
in Barcelona, Madrid, Zaragoza and Valencia Universities.
The largest professional strikes took place in Madrid,
Bilbao and Barcelona in 1961, which led to yet another 
reorganisation of the S.E.U. in September of that year,
which gave the power of veto to the dean (he could now 
veto the elected delegates and approve or not when 
elections took place). This measure greatly radicalised 
the student body, which abandoned the strategy of infil­
tration within the S.E.U., and launched it on a more 
political course of action. (*25)^ «phis growth in the 
internal Spanish opposition, displayed clearly at the Congress 
of the European Movement in Munich in 1962 (where the 
majority of delegates were from Spain), now placed the 
regime on the offensive. The new government of July 1962 
showed that the opposition would be dealt with in the same 
way : Opus Dei retained all the economic ministries, while 
the position of the army was further strengthened. An important 
addition was Fraga Iribarne in the Information field. This 
showed that a new "style was to be introduced, 'young and 
efficient". He represented in the information field the 
equivalent of the young Opus economists already serving 
in the government. .
This new confidence and strength of the government can 
be seen in the repression used against the strikes in 
Asturias and Catalonia in the autumn of 1962. (127)^ while
the wage increases (consequence of the spring strikes), 
and the repercussions of the Cuban Missile Crisis contri­
buted to the lull on the labour front in 1963, it was the 
massive detentions after the spring and autumn strikes (128)which was the decisive factor in the downturn in struggle. 
Again, as in 1960, increased repression and unfavourable 
conditions for mass struggle saw the appearance of armed 
action. The Conseqo Ibe'rico de Liberacfon began a bombing 
campaign against Iberian aircraft, in an attempt to deter 
tourists from visiting Spain. Three members of the "Yeung 
Libertarians" were detained, and the death sentence was 
called for by the military judge. In Milan, Italian students 
kidnapped the vice-consul of Spain, declaring that he would 
not be released until one of the accused was freed. Despite 
reactions from official Spanish circles, the FIJL member,
Conili, was repreived and sentenced to thirty years. ( 1 2 9 )
Others, however, had to pay the full price for their dissent. 
Julian Grimau, member of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party, died after supposedly throwing himself 
from the Security Headquarters in Madrid, in April 1963.
This was followed in August by the execution, by garrote, 
of two anarchists, Francisco Granados and Joaquim Delgado, 
accused of bombing attacks. While bombs continued to 
explode, claimed by the Union Democratica Popular Espahola, 
they did not incur any loss of life nor did they involve 
much material damage. 1^30 .^ These actions did little to 
shatter the strength of the regime. While the executions 
brought forth some anti-Francoist feeling, millions of 
tourists continued to arrive in Spain, while their govern­
ments hastened to improve their relations with a regime that 
opened its doors to foreign investment. 1^31  ^. Long-term 
loans were conceded to Spain by Germany and France, while 
the credits of the Export-Import Bank to the Spanish armed 
forces exceeded 100 million dollors. Spain became a member 
of GATT in July 1963, and in December of that year, after 
two years of preparatory work, the First Development Plan 
officially saw the light. 1^32  ^.
Although dogged from its inception by inflation, the First 
Development Plan introduced in 1964 certainly produced an 
upturn in economic activity. The annual income per head of 
population rose from 443 dollars in 1963, to 637 dollars 
in 1966, while the percentage of population in the rural 
sector fell from 42 % in 1960, to 30 % in 1966 (and to 
25 % in 1971) . Urbanisation increased dramatically, while 
the annual rate of GNP growth from 1960 to 1965 was 9.2 %, 
higher than any other Western European country. Unemployment 
was kept at 2 %, given the high levels of emigration to 
other European countries. 1^33  ^.
It is within the context of economic expansion that the 
tolerance towards the Workers' Commissions between 1964 
and 1967 must be seen. It was also of course, part of a 
longer-term strategy pursued by the European "technocrats" 
since they had obtained the reins of governments in 1957. 
"Integration" of working class demands was now seen as a 
prerequisite for further economic development, by both 
the advanced capitalists of the "Desarrollo" (Development) 
group, and even by sections of the Falange syndicate. 
Undoubtedly too the problem of succession underlay much 
of the search for a consolidation of the regime on a new 
basis, as economic development had radically changed the 
Spain born out of the Civil War, and Franco was now seventy 
years' old. This trust to achieve "integration",
though primarily with an eye to the working class, was also 
directed to the burgeoning middle classes, engaged in the 
service industries, and the expanding industries of a more 
technological type. . Thus we see the informal libera­
lisation carried-out by Fraga from 1962, finally embodied 
in the Press Law of 1966, and the tolerance accorded to 
middle-class radicals such as Ruiz Gimenez, whose magazine, 
"Guadernos para el Dialogo", published from 1963, reached 
a fairly wide audience. This was becoming increasingly 
necessary as sectors of the population not previously known 
for their militancy were beginning to engage in struggle 
in the 1960's. (137).
There is little doubt that it was this attitude of tolerance, 
with a view to integration, that allowed the Workers’ Com­
missions to grow and extend their organisation during these 
years. 1^3®^. From the workers point of view, the experience 
of the 1962 strikes in the North (the Basque provinces and 
Asturias), had certainly shown the benefits of unity in 
struggle. This example was followed in Madrid, in 1964, when 
militants from various organisations, and several "independents" 
set-up a Commission there. Members of the CP, the FLP, the 
FST, the UTS and Christian militants participated in their 
creation. 1^3®).
This is described in a clandestine bulletin of the time :
"Effectively in Madrid, on the tenth of April 1964, and in a massive way on the 20th, in the offices of the official trade union, an assembly of enlaces and jurados was held. (140). These meetings had been called by the trade union school of the 'vertical' to try to indoctrinate the trade unionists in official corporativism. This was repeated on the second of September and they proved to be the meeting place of men from different firms in the Metal industry. On this date, and under the presidency of the hierarchy of the 'vertical' (Vice- Secretary of the provincial social section, the provincial president of the Metal industry, and the head of the Social Section), the creation of a commission of a dozen workers was authorised to represent the enlaces and jurados from the Metallurgy trade in Madrid. Prom that date the meetings continued on a weekly basis till October s about two hundred representatives of the workers supported the commission. Here was the embryo of what was to become the Workers' Commissions : the commission of enlaces and jurados totally representative of the rank and file."
Apuntes Para una historia, Madrid, 1969.
It is certainly an historic irony that the organisation which 
would become the most combative under Franco should be launched 
in the offices of the official trade union, and with the 
wholehearted approval of the syndical chiefs. The latter 
were desperate to breathe some new life into the "vertical" 
and thus maintain their positions within their sole centre 
of power. Moreover, they were hopeful that the new movement 
could be kept under control. However, there does not appear 
to have been any national coordinated strategy towards the 
Workers' Commissions. Attitudes towards the Commissions 
varied from region to region and from firm to firm. But 
legal changes, the new law on strikes and the setting-up 
of Labour Courts , plus contacts with clandestine labour
organisations, indicate that a general orientation of “dialogue" 
with labour was the policy at this time. .
The Madrid Workers' Commissions displayed a greater degree 
of unity during its first years than would be the case in 
Barcelona. Indeed it was from the capital that the principles
of the movement were issued in 1966, signed by members of 
the different political organisations. These were the 
following s (a résumé).
In the preamble to the document it states :
,rThe movement is not motivated by 'exclusivism' or 'factionalism'. No one section of the tendencies now attempting to represent the workers and their struggle should take predominance, and the highest spirit of service to the workers' movement is of primary conside­ration.
1) The official syndicates are rejected because they deny the reality of a difference of interests between workers and employers.2) The struggle for the right to associate is of primary importance.3) Unity, independence and liberty are also crucial to the movement.4) The movement must not be dependent upon a political party, although there is room for 'political parties which are identified with the aspirations and interests of the working class'.5) The workers must recognise their status and position as an exploited group, from which they must emancipate themselves. Organisational independence in this matter does not preclude 'joint actions with other social groups for the achievement of coinciding aims.'6) The 'effective instrument' of the movement will be a federation of labour, whose principles will be freely and democratically decided upon by Assemblies of workersin each place of work.7) All the democratic freedoms are a sine qua non of a labour movement and all tendencies within the movement must be respected. The Assemblies of unions must contrive to avoid control by particularly strong or well-organised groups, at the same time respecting the groups which represent the majority.8) 'We hope that some day we will have at our disposal instruments of the law of the land which guarantee the possibility of our coming under the suspices of a united federation of labour according to the will of the workers, freely and spontaneously expressed.'9) All militants of the workers' movement must collaborate in the propagation of ideas, in the constitution of negotiating and discussion teams, in the coordination of the efforts of all those involved in the worker's struggle.10) The key to success in the achievement of 'traditional and present-day objectives' is unity". (144).
Ellwood, London, 1976.
The meetings in the Madrid "vertical" offices were halted in 
October, after a demonstration of some 15,000 in front of 
the offices of the National Trade Union centre. After this, 
the Commissions met in the social centre of the Movement, 
"Manuel Mateo", in a semi-clandestine fashion, but with 
the approval of certain Falange syndicalists. *145). It was 
from here that the consolidation and organisation of the 
movement took place. Within a short period of time, the 
commissions had been established in the largest and most 
important factories in the area. 1^4^. within a year, however, 
the first signs of dissent appeared, when militants of ASO,
UTS, UST, and the FST tried to set-up a rival organisation 
"as a species of common front against the Communists''.^147  ^. 
This dissent would never reach the levels it obtained in 
Barcelona, nor did it seriously impede the development of the 
Commissions in Madrid. Undoubtedly the growth of the Workers' 
Commissions in Madrid was the greatest in Spain, reaching its 
climax in 1966-1967, when demonstrations of several thousands 
were organised, indicating that a higher degree of unity 
was maintained until then.
The setting-up of the Workers' Commissions in Barcelona followed 
quite a different pattern. Here, the tolerance that was 
shown towards the Commissions in Madrid was totally absent.
"In Barcelona, the experience of the Workers' Commissions was initiated by the spontaneous contacts of the commissions from the different factories at the end of 1964. In November of that year, in an assembly, workers and militants from various political groups and trade unions, about 300, attempted to coordinate the Barcelona Workers' Commissions ; they listed a series of demands, amongst which was the demand for a minimum wage of 200 pesetas. These demands were backed-up by more than9,000 signatures and it was decided that a Commission supported by all the workers should be presented to the vertical hierarchy of the official trade unions. However, the elected commission was detained the day before the demands were due to be handed-in, which did not stop the holding of the planned demonstration, after which, in January 1965, a hundred were detained. (148) .
Apuntes, Madrid, 1969.
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There seem to be differences of opinion over the level of
development of the Commissions in Barcelona. Many militants
I interviewed have argued that the organisation was impeded
from its inception by disagreements and tensions between(149)political groups. . Most writers I believe, underestimaté
the effects of repression on the movement, which meant that 
for a year and a half after the first meetings the movement 
was almost leaderless and uncoordinated. This is undoubtedly 
a situation where political differences are highlighted. 
Despite these bitter political disagreements, which became 
particularly acrimonious after 1968-69, the Commissions did 
obtain a fairly high degree of organisation in the factories. 
(150). In{jee<jf the workers' Commissions in Barcelona were 
second only in importance to Madrid by the end of the 
Francoist period, by which time it had become the strongest 
working class organisation in Catalonia. . The Communist
Party was of primary importance in the extension of the 
Workers' Commissions. The CP dissolved its Organización 
Sindical Obrera, which had been set-up as the CP's trade 
union base, but which had had little success, and advised 
its militants to work within the commissions in their 
areas. This was in response to the important role the 
commissions had played during the 1962 events. Despite the 
considerable clandestine network of contacts and organising 
facilities, the organisation never achieved national 
coordination, "never really exceeded the provincial scale 
in each case, so that each of the great industrial centres 
developed organisations with marked local characteristics ; 
a tendency reinforced, of course, by the difficulties of 
communication and the need to work in secrecy", .
Thus we have the case of Valencia, which only began organising 
a commission towards the end of the experience, and which 
only lasted a year, from 1967 to 1968. . j;n Bilbao,
by contrast, the movement got off to an early start, after 
the 1962 strikes, and was mainly animated by the CP. .
- Ih « -
Seville, a stronghold of the CP since the Civil War, was 
likewise set-up under CP auspices, while in Asturias, Socialist 
Party strength meant that the Commissions were relatively
The strategy of the Workers' Commissions was identical to 
that p rsued by the Communist Party, although other organi­
sations, such as the FLP and the Christian organisations, 
adopted a similar approach :
"The first organisational efforts of worker leaders within a given factory centred around the creation of a workers' commission for the factory which could present candidates for election to the post of 'vocal' (delegate) to the 'jurado de empresa'. When such organisations existed in various factories within an industry it soon became necessary for representatives from the various factories to meet and to discuss particular actions.This led to the beginning of organisations or federations by industry, and each area had federations which reflected its important industrial sector. In Madrid, the 'Federación Siderometalurgica' (Iron and Steel), in Seville, the 'Federación de Construcción', and in the Catalan textile towns the 'Ramo de Agua' or textile federation." (156)
Amsden, London, 1972 p. 58.
It would seem that during the first period of development 
of the Workers' Commissions the organisational workings 
were governed by strict democratic practice. (*57) ^ Despite 
the enormous problems involved (more than five people could 
not legally assemble), problems were discussed and votes 
taken on each issue. This of course depended to a large extent 
to the attitude of the employers. As both Maravall and 
Amsden point out, it was the expanding industries with a 
"Europeanising" mentality which allowed assemblies to be 
held, and therefore the movement to organise. Other
employers however, did not act with such benevolence, and 
in some cases did their utmost to smash the developing 
organisation. This was certainly the case in the Echevarri 
steel works in Bilbao (Laminacfon de Bandas en Frfa) where 
workers struck for five months, a strike which ended in 
victory for the employers. d59)^
It was in the large metal firms of Barcelona, the Basque 
provinces, Madrid and the Asturias mines that industrial 
conflict was concentrated, and it was in these firms, in 
the main, that the Workers' Commissions had their greatest 
strength.
As Maravall points out :
"Working class militancy was concentrated in what had been the historic centres of political radicalism in the 1930's and where, after the Civil War, political opposition to the regime was strong. In spite of massive repression, Francoism could not totally eradicate working class organisations in these areas, and they were important in re-kindling the struggle. However, this political factor was supplemented by changes in the economy. The working class movement re-emerged in pockets of political radicalism which were also the most industrialised centres in Spain, with a high prole­tarian concentration and comparative high rates of immigration. These enclaves were also the wealthiest parts of the country. The main course of action taken by workers was to strike, and workers mobilised mostly on the issue of solidarity. (161). Later on in the seventies, when, as a result of organisational success and of industrialisation, the movement expanded to new centres, the main features of the struggle did not vary much. Conflict in the new centres was often associated with collective bargaining, as the underground groups took full advantage of the possibilities opened up by the system of industrial relations. But conflict was also very openly political, both through displays of working class solidarity, and through the open challenge to the official trade unions (a major issue even amongst bank employees".) (162).
Maravall, London, 1978 p. 204.
During the period from 1959 to 1969 there was a rapid and 
spectacular development in the system of collective bargaining.
. Other developments were taking place which also showed 
the increasing politicisation and degree of antagonism on 
the labour front. Plant bargaining was being increasingly 
used to avoid it being carried-out by the official trade 
unions, and this was overwhelming the case in Barcelona,
Madrid and Bilbao, and in the steel and metal Industries 
in particular. .
Moreover, deadlocks in bargaining became much more frequent, 
and recourse was had to the procedure of compulsory arbitration 
through the Ministry of Labour (Normas de Obligado Cumpli- 
miento). In 1963, only 63,051 workers were involved in this 
system, whereas in 1966 the figure had risen to 438,288. In 1966, 
79 % of the workers in the steel and metal industries, 
and 58 % of miners had their conditions of work regulated 
by compulsory arbitration, in contrast, this was the case 
for only 7,4 % of agricultural labourers. (165)^ T^e overa^^ 
increase in Normas certainly reflected a growing sense of 
militancy : the ratio increased from 2.6 % to 20 % in the 
decade from 1960 to 1970. .
A further demonstration of the growing strength of the 
working class movement, and the success of Communist Party 
strategy, was the election of a majority of officials from 
the Workers' Commissions in the September 1966 trade union elections. 
This seemed to vindicate CP strategy, and the use of legal 
and extra-legal methods. However, the relatively open campaigns 
which preceded the elections left the Commissions very 
vulnerable to repression. This became apparent after a series 
of strikes and partial stoppages which affected many parts 
of Spain in 1966. . workers' leaders were easily
identified, due to their participation in the elections.
Many leaders were dismissed from their posts, others were 
sacked from their jobs, while some were arrested (Marcelino 
Camacho, Julian Ariza and Manuel Otones). The very campaign 
itself generated a climate of militancy and level of mobili­
sation which went way beyond what the government and the 
employers could accept, as this clandestine bulletin of the 
time points out :
"The months prior to the elections were characterised by a great upsurge in the mass movement, which meant that the Workers' Commissions gained a majority in the trade union elections. In Madrid, joint candidacies were established with the AST and USO. In Barcelona it was again possible to hold large assemblies. In August of that year, workers from Barcelona and the surrounding counties met and held large meetings. It was in this period of euphoria that all the organisational bases, supported in branches of production, and the sovereign capacity of the assemblies, were created." (168)
Apuntes, Madrid, 1969.
This increasing militancy was, in the sense, a product of 
the contradictory development framework itself, and the 
political responses to it. For although economic development 
had been dramatic, it had been accompanied by a steep rise 
in prices and the cost of living, with inflationary tendencies 
getting steadily worse. Undoubtedly the increase in
"Normas" reflected the inability of employers to concede 
wage increases, as much as they reflected growing working 
class organisational strength. From the end of 1966, Bilbao 
firms ended all overtime. Similar measures were taken in 
Catalonia in mid-'67. In Sagunto, in Valencia province, the 
iron and steel works asked for permission to reduce their 
work-force by a fifth. (170)^
(171)
The success of the 1966 election campaign, and the increasing 
militancy and politicisation of the workers'movement, led 
to intense repression of the Workers' Commissions in 1968.
And this repression caused a major crisis within the movement. 
Certainly ideological differences came to the fore, as Maravall 
explains : "These disputes centred on the type of organisation 
and the strategy of the 'comisiones' : some groups criticised 
what they considered to be an excessive reliance on 
'personalities' and individual leadership, an over-optimistic 
belief that a democratic 'breakthrough' was close, a lack of 
secrecy, and consequently, an over-exposure to repression.' 
Indeed, from about 1966, Catholic, Socialist, and Left Falange 
militants criticised the methods used by the Communists, 
especially the systematic use of votes of confidence which 
gave them a free hand. It was precisely over this issue that 
a serious crisis occurred in Madrid, in June 1967, when 
Socialist representatives from the U.G.T. and the PSOE,
Catholic and independent Socialists left to set-up their own 
trade unions. (173)^
(173)
Similar problems in Bilbao left the Commissions in such a 
state of weakness that organisation was halted for a consi­
derable period of time. .
i  ‘-m
This crisis was not confined to criticism from militants 
outside the organisation, however, but came from within the 
ranks of the party itself. The first serious split within the 
CP took place in 1963, when the majority of the Madrid 
student organisation split and adopted pro-Chinese positions. 
From then onwards, a whole series of splits took place, and 
groupings and re-groupings, of which the most important were 
the pro-Chinese CP (Marxist - Leninist), and the less orthodox 
Movimiento Comunista (ML) , both primarily student-based 
organisations. . The crisis did not affect workers
within the Communist Party until 1967, when one of the most 
serious splits occurred in Catalonia, where many workers 
joined the new "Bolshevised" party, the PC International.
Certainly the moderate nature of the CP's policy of "national 
reconciliation" was becoming increasingly apparent. At the 
Sixth Congress, in 1960, the difference was established between 
"regular" and "irregular" organisation (between the party and 
the movement). This attempt to create a people's party, 
or mass movement, seemed an urgent necessity, as the peripheral 
sympathisers of the party grew steadily throughout these years, 
in particular amongst intellectuals. Indeed, the structures 
of the organisation were even changed to make them more 
attractive to the middle-classes. Article 33 was modified 
so that individual adhesions were authorised outside of the 
cell structure. .
The policy of "national reconciliation", went much further 
than that, however. Guy Hermet, commenting on the consequences 
of the policy begun in 1956, but more fully elaborated in 
1960, has this to say s
"Throughout the following years, the Communist leaders multiplied their appeals to the 'middle classes', and particularly to the 'non-monopolistic bourgeoisie'.They even paid homage to the police and the army. An article published in December 1960, showed the almost friendly attitude to the Civil Guards and the Commandant Pardo de Santayana, respectively the guards and the defence consul in the trial of the congress members on their return from Prague. Shortly after this, in a speech directed to the armed forces during the strikes in May'62,
the secretary general of the party spoke of the apparent sympathy of the Civil Guards towards the strikers, and called on the army not to allow Franco to undermine their honour. "
Hermefc, Paris, 1972 p. 108.
As we have seen, the Communist Party's analysis of Spanish
isociety rested on the belief that the next stage of developments, 
"the democratic revolution" and the policy of "national 
reconciliation" was designed to unite sectors of the "democratic 
non-monopolistic" bourgeoisie with workers, students and 
intellectuals, in a common front against the Francoist clique 
of monopoly capitalists. This analysis was contested within 
the Central Committee itself, which led to the expulsion of 
Fernando Claudin and Jorge SemprGn, accused of right-wing 
deviationism in 1964. Claudin, a leading intellectual within 
the party, and third most prestigious leader after Dolores 
Ibárruri and Carrillo, pointed to the high level of develop­
ment of Spanish capitalism, and disagreed with Carrillo 
that a bourgeois democratic revolution was needed, as Spanish 
capitalism had developed along Prussian lines. The next 
historic stage was socialism, given the degree of socialisation 
achieved under Franco, he argued. National reconciliation did 
have a "tactical" usefulness though, given that the political 
and social conditions did not Xet exist for a direct transi­
tion to socialism. But one had to be careful of alliances with
the bourgeoisie, and ensure that working class "independence"(178)was maintained, and socialist goals protected. v .
On the other hand, Claudin criticised the catastrophic and 
subjective interpretations of the political and economic 
situation in Spain, accepted erroneously by the party lea­
dership. For the Communist Party continued to believe, 
despite the evidence of economic development that was apparent 
to all, that the Francoist regime was on the verge of 
collapse, and that a national general strike by workers 
would be sufficient to topple it. The party, Claudfn argued, 
had mistaken the political crisis, a crisis of the form of
capitalist domination, with the crisis of Spanish capitalism 
itself. This can be seen clearly in the CP's analysis of 
the 1962 strikes, which were not seen as a product of econo­
mic development, but as a vindication of the party's notion 
of the regime's imminent fall. 1^79^. Claudin reproached 
himself, and his colleagues, for having sacrificed numerous 
militants in the clandestine struggle because "of a mistaken 
analysis". .
Claudin's criticisms of Communist Party strategy are well 
illustrated by a look at the party's work within the Workers' 
Commissions. CP militants worked hard within the Commissions, 
kept their "political" views in the background, and worked 
together with Falange and Christian militants for concrete 
demands, However, the party's "catastrophic" analysis
of Francoism led them to believe that one day they would 
replace the Falange within a renovated trade union 
organisation, and led them to sorely underestimate the powers 
of repression at the disposal of the state. That this was 
generally accepted can be seen in this interview with a 
Workers' Commission leader :
"I think that the basic problem was that we believed that everything was at hand, you see. So we didn't really expect the brutal repression that was to follow, the series of states of emergency, the systematic beheading of 'comisiones'. I remember that in 1969, the Provincial Commission of the Metal industry had only two members, while in 1967 it had sixty. The openness of 'comisiones', which was one of the reasons for its success, made repression easier."
Maravall, London, 1978 p. 254.
Certainly the increasingly moderate nature of the CP, and its 
policy of "national reconciliation”, was the primary cause 
of the various splits to its left, which resulted in an 
incredible proliferation of Maoist and Trotskyist groupings 
throughout; the Francoist period. . Carrillo's calls to the
bourgeoisie seriously damaged his credibility,especially amongst 
his own militants.
As Paul Preston points out :
"The all-embracing search for alliances clearly ran up against the harsh reality of class contradictions. And those members of the bourgeoisie who did seek change were doing so to assure their own future. Effectively, the representatives of the Army, the Church, and the haute bourgeoisie would only ally with the PCE when it could offer guarantees to keep the working class in check. Increasingly many in the party began to feel that Carrillo was either harbouring vain illusions or prepared to play such a guarantor's role".
Preston, London, 1976 p. 148.
Despite its shortcomings, and its failure of analysis, the 
Communist Party had however highlighted one of the most 
fundamental problems of the left under the Francoist dicta­
torship i.e. the type of organisation to adopt. For to remain 
at the level of a clandestine party, with a strict recruit­
ment policy, could mean isolation and ineffectuality. To "come 
out into the open", and try to build-up a mass movement, 
especially when the conditions favoured this, as they did 
after 1962, opened-up enourmous possibilities, but left 
it open to repression.
As Maravall has pointed out, it would seem that in the first 
period of the dictatorship the only possible strategy was 
an underground effort to survive and protect the organisation, 
a strategy which the U.G.T. adopted. During the second 
period, however, when there was a relative opening of 
society and limited reforms decreed, infiltration of the 
corporatist institutions was profitable. But onee mass 
mobilisation had been achieved, after 1967, the strategy 
of boycotting the legal institutions seemed the best strategy.
"The intentiion was to avoid repression, to produce the collapse of the official unions, and to replace them by illegal factory assemblies and committees. This was especially the case after 1974, and assemblies and committees spread through factories, pits and building sites. It seems to me therefore, that the strategy of
the U.G.T. was right in the first and third period, but that the infiltration and mobilisation achieved by 'Comisiones Obreras' were of major importance in the growth of the working class movement and, furthermore, that they made the transition form a first period of survival to a third period of subversion possible."
Maravall, London, 1978 p. 170.
A very similar strategy was followed by the student 
movement. Students had used the legal platforms in the 
councils and trade union chambers, like their counterparts 
in the Workers' unions, to put forward demands for freedom of 
association, expression and university reform. By concen­
trating on "professional" issues, such as curricula and 
unemployment, plus the use of legal posts, the movement was
developed and extended beyond the enclaves of political ( 18 3 )activists. . The main objective in this period was the
dismantling of the SEU, and the creation of a democratic 
trade union. The FUDE (Spanish Democratic University Federation, 
the INTER in Barcelona), was set-up in 1961-1962 as the demo­
cratic alternative, mainly animated by the Communist Univer­
sity group, the FLP and the Socialists. In 1962, secret FUDE 
candidates were successful in the official elections for 
representatives posts in the Chambers of Delegates. Despite 
sanctions, the capacity of the Chambers of Delegates to 
mobilise developed considerably, while the elections were 
of great importance in politicising the university. .
The decree issued which gave the dean the right of veto, 
in September 1961, only served to further undermine the SEU, 
while solidarity by students during the strikes of Spring '62 
led to detentions and sanctions which radicalised students 
further. At the end of 1963, the CUDE (Confederacitfn Univer- 
sitâria Démocraties EspaTiola) was set-up which united the 
various trade unions which had been organising in the Uni­
versities. A major attack was then launched against the 
last remnants of the SEU. The years 1964-1965 were
ones of increasing conflict in the Universities. Free 
assemblies were held, lecture weeks organised and sit-ins 
took place on an ever increasing scale. Expulsions, sanctions 
and violent confrontations only served to radicalise the 
movement. The Universities were now turned into "liberated
territories", and the overwhelming majority of university 
districts withdrew from the SEU. Elected representatives now 
set themselves up as-the future democratic union. An attempt by 
the government to replace the SEU by the Professional Students' 
Association backfired when the national delegates of the 
professional associations resigned in 1967. The new democratic 
student union, the Sindicato Democrático de Estudiantes, 
was now operating in all Spanish universities, and the 
"liberated territories" of the universities became centres 
of a veritable sub-culture, with non-stop political discussions, 
seminars, plays and films. .
However, the universities were no longer ghetto®. Solidarity 
actions were carried-out with workers in 1966, and throughout 
mos of 1967. The largest working class action since the 
Civil War, organised by the Workers' Commissions in January 
1967, was supported by students occupying the University 
of Madrid. One of the most impressive demonstrationscarried- 
out by students and workers occurred on October 27th 1967, 
which led to 1,500 detentions, many of whom were students.
The "suicide" of Rafael Giujarro in February 1967 raised the 
tension further, and helped spread protest to universities 
unaffected until then,
The growing solidarity between the worker and student
movement was viewed with alarm by the government, especially
as the left saw the fusion of these two movements as its (188)main objective. v '. Increased repression during 1968
only succeeded in radicalising the movement further. Throughout
1968 strikes and sibudent demonstrations were almost continuous,
and even recitals by left-wing singers were the scenes of
( 18 9)meetings and confrontations. ' .In April and May 1968, 
three days of protest organised by the Worker's Commissions 
was met by mounted police and numerous confrontations.
The application of the 1960 Law against Terrorism by the 
government could not contain the movement ; strikes, 
demonstrations and violent confrontations with the police 
continued, .
It is against this background of unprecedented struggle and 
combativity that the declaration of the state of exception 
in January 1969 must be seen. The actual pretext for calling 
the state of exception was the recent student disturbances 
after the "suicide" of Enrigue T^ iano, a student who had 
apparently thrown himself from the seventh floor while in 
police custody, _ But. ^  more likely that the
state of exception was designed to end the tension of the 
previous years, especially as police brutality and intense 
repression were exacerbating the trend towards revolutionary 
violence. This was certainly the case within sectors of the 
student movement, but particularly so in the Basque separatist 
movement, ETA, who had killed the chief of the politico- 
social police in August 1968. .
A massive operation was launched in late 1968 to dismantle 
ETA, whose members were likely to get the death sentence.
ETA prisoners demonstrated, and in December 1968, ETA members 
staged hunger strikes in the prisons of Soria and Madrid, 
while wives of ETA members occupied Churches in their support. 
The government was undoubtedly aware that the Vizcaya 
Workers' Commissions were strongly influenced by ETA, and 
indeed many of the strikes in Bilbao in 1968 were carried- 
out by ETA's Workers' Front, which had been set-up in 1967.
The strong attraction ETA held for the student movement, and 
Che links both these movements had with the working class, 
which had proved their revolutionary character in Paris, 
in May 1968, must have been viewed with alarm by the gover­
nment. As yet this only affected a small minority within both 
the student and workers' movements, but it was clear that
ETA was admired, not just within the Basque provinces, but(194)within the workers' movement throughout Spain.
The end of the "liberalisation" experiment with the delcaration 
of the state of exception would have important consequences 
for the "internal composition" of the workers' movement.
The "mass movement" character of the 60's was destroyed 
for a time, while small "grupuscules" of Maoist, Trotskyist 
and anarchist persuasion abounded. This was especially 
true of the student movement. Due to internal differences 
over strategy and the severity of repression, the mass 
democratic union, the SDE, was disbanded in 1969. 1^95 .^ The
consequences of these changes are spelt-out by Maravall :
"The link with the working class movement was still central, but after 1968, the working class movement was seen as "rezagado1 (lagging behind), 'frenado' (putting on the brakes) as wage-oriented. A theory of 'political substitution' began to circulate, according to which the students would have to carry on in a situation of 'prole­tarian retreatism".
Maravall, London, 1978 p. 223.
Although students would again show their solidarity with 
workers in struggle, the type of movement generated in the 
60's would be ended, and the universities became "ghettoised". 
The workers' movement was not, however, immunised from many 
of the ideas aired in student circles, especially after the 
May '68 events. In the years ahead, the burning question 
- mass movement or revolutionary party - would be increasingly 
asked within the workers' movement itself.
THE CONTINUITY OF FRANCOISM : A NEW CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK.
It was during the late 60's that a new constitutional 
framework was sought which would secure the continuity 
of Francoism after Franco's death. Economic development 
was still seen as the cornerstone of the regime's success, 
and the Second Development Plan was introduced in 1969.
During its existence till 1972, the GNP grew at an average 
annual rate of 6 % - well above the planned 4 %. . The
desire to integrate Spain within Europe and the Common Market 
continued to be the regime's principal objective, and measures 
were taken between 1966 and 1969 to "normilise" the regime 
and gain it some "democratic" creidibility, while simultaneously 
guaranteeing the continuity of the Francoist regime.
The well-orchestrated official campaign, which allowed the
Organic Law of the State to be approved by referendum in
December 1966, gave the regime an overwhelming sense of
legitimacy : 88,79 % voted, of whom 94.05 % said "yes". .
While not substantially changing anything, the Law did allow
for some cosmetic changes, like the legal disappearance of
the Falange (now called the "Movement"), and by giving the(198)Cortes slightly increased representative powers. '. The
final coup de grace of this process came in July 1969, when 
Franco named as his successor Don Juan Carlos, the monarch 
which Franco himself had groomed. Two years earlier Franco 
had elevated Carrero Blanco, Franco's "grey eminence", to 
the vice-presidency of the government. As Gallo says : "The 
stage was set for post-Francoism. As it was rumoured in Madrid, 
'the operetta king and the Chancellor <rf Iron' would secure
a suitably ’.stable' transition which would hopefully convince(199)Europe of its credentials."
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But this strategy of "democracy for Europe" and repression 
at home, was a difficult tightrope to walk. This was demons­
trated clearly when the state of exception had to be lifted 
a month before it was intended, due to the fear of loss of 
tourist revenue, and the level of opposition both at home 
and abroad. (200)  ^ For while the state of exception had 
dealt a blow to working class and student organisation, it 
had not succeeded in eradicating strikes and protest actions 
during its application, and indeed, many strikes had taken 
place against the state of exception itself. Protests against 
the state of exception did not come solely from the workers' 
and student movement however.Basque priests, Spanish bishops, 
and even "procuradores" from the Cortes united with Spanish 
emigrants throughout Europe in calling for an end to the state 
of exception. It was becoming increasingly apparent that 
measures which the regime had taken with impunity during 
the 1940's would now be met with stiff opposition, both at 
home and abroad. (201)^
But the repression did not let up. Indeed, more deaths
occurred from 1969 to 1975, in strikes and demonstrations,
than throughout the earlier part of the sixties, reflecting
the growing polarisation taking place within Spanish society.
During a peaceful demonstration in Erandio, a Bilbao suburb,
in October 1969, the Civil Guard opened fire on the crowd,
( 202 )killing two people and seriously wounding many others.
In July 1970, in Granada, three workers were killed and 
several wounded while demonstrating peacefully in front of 
the official syndicates. (203)  ^ strike activity was certainly 
on the increase in 1970. Asturian miners, Madrid building 
workers and Catalan textile workers struck for wage Increases, 
better working conditions or in solidarity with other workers 
on strike. (204)_ one of the most spectacular strikes took 
place in July 1970, when the Madrid metro workers were 
threatened with court martial and "militarised" back to 
work. (205).
Undoubtedly the strike "explosion" in 1970 was inevitable 
sooner or later, given the wage freeze maintained since 
1967. But one of the most distinctive features of the strikes 
in the 70's was the increase in solidarity strikes, and 
those for "political" demands. (206). Another important 
aspect of these strikes was the increasing number agreed 
to in assemblies. This was the case with the Bilbao metal 
workers and the Madrid metro workers. ' . Although the
Workers' Commissions continued to have an important clandestine 
network, (especially in the large metal firms which had been 
the sector most influenced by Comisiones), even in these 
firms the opposition to Comisiones was growing, as the 
growth of "wild-cat" strikes, and the proliferation of 
factory committees and assemblies testify. v .
1970 also saw the greatest crisis for the regime yet, 
in the famous "Burgos trial", when the regime ordered a 
military trial for sixteen ETA members, and called for six 
death sentences and more than seven hundred years impri­
sonment. Protests came from all sectors, lawyers, intellectuals, 
priests, while demonstrations took place throughout Spain 
and Europe. Pressured by the Church, the proceedings were 
finally held in public, and their onset was greeted with 
a general strike in the Basque provinces (even small-shop­
keepers closed in solidarity). Three hundred Catalan intellec­
tuals including the painter Joan Miró, occupied the monastery(209)in Montserrat, where they remained for forty eight hours.
Tension increased when Germany's honorary consul in San 
Sebastian, Eugen Beihl, was kidnapped by ETA, and threatened 
with death if any of the six death sentences were carried 
out. The West German government reacted by threatening 
economic sanctions if the sentences were imposed. This was 
certainly a serious threat, as Germany was the second most 
important supplier, second customer, and third largest foreign 
investor in Spain. This was undoubtedly the greatest humiliation 
the regime had suffered yet, and, for the first time in 
thirty-odd years, Spain's ruling class was not sole arbiter 
of the situation. (21°).
The trial itself was an act of great political importance,
as accused after accused denounced the torture they had
received, and called for socialism as the only solution
to the economic, social and nationalist problems in Spain.*211^
This was countered by a 100,000 strong pro-Francoist
demonstration in Madrid, followed by similar acts in most
of the larger Spanish cities, the size of which surpassed
the authorities' aspirations for such "show" events. The
Falange, the Army, and the Right generally, were showing their
opposition to any relaxing of measures of "Law and Order",
with the slogan, "Spaniards, Let's Unite against the Whole 
(2121World". . The unrest within the Army was serious.
Thousands of officers issued a manifesto calling for severe
measures to stem the tide of opposition, while General
Perez Viñeta warned that he would initiate a "Crusade" against(213)those who disturbed the peace. . Others, such as Garcia
Valiilo, demanded that the Army withdraw from the trial, 
arguing that "the identification of the Army with the regime 
only intensified its separation from the people". 2^14^.
In the event Franco managed to act with his customary skill 
in resolving the crisis. The double death sentences applied 
by the military court in Burgos were reprieved by the 
Caudillo himself, thus appeasing the right while satisfying 
the German government. As Ben Ami says : "The pressure of 
the Right, the Army and 'public opinion' in support of a 
'hard hand' was interpreted by Franco as support of the 
amnesty, without it being seen as a capitulation before the 
capitals of Europe, nor as a victory for ETA terrorism," 2^15 .^
This act of clemency did not mean any relaxing of the arsenal 
of repression. On the contrary, the "Burgos" trial, and its 
aftermath, marked the beginnings of the "Right offensive", 
with increased state repression and the growth of extreme 
right-wing groups, tacitly supported by the authorities,
Ths suspension of Article 18 of the Spanish Charter was used 
to round-up militant workers, students, intellectuals, left- 
wing militants and members of the Workers' Commissions 
throughout Spain. *216 .^ Those who opposed the regime would
now be court-martialed, and not, as before, tried in civil 
courts. The death sentence would henceforth be automatic 
for those accused of terrorism. 2^17^. it would seem that 
the dictator, during the final years of his reign, was 
determined to maintain Spain on the course he had set her 
on, and, as earlier hopes that economic liberalisation would 
bring about "integration" were proved groundless, repression 
remained the only way to keep Spain within the narrow limits 
which the Francoist state had imposed.
ETA continued to receive the biggest share of this repressive
onslaught and its members were usually tortured during
interrogation, and sentenced to long terms of imprisonment
in military courts. ' ' . ETA replied in kind, with a series
of bank robberies, hold-up?, bombings and kidnappings which
became more frequent from the end of 1971. In January 1972,
the managing director of the Precicontrol company, Zabala,
was kidnapped, and was only released after he had reinstated
the 183 workers sacked for striking, and after an increase(219)in wages had been decreed. ' .
This escalation in violence was not confined to shoot-outs
between ETA and the police and Civil Guard (which were
numerous between 1972 and 1973), confrontations between
striking workers and the police also increased dramatically(220)during the same years. . One of the most impressive acts
of combativity and solidarity was displayed at the car plant
Seat, in Barcelona in October 1971, when workers occupied
the plant in support of twenty sacked workers. Some of these
workers had been sacked for their trade union activity, but
reinstated by the Labour Magistrature. When the employers
refused to uphold this decision, 7,000 workers went on strike
and decided in assembly to occupy the plant. A pitched
battle ensued with the police, with workers brandishing
iron bars and hammers. The confrontation lasted till late(221)afternoon, with several wounded on both sides. .
The strike wave which got under way at the end of 1971 was
itself a product of the rapid development which Spain had
undergone during the previous few years. The "consumer boom"
of these years had fuelled inflation, with a steep rise
in prices which was not matched by a corresponding increase
in wages, which, since 1970, had been kept at 6.5 %. *222*.
The 1971 strikes affected large sections of workers, many
of whom had not previously been known for their militancy, and
were on the whole carried out when negotiations for the new
( 2 2 3 )collective contracts broke down. . During the first
months of 1972 the strike wave gained momentum, affecting 
shipbuilding, engineering, tyre making in Vitoria, while 
bank workers launched a three-pronged assault in Madrid, 
Barcelona and Seville. 2^2^ #
One of the most important, and tragic strikes took place
in El Ferrol, Franco's birthplace, in March 1972, when
workers struck after the signing of the collective contract.
After six workers were sacked for their involvment in these
strikes, the Bazan shipyard was occupied by 3,000 workers.
The police retaliated by wounding twenty three men, which
led to further demonstrations and the killing of two workers.
The demonstrators continued, forcing the police to withdraw
to their barracks, and for a few hours El Ferrol was in the
hands of the workers. When reinforcements finally did arrive,
they found the entire town in mourning - shops, offices, bars,
cinemas, factories and schools all closed in sympathy. In a
ministerial meeting in which Franco himself was present, the
crisis was resolved by threatening the workers with court-(225)martial, and "militarising" them back to work.
Solidarity actions were not confined to Gallicia, where 
thousands of workers struck in solidarity, but extended 
throughout Spain in the days ahead. Indeed, the events in 
El Ferrol did not serve to "contain" the movement, if that 
was the intention, but merely served to extend the strike 
wave and radicalise it further. Again, in April 1973, another
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shooting occurred at San Adrian de Besoms, a suburb of 
Barcelona, when building workers struck for a minimum 
wage, holidays and better working conditions. The death 
of a worker, when the police were called in by management 
after declaring a lock-out, led to a twenty-four hour strike 
by some of the larger firms in Barcelona : Seat, Maquinista, 
Hispano-Olivetti and several building firms. (226) ^ >j>he 
Workers' Commissions, working with the students' organisa­
tions, led a demonstration of some 4,000 in Barcelona, 
while solidarity actions were carried-out in most of the 
larger Spanish towns. 2^27 .^
On the University front, 1972 was to prove to be the "hottest 
year" since 1969. Certainly it took little to propel the 
situation to confrontation point, as the Universities had 
been virtually occupied since 1968, when campus police were 
introduced on a permanent basis. v '. Moreover, as the 
Inter-Faculty Study Group of Madrid University pointed out,
there were few career opportunities for graduates, the. (229)majority of whom were forced to seek employment abroad.
The mass mobilisations of the universities in the late 60's
and early 70's were on the basis of university reform, allied
to demands for representative trade unions, and students
were striking for reform of their courses more frequently
in 1970 and 1971. 2^20^. As a result of such a strike by
medical students in Madrid, the Rector of the University
cancelled the enrollment of these students and demanded a
written apology from each of them, with a guarantee that( 231 )they would respect the authorities in future.
This action led to violent confrontations in the University 
of Madrid, followed by similar disturbances in several 
provincial universities. Students were fined, detained and 
expelled, and the medical faculty of Madrid University 
closed for a record five months. The movement continued 
however, despite the setting-up of disciplinary councils 
and regulations which allowed the permanent expulsion of 
subversive students and teachers. Teachers now had to hold
a "good conduct" certificate before being allowed to teach.
In July 1972, the autonomy of Madrid and Barcelona Univer- 
sities were suspended for a year. ' .
These measures brought forth the resignation of university 
Rectors, deans and professors in many Spanish universities, 
who were everywhere replaced by more rabid Francoists. But 
the agitation continued throughout 1972 and the first half 
of 1973, with strikes and confrontations with the police 
becoming a daily occurrance. The closure of Barcelona 
University, and the sacking of the Rectors of Barcelona 
and Madrid Universities did not bring the disturbance to an 
end, and the tension continued to mount throughout 1973. (233)
With agitation in the Universities at an all-time high, and 
a renewed strike at Seat and Barcelona, (which was contested 
by a lock-out by management), the extreme Right went on the 
offensive. Groups such as Guerrillas of Christ the King,Cruz 
Ibérica and the Círculo de Amigos de Europa, spounting nazi 
slogans, attacked progressive priests and carried-out hold-ups 
on banks. The complicity of the authorities in these actions, 
which moreover, were tried in civilian courts, only served 
to increase the already high level of tension in the 
universities and working class districts, which culminated in 
the stabbing to death of a policeman, the first since the 
Civil War, during the May Day demonstrations in Madrid. (234)  ^
The killing of a policeman, and the wounding of two others 
by FRAP (Frente Revolucionário Antifascista Patriótico) 
brought the Right and the police onto the streets, in 
massive demonstrations of strength, where both the Opus 
and the Interior Minister, Garicano, were openly attacked 
and ridiculed. As De Blaye says :
"The events of I st May were actually the opportunity the 'ultras' had longed for to precipitate developments. They wanted to put a strong man at the head of Spain's government before Franco died. Tired and old, the monarch of El Fgr.do was obviously no longer capable on his own of giving a serious turn of the screw. On 8th June 1973, the Generalissimo yielded to the pressure of those around him. Thenceforth, Luis Carrero Blanco would take
on the actual exercise of power. There was certainly 
nothing surprising in this choice. With Carrero the faithful, Carrero the ruthless, there was no cause for fear, the continuity of the system was assured : it was rather like Caetano in relation to the late Salazar.." (235).
de Blaye, London, 1974 p. 358.
The government formed by Carrero Blanco showed the sharp 
turn to the right which had taken place amongst Spain's 
governing classes since the Burgos trial. Men such as 
L<5pez Bravo, believed to be too "soft" in his foreign 
policy, especially with the British over Gilbratar, and 
the Interior Minister Garicano Gofii, who had refused to 
shoot on the demonstrators during the May Day events, were 
replaced by more "hardline" Francoists. The new Interior 
Minister, Arias Navarro, known as the "hangman of Malaga" 
for his ruthlessness during the Civil War, embodied the 
renewed vigour of the right, and their determination to 
end the "disturbances" of the previous years. (236)^
Despite the increased presence of the Falange in the new 
government of Carrero, economic expansion and modernisation 
continued to be the major priorities, and "Opus" men continued 
in the key ministries. The economy certainly continued to
grow, with a 10 % increase in industrial production in 1972,(237)and had recovered from the recession years of 1967—1969.
The Third Development Plan for the years 1972-1973 was viewed 
with great optimism, with hopes that Spain would become one 
of the richest industrial countries in the world seemingly 
well placed. ' '  . With economic expansion underway, and
the problems of the Succession solved with the ascension to 
power of Carrero, Spain's governing classes had reason for 
optimism in mid-1973. But the situation changed dramatically 
in December, when Carrero Blanco was blown to pieces in his 
car as he returned from daily mass in Madrid. The operation, 
carried-out by a commando of ETA, was so well planned and 
executed that at first it was thought that army specialists 
were involved. '. Everyone held their breath as news
of an army takeover circled through Spain. In the event, 
despite numerous detentions, a state of emergency was not 
declared and the army remained in its barracks.
It appears that the "neutrality" of the army was due to 
the intervention of the moderate chief of the General Staff, 
Diez Alegría, who prevailed against the Guardia Civil chief 
Iniesto Cano, one of the most extreme "ultras", who had 
called on Franco to stage a right-wing coup. ^
The choice of Carrero's successor at the end of December, 
came as no surprise. Arias Navarro, Carrero1s tough Interior 
Minister, was considered second only to Carrero in his 
fidelity to Franco, and his first act as premier left little 
doubt as to the course he was to take. A few days after 
Arias' appointment, leaders of the Workers' Commissions, 
the "Carabachel Ten", were sentenced to up to twenty years 
imprisonment for their organising activities. (242)^ The 
government headed by Arias reflected the hardening of atti­
tudes which was taking place, with the preponderance of 
Falangists and faithful Francoists and the exclusion of 
Opus in the most extensive purge yet witnessed under 
Franco. . Even Lopez Rodó, the brilliant Opus "techno­
crat" of the Development Plans of the 60's lost his post(244)as Foreign Minister which he had held under Carrero.
To everyone's astonishment however, Arias announced the 
"opening" of the system, with a reform package which included 
the separation of powers, the establishment of political 
"associations", trade union reform which would allow workers' 
representation, and the election of town mayors. The
extent of these "reforms" was clearly seen a few weeks later, 
with the execution of the Catalan anarchist, Puig Antich, 
by garrote, an execution believed to have been to avenge the 
assassination of Carrero. 2^4*^  . In the event, Arias’ 
"liberalisation" process came up against the hard reality 
of the Portuguese revolution, when it was feared that the 
example might encourage the Spanish left in a similar 
endeavour. By June 1974, Arias had announced the postponement 
of the reform programme, while Franco had dismissed the liberal 
Chief of the General Staff, Diez Alegría, fearing that 
he could become the "Spinola" of Spain. 2^4^  . The two most 
"liberal" Ministers of the Arias' team, Barrera de Irimo 
and Pio Cabanillas (Treasury and Information) were sacked 
later in the year. Indeed, between January 1974 and June 1975,
a third of the ministerial appointments were changed, due 
to deaths, re-shufflings or resignations. (248).
Certainly the history of the government of Arias, and 
the ups and downs of his reform programme, reflected clearly 
the grave crisis of the Francoist state in the final years 
of the General's reign. Indeed, Arias' "liberalisation process" 
was a classic case of "too little too late", and moreover 
was stymied by Franco and the Right before it could ever be 
tested in practice. As Paul Preston points out, events in 
Europe were of great importance at this time :
"The first half of 1974 passed in a mood of hopeful cooperation on the moderate left. The feeling that Carrero's death had imposed new options was reinforced by events abroad. The Italian divorce referendum, the French presidential elections and the Portuguese revolu­tion were watched in Spain with intense interest. All these events polarized the situation and did much to politicise Spain by proxy. The fall of Caetano, the defeat of Fanfani, the near victory of Mitterrand and later the collapse of the Greek colonels convinced the left and many of the right that change must be given before it was taken. With possible success nearer than ever before, disputes about the distant future were replaced by a more pragmatic approach to the immediate task of removing the Franco regime."
Preston, London, 1976 p. 152.
This new pragmatism had been demonstrated in November 1971, 
when the first Catalan Assembly of Democratic Forces was 
held in Barcelona, which was attended by three hundred 
delegates from the leading political organisations of 
Catalonia, including some Trotskyist and Maoist groups, 
Workers' Commission delegates, progressive Catholics, monar­
chists and even individual representatives of the industrial (24 9)bourgeoisie. . This process spread throughout Spain
during 1973, and speeded up considerably after Carrero's 
death. This movement, known as the "democratic break" (la 
ruptiira democritica) was given a great boost after the 
Portuguese revolution, with the Communist Party claiming 
that similar processes were at work in Spain.
"The Communists considered that Caetano had fallen under pressure from something that resenbled the 'pact for Liberty' - an alliance of workers, the army and 'the most dynamic and liberal sectors of capitalism?. The Secretary General proclaimed the need to make alliances like those already emerging and condemned sectarian attitudes."
Preston, London, 1976, p. 152.
The CP's bid for unity was not wholly realised, as the Junta 
Democratica, set-up by the C.P. in Paris and Madrid in July 1974, 
though including the Popular Socialist Party of Tierno Galvan 
and Opus members such as Calvo Serer, was rejected by the 
Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE), who founded their own alter­
native, the Platform of Democratic Convergence, in the early 
months of 1975. (250). T^e pj_,atform included such groups 
as Riduejo's Social Democratic Union, and the Christian 
Democrats of Ruiz Gimenez. Later, in 1975, some erstwhile 
revolutionary organisations, Bandera Roja and the O.R.T. 
(Revolutionary Workers' Organisation) joined the Junta 
and Plataforma respectively, while many others debated the 
wisdom of carrying-out a similar strategy. .
It was during these same years that the Spanish Socialist 
Party witnessed a great resurgence in popularity and activity. 
While it had continued to have support in the sixties in 
its traditional bastions of power, Asturias and the Basque 
provinces, and had animated an important student following 
in the universities, it was hampered by an out-of-touch 
bureaucracy, headed by Llopis and other older exiles. This 
caused a split in 1968, when Tierno Galvan formed the Popular 
Socialist Party. By 1972, the older bureaucrats had been 
ousted, and militants from the interior, led by the youthful 
and charismatic Felipe Gonzalez, took over the reins of the 
organisation. The consolidation of the renewed party, 
at Suresnes in 1974, took place against the backdrop 
of the Portuguese revolution and a corresponding upsurge 
in the popularity of the Socialists, deemed capable of 
playing a similar part in the Spanish democratic process.
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Undoubtedly it was this growth in the opposition's 
activities which propelled Arias into decreeing some type 
of reform, however limited, of the crumbling edifice of 
Francoist Spain. Certainly Spain was crumbling in more 
ways than one during these last years of Francoism, as the 
Spanish "miracle", which had formed such an important part 
of Francoist rhetoric, was visibly grinding to a halt.
Floods, during the winter of 1973, caused the death of 
hundreds of people and livestock, while the almost total 
destruction of the agrarian infrastructure in the South 
and East left these provinces devastated.
The following winter severe drought meant the loss of numerous 
crops, with twenty provinces classified as "catastrophic 
zones". (253). As a resu^t 0f these agrarian disasters, 
thousands emigrated to the towns, which exacerbated the unem­
ployment problem considerably, given the fall in tourism 
and construction, as the energy crisis and price increases 
began to bite. Indeed, tourism dropped by 17 % in 1974, 
the balance of payments deficit grew vertiginously, while 
the gross national product grew by only 4.6 %, compared to 
an average 8 % during the previous fourteen years. Moreover, 
political uncertainty had caused a steep fall in foreign 
capital investment. .
To many on the left of the CP the situation in Spain during 
these last years of Francoism seemed to correspond to 
Lenin's preconditions for revolution : economic crisis, 
an uncertain and divided ruling class, and a working class 
which was daily showing its combativeness and increasing 
politicisation. Strikes, triggered by economic motives, 
quickly became political and general, especially in the 
industrial regions of the North and Catalonia. (255)^ The 
power and strength of the Workers' Commissions grew apace.
An example of this strength was demonstrated in Pamplona 
in 1973 when, in response to the sacking of some workers in 
the car industry, solidarity strikes took pJto.ce throughout 
the Basque provinces, and became almost general a few days
These types of actions increased throughout 1974, which 
registered a record level of 1,900 strikes. 2^57*. In June 
1975, a "working week" organised by the Partido del Trabajo 
de EspaTla, (Spanish Workers Party) (258)  ^ brought thousands 
of workers in the construction industry out, with slogans 
for "democratic freedoms". Similar acts took place in 
other points of Spain, particularly Madrid, Seville and 
Zaragoza. (259).
This unprecendented strength of working class power and 
organisation seemed to bear out the revolutionary perspective, 
especially after the success of the Portuguese revolution.
Revolutionary groups abounded and extended their influence. 
Priests, especially in the Basque provinces, talked of the 
similarities between Marxism and Christianity, and the need 
for changes of a "class nature" in Spain. . The growth
of violence, from such groups as FRAP, MIL and GARI, and the 
continuing campaign by ETA,served to confirm, for many, the 
drift towards a violent class confrontation, especially as 
this was increasingly contested by violence from extreme 
Right-wing groups. 1 ' . As Ben Ami points out, the violence
by left and right-wing groups during the last months of 
Franco's life, was redolent of the war between rival factions 
during the "tragic spring" of 1936, just before the start 
of the Civil War. .
(260)
There were real fears that a revolutionary situation might 
develop during the last years of Franco's rule. Undoubtedly 
the more advanced and "European" industrialists were aware 
that a "democratic" alliance with the most important working 
class organisations, the CP and the Workers' Commissions, 
was imperative to stabilise the situation and avoid the 
confrontative type of labour relations which breeds revolu­
tionary alternatives. Indeed, in an assembly of businessmen 
in Barcelona in 1975, it was overwhelmingly agreed that it 
was no longer possible to deal with the defunct syndical 
bureaucracy of the C.N.S., as they did not represent "real 
working class forces" (264)
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As a result of this pressure, from workers and employers 
alike, trade union elections were authorised at the beginning 
of 1975, for "enlace" and "jurados de empresa" in the first 
round. The candidature Democratica Unida (Democratic Unity 
Candidacy) composed of the Workers' Commissions and the 
Union Sindical Obrera, obtained 60 to 80 % of the votes. 2^65*. 
Though limited (representatives were elected only at the 
factory level - the provincial and national bureaucracies 
remained) these elections represented the death knell of 
Francoist corporatism. For, as Ben Ami points out, these 
first elections were fought on a programme which concentrated 
almost exclusively on pay and working conditions, and had 
little direct "political" content. But, as the new "enlaces" 
and "jurados" were soon to discover, they were hampered 
by the continuing presence of the provincial and national 
bureaucracies, and were unable to get their demands taken 
up. This led to more overt "Dolitical" acts throughout 1975.^^®'
Time was certainly running out for the Francoist regime,
a regime which could not continue in existence without
the dictator himself. The scamble for position in a new
Spain accelerated during Franco's illness and delegation of
powers to Juan Carlos between July and September 1974.
Numerous erstwhile Francoists, taking advantage of the
"associations' Law" of Arias, now formed groupings of all
shades of blue, renounced their political past and prepared
( 267 )themselves for the inevitable democratic changes to come. v '.
The Caudillo, now in his eighty-second year, returned with 
vigour however, in September 1974, and it was undoubtedly 
as a result of his pressure that the two most "liberal" 
ministers in Arias' cabinet were relieved of their posts 
in October . Certainly the Right-wing was trying to
hold on as best it could, and exerting increasing pressure 
after the bombing in a Madrid café of eleven persons. This 
act, although officially attributed to ETA, was generally 
believed to have been a provocation by extreme rignt-wing 
terrorists. 2^® ^ .
The last year of the dictator's rule, 1975, gave the appearance 
that very little had changed in the regime forged out of 
the Civil War, some thirty-six years before. Massive demonstra­
tions continued to be staged by the Workers’ Commissions 
in Madrid. , the Basque provinces and Catalonia, while a 
state of emergency was declared in the Basque Provinces 
after the Shooting of two policemen in April. Anti-terrorist 
legislation, previously only applied to the Basque provinces, 
was now extended throughout Spain. The Caudillo’s final act 
symbolised the authoritarianism of his rule : five ETA and 
FRAP members were executed in September, despite massive 
protests at home and abroad.
But is was soon realised that the time had passed when 
such actions could detain the process towards another type 
of political regime. On October 6, the government declared 
that the death sentence would no longer be applied, even 
though three policemen had been killed in the Basque 
provinces a few days before. . The end of the Francoist
regime was now a fait accompli, and the dictator dutifully 
died on November 20, 1975.
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44. For example, José Ibañez Martín, Education Minister during the first ten years of the regime, declared in the Cortes' session which approved the Act s "What is indeed important from a political point of view is to eradicate from teaching and from scientific creation, ideological neutrality and to banish laicism, to train a new youth imbued with that Augustinian principle that science does not bring one any closer to the Supreme Being".
Quoted in J. Maravall : Dictatorship and Political Dissent. Workers and Students in Franco's Spain.London, 1978. p. 100.
Ibanez Martin was a member of Catholic Action (AGNP), and a close associate of Opus Dei members.
45. "Between 1939 and 1944, 155 professors were appointed - 56 % of all professors in Spanish universities in 1944, whereas exile and the taw on Repression of Communism and Free Masonry had eliminated a large number 
of Republican university teachers."
J. Maravall : Dictatorship and Political Dissent, 
op. cit. p. 99.
Besides a few ideologues and poets (Eugenio d'Ors,
Pedro Lain Entralgo, Dionisio Ridruejo), the Falange had few professors in their ranks.
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46. As Norman Cooper shows, Opus Dei had its centre of power in the CSIC (Higher Research Institution) whose secretary general was Albareda Herrerra, one of the founders of Opus. "The CSIC had taken over the role of the Republican Junta para Ampliación de Estudios, responsible for the allocation of grants for higher education. By this means Opus Dei could select people favourable to their ideology and build up a cadre of leaders within Francoist Spain, in accordance with the instructions given by Escriva in the Opus handbook 'Camino'. Like the ACNP, the Opus Dei were successful during the forties in obtaining university chairs, thanks to the 1943 University Act which gave the Minister of Education the power to nominate three of the five member of the Tribunal which would supervise the tests required for selection. Among those who became University professors were Calvo Serer himself and the future Ministers Laureano Lopez Rodó, and Alberto Ullastres Calvo."
Norman Cooper, op. cit.
47. As Guy Hermet says : "The relative flexibility of the censor allowed for the publication of a growing number of texts by Marx and Engels and various other works.Thus, slowly we see the passing from the phase of simple initiation with Marxism to that of Marxist thought itself
Guy Hermet. op. cit.
Aranguren, a university professor, was important in propagating the ideas of existentialism.
48. The Socialist Realist movement was the first "awakening" in the Spanish arts since the cultural devastation which the Civil War and the post-war repression had wrought.In Literature, José Cela, Ana Marfa Matute, Rafael Sanchez, in theatre, Alfonso Sastre, poetry, Blas de Otero, and in cinema, Bardem and Berlanga.
Ellas Diaz. op. cit.
49. Alfonso Sastre, Sanchez Ferlosio, Bardem and Juan Velarde Fuerte amongst others.
Ellas Diaz. op. cit.
50. Quoted in Elias Diaz. op. cit.
51. A. Pefla : Veinticinco años de luchas estudiantiles, in Horizonte Español. Vol. 2, 1966.
52. This must be seen in the context of franco's use of the different clans at various times to "neutralise" one another, and thus strenghten his position as sole arbiter and guarantor of the social order. Throughout the 50's he alternatively encouraged the Falange - ata massive Falange demonstration in October 1953, 150,000 attended — and the Monarchists — interview with Don Juan in December 1954 to discuss the education of the future 
king, Juan Carlos. In an interview in the "Sunday Times", it was announced that Franco would step down in 1964, 
and Juan Carlos would be crowned king.
Gallo, op. cit.
53 . The Opus' rise within the University has already been mentioned. After 1951, with the appointment of Ruiz Jiminez, their assault on government began.The programme put forward by Calvo Serer was essentially :a) in the political sphere : a Monarchist restoration.b) economics : control of public spending and an administrative reorganisation and an affirmation of ecomonic freedom. As Gallo says, "It was a programme which had as a goal to check any liberal evolution (Christian Democrat) or Republican (Falange) or revolutio­nary (the case with some Left Falangists) allowing at the same time economic development."
Gallo, op. cit. p. 251.
54. Gallo, op. cit.
55. Gallo, op. cit.
56. A. Peña. op. cit.
r*in A. Peña. op. cit.
58. Gallo, op. cit.
59. Gallo, op. cit.A. Pena. op. cit.
60. The Frente de Liberación Popular, was at this time committed to armed struggle, and shunned the idea of a party, designing itself on the Castro "frontism" whichhad won in the Cuban revolution. It was of great historical importance in being a sort of "bridge" between radical Christianity and Marxism. Many of its leaders would go on to form the many Trotskyist groups in the 1960's.
Sanz Oiler : Entre el Fraude y la Esperanza.
Paris, 1972.
61. A. Peña. op. cit.
62. The larger firms in Barcelona, such as Maquinista and Seat, were often at the forefront of the struggle in the town. In Bilbao, Babcock and Wilcox and General Electric often played a similar role.
Gallo, op. cit.
Sanz Oiler, op. cit.
63. There were two-stage wage increases : on April 28 and 
November of the same year.
64. Military juntas, set-up in 1956 in Valencia, Seville and Valladolid, discussed the student disturbances, strikes 
and the Moroccan problem (Spain gave up its colony in that year). There were many comings and goings between Franco and the generals, the latter reputedly offering themselves to put an end to the "unrest".
Gallo, op. cit.
- / 74 -
65. Monsignor Herrera, in a pastoral letter, criticised the lack of social conscience of Spanish Catholics.The Falange in the vertical syndicates, closer to the workers, pushed for the wage rises.
Gallo, op. cit.
66. In June 1956, the American ambassador in Madrid said that "American capital could give efficient aid to Spanish capital to develop the country, if liberalisation measures were taken" .
Gallo, op. cit. p. 273.
Also, American loans were turned down. It is generally thought that the conditions for more financial help were dependent on full liberalisation of the economy and an end to bungling etatism.
J. Esteban, op. cit.
67. Gallo, op. cit.
68. With the appointment- of Arrese in February 1956, the Falangists thought that their moment had arrived, as Arrese was one of the theoreticians of national socialism. Franco then asked the Falange to prepare new fundamental laws which would give him popular support. Throughout 1956 Falange activity was feverish, and for the first time in many years was able to recruit new members.But in January 1957, Franco rejected the plans and drew-up his own laws in May 1958. As a result of this rapprochement between the Falange and the Francoist regime, many "radical" Falangists, such as González Vice'n, resigned.
Gallo, op. cit.
69. Giron, Labour Minister, and Arrese, secretary general of the Movement, were removed.
70. This was expressed in the memorandum sent to the IMP and the OEC.
J. Esteban, op. cit.
80. Gallo, op. cit.
81. It must be remembered that the use of military law in Spain has been one of the main arms of the regime.As M.G. Garcia explains : "In April 1947, the period of martial law, which had begun in 1936 came more or less to an end. From then onwards, certain non-violent political crimes have come under the jurisdiction of civil magis­trates. But for many years, and even today, the military ( tribunals have retained jurisdiction over arenas which are normally reserved for civilian courts in other coun­tries. The Code of Military Law, published in 1943, conti­nues to be applicable to crimes which threaten the security of the state, and until 1963, included offences of expression and opinion and strikes. The Law of Banditry and Terrorism, to pursue political violence, was passed in 1943, and brought up to date in 1960 ; it was made less harsh in 1963 with the creation of the Public 
Order Courts, and tightened-up yet again in 1968."
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M.G. García : The Armed Forces : Poor Relation of the Franco Regime, in Spain in Crisis; op. cit.
Gallo, op. cit.
83. These commissions were groups of delegates, elected by their workmates to represent them in a particular struggle. When the strike ended, the Commissions would be dissolved.
84. It is estimated that 50 % more workers left Spain than in the previous year, while national income droppedby 3,6 %. The threat of unemployment and lowered living standards prevented any large-scale strikes.
85. It is difficult to assess the level of influence of the ASO in 1958, as libertarian sources tend to exaggerate its importance, while other sources barely mention it.
86. An attempt to control and contain the movement beganat this time, although more stringent measures were not applied until the late 60's.
J. Colomer : La JOC en España s 1946 - 1970.Salamanca, 1978.
87. This would later be called the Federación Solidaria de Trabajadores.
88. The SOC - Solidarität d'Obrera Catolics, later Catalans.The AST - Acción Sindical de Trabajadores, was created partly by the Jesuits in 1964.
89. Although the FST in its manifesto did say that the workers' movement had to be constituted by a trade union and a party, as did some militants from the other groups. (FST : Declaración de Asturias : founding document. 1958).
90. Gallo, op. cit.
91. By the end of the year, Spanish revenues had rocketed to 200 million dollars. The increase in foreign capital was from 46,5 million dollars in 1960, to 154,4 million in 1964.
Gallo, op. cit.
92. Gallo, op. cit.
93. R. Bulnes. op. cit.
94. The usual strategy of presenting a liberalising image abroad, while carrying-out repression in Spain continued.On the death of Pius VII, an amnesty was declared.Exactly one month, later, Eymar,head of the politico- social brigade»launched a round-up in all the major Spanish cities ; Madrid, Barcelona, Bilbao, Granada, Seville, San Sebastian, Vitoria and Z^ragoz^, accusing
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the detained of having tried to reconstruct the Socialist Party (November 1958). After the National Pacific Strike (June 1959) , a new tougherrr Public Order Law was promulgated, while in 1960 a massive witch-hunt was undertaken in the southern provinces of Cordoba and Seville. More than 400 people were detained. After the National Pacific Strike (HNP) attempt several leaders and numerous militants of the CP,the FLP and the ASU were imprisoned (Julio Ceron, Sanchez Montero etc...)
Gallo, op. cit.
95. The last strike wave occurred in Asturias in March 1958, when 15,000 workers were involved. Several articles of the Fuero (Spanish Charter) were suspended and the miners were forced back to work. A month later, however, the five largest firms in Barcelona went on strike (about 25,000 workers were involved). In the Basque provinces too, go slows occurred. These favoured actions in the Universities : Madrid, Barcelona, Seville and Zaragoza universities went on strike. However, massive detentions silenced both these fronts within a month. These strikes, and the HNP organised by the CP, endedin failure.
de Blaye. op. cit.
96. Gallo, op. cit.
97. I shall look more fully at the DRIL and revolutionary armed action in the next chapter. However, mention should be made of a spectacular action carried-out by the DRILin January 1961. A DRIL commando, headed by the Portuguese captain Henrique Falvao, hijacked the Portuguese tran­satlantic ship "Santa Maria", to inform the world that resistance was going on against the Salazar and Franco dictatorships. Composed of Portuguese, Spanish and South Americans, the DRIL was presented by the Spanish press as an international communist organisation which used terrorists trained in Cuba. This was categorically denied by the organisation.
de Blaye. op. cit.
98. Espafta Hoy. (Collection of newspaper cuttings).
Paris, 1965.
99. To chart the history of the Nationalist movements in Catalonia and the Basque provinces is beyond the scope of this paper. However, certain general points should be made. In Catalonia, a certain cultural renaissance began around 1942 - 1943, when the iCatolics Catalans” group contested the SEU monopoly of the universities.But the Church proved a more popular centre for nationalist feeling, with the abbot Escarre, at the monastery in Montserrat, able to organise thousands at his ceremonies.A more political Catalanism began to emerge after the
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1956 events, when the main groupings can be clearly detected : the moderate "Gatolics Catalans" and the more left-wing group around Castellet. The massive influx of immigrants from Andalusia between 1940 and 1960, raised the question of language (Catalan was not taught in schools), which continues unsolved to this day. The early sixties saw the birth of the nova cansó Catalá (prot­est songs) which swept Catalan youth in the sixties. Petitions were sent to the government demanding that Catalan be taught in schools, and the demand that Catalan newspapers be published issued from the Institut d'Estuds Catalans.
Norman Jones : The Catalan Question since the Civil War. Spain in Crisis, op. cit.
Language was also one of the principal demands in the Basque provinces. An independent school movement, the 
"ikastolas" got underway in the fifties, greatly helped by the clergy. The Basque political situation retained greater continuity, as the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party) remained the dominant organisation. After the 1947 general strike, organised primarily«/ by the PNV, organised opposition collapsed. A group of university students in Bilbao attempted to build a national alternative and set-up a study group, "Ekin", the name of their maga­zine, in 1952. This merged with the PNV youth group Euzko-Gastedi in 1957. The alliance broke down a year later, as Ekin viewed the PNV as too right-wing and out- of-date. Thus it was that in 1959 ETA was formed.National feeling has often been allied to radical trade unionism in the Basque provinces, with ETA setting-up its own trade unions which have often been powerful in organising general strikes in the provinces.
L. Hollyman s Basque Revolutionary Separatism - ETA. 
in Spain in Crisis, op. cit.
F. Letamendia s in Viejo Topo, June, 1979.
100. F. Letamendia. op. cit.
101. Gallo, op. cit.
102. Intellectuals frequently supported student demands.Figures like Tierno Galván, Antonio Menchaca, Lopez 
Aparicio and Dionisio Ridruejo, tried in March 1961 for their political involvement, symbolised the active intellectual opposition to the regime.
Elias Diaz. op. cit. /
103. As Gallo points out, more and more oppositionists were coming out into the open during these, years. "Liberal intellectuals sign petitions and publish articles in foreign papers. The courts were being used as platforms.
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CP member, Miguel Núñez used the courts in this way in 1958, as did some priests and Julio Cerón, another CP member, a few years earlier".
Gallo, op. cit. p. 231.
104. Losada editions in Buenas Aires published a thologies of prohibited Republican poets and novelists, while Castellet editions published works in Castillian and Catalan of works previously unknown in Spain. In 1961,a group of exiles in Paris founded Ruedo Ibérico, which mostly published historical narratives, and sought to analyse contemporary problems f .m a non-Francoist perspective.
105. España Hoy. op. cit.
106. The VII Congress of the PSOE was held in 1958 in Toulouse. Militants from the interior called for common actions with all the opposition forces, but especially the CP.This demand was ignored. At the MSC Conference (the Socialist Movement of Catalonia) in 1958, the need to coordinate all opposition forces in Catalonia was stressed. The "Acuerdo de Paris" (1957) was signed by most opposition forces (except the CP the POUM and the "apoli­tical" faction of the C.N.T.), calling for the need to form a provisional government which would set the elec­toral process in motion. Nothing however was said about what kind of action and strategy this involved, andso the agreement remained a dead letter.Calls for unity were heard from the Socialist University group (ASU), the Democratic Union Group (UDE) and by sectors of the FLP.
España Hoy. op. cit.
107. Gallo, op. cit.
108. The figures for 1961 are : Wages per hour, 118.3 productivity per hour, 123.2. As these are official figures, the real figures probably show a greater gap.
Jordi Blanco : Las Huelgas en el Movimiento Obrero Español. In Horizonte Español, 1966. vol. 2 p. 160-1.
109. Throughout the year, strikes in Granada, Madrid, Valencia and Barcelona, demonstrations in the Basque provinces, student demonstrations and strikes and attacks on "Opus" control of the universities showed that the pace of 
"contestation" was speeding-up.
España Hoy. op. cit.
110. España Hoy. op. cit.
Guy Hermet. op. cit
Ill. E.S. Guzman, op. cit
112. E.S. Guzman, op. cit
Gallo, op. cit.
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1 1 3 . This would speed-up considerably in the later 1960's. Indeed, between 1964 and 1970, 50 % of those leaving the land were land-owning peasants.
E.S. Guzman, op. cit.
114. J. Esteban . op. cit.
115. Gallo. op. cit
116. Gallo. op. cit. p. 329
117. Gallo. op. cit.
118. In España Hoy some of the literature of the period is reproduced, which clearly shows how quickly protest actions became political.
España Hoy. op. cit.
119. Espafia Hoy. op. cit.
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España Hoy. op.
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cit.
122. Jose Maravall : Dictatorship and Political Dissent, op. cit.
123. A. Peña. op. cit.
124. A. Peña. op. cit.
J. Maravall. op. cit
125. A. Peña. op. cit.
J. Maravall. op. cit.
126. Gallo, op. cit. p. 340.
127. España Hoy. op. cit.
128. The Communists' attempt at yet another General Political Strike, in September 1962, was the greatest failure so far for this kind of venture, while the Alianza Sindical (CNT/UGT/STV) broke down, indicators of the demoralisation which reigned after the mass actions of 1962.
España Hoy. op. cit.
Gallo, op. cit.
129. The guilt of these Young Libertarians was never proved.On the contrary, an independent inquiry insisted that the attacks were carried-out by a commando which had 
nothing to do with the accused.
España Hoy . op. cit.
130. Gallo. op. cit.
131. Gallo. op. cit.
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132 . The main points of the plan were the following :(mainly on the recommendations submitted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development)a) an end to the control still exercised by the gover­nment oyer the economy and a greater rationalisation and reliance on market forces.b) balancing the budget.
c) increasing foreign trade and investment.d) the INI (National Enterprise Board) should continue to invest in areas still unattractive to private investors.e) an "indicative" investment plan for private enterprise.f) improvement in agricultural technique.g) regional decentralisation.
The last of these items was the one most fully realised, with the creation of "poles of promotion" where indus­trialisation had not begun (Huelva, Burgos), and "poles of d^evelotxrent" where it was expanding (Seville, Vigo, Valladolid, Zaragoza and La Corunna).A programme of public investment was launched amounting to over 2,000 million pounds, with the backing of the OEEC, the IMF and the money from the defence agreement with the U.S..
J. Esteban, op. cit.
133. More than a million abandoned agriculture between 1960 and 1968, while those living in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants rose from 19.1 % in 1960 to 32.7 % in 1965, higher than Italy, Sweden or the Soviet Union.
Gallo, op. cit.
134. R. Bulnes. op. cit.
135. Jon Amsden : Collective Bargaining and Class Conflict 
in Spain.London, 1972.
136. Gallo, op. cit.
137. As Gallo points out, women protested in markets about the price rises, demonstrations began to be carried-out by sections of the middle classes, and small milk- producing peasants in Asturias blocked—off roads and overturned lorries in their struggle against the large proprietors who collected their milk. Throughout the country, the development of a broader movement of protest 
could be detected by the late 60's.
Gallo, op. cit.
138. J. Maravall : Dictatorship and Political Dissent, 
op. cit.
139. The FST has been previously mentioned. The UTS was a neo—Falange group, created in 1964, and said to have moved 
towards anarcho-syndicalist positions.
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1 4 0 . The Jurado de empresa" was a sort of shop stewards' committee, ".he "enlace" was the works' representative who sat on the committee.
141. Apuntes para una historia". Fondo de Documentación Anarco-sindicalista.(cyclostat copy). Madrid, 1969.
142. The Tribunales de Orden- Publico were created in 1963.These were civil courts, while previously all strikes had been considered acts of revellion and thus tried in military courts.
143. Overtures had been made to the 'JtTT and the CNT, to heln in the "regeneration of syndical life". The UGT refused to have anything to do with this manoeuvre. However, certain CNT members drew-up a six-point programme with the "vertical". This shall be taken up more fully in the next chapter.
144. This brief summing-up of the ten points of the Workers' Commissions is stated in "The Working-Class under the Franco Regime, by Sheelagh Ellwood (in Spain in Crisis, ed. P. Preston) However, in the full document "Ante el future del Sindicalismo", printed in the clandestine pamphlet previously mentioned ("Apuntes para una Historia", op. cit.) in point 1 there is a more strident attack on the capitalist system, and the reason given for the need for assemblies is that "they should agree to a formula that avoids the dictatorship of the strongest and best organised group, compatible with the respect shown towards the democratic agreements of the majority. This will be the guarantee of unity". This is an important difference given the later problems within the Commissions over CP dominance. It was also an important precedent for the later development of the Assembly movement and Worker's Autonomy.
Jon Amsden also points out that in another document (published in Cuadernos de Ruedo Ibérico, August/September 1966), the leaders of the Workers' Commissions
were fully aware of the possibilities opened—up by the Law of Collective Contracts, and also its connection with 
productivity agreements.
Amsden. op. cit. p. 102.
145. Several "Left" Falangists continued within the syndical Movement, and viewed the development of the Workers' Commissions favourably.
146. Standard Electric, Marconi, Perkins, Lamparas Metal, Helices 
Bresel, Siemens, Pegaso, Roeticher, AEG and Osram."Apuntes para una historia", op. cit.
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147. Jon Amsden. op. cit. p. 96
Amsden sees this as being essentially an anti-Conununist manoeuvre, as the groups involved were Christian and Falangist. Although this is probably in part true, he fails to mention however the increasing Communist penetration, and anti-democratic actions, which Guy Hermet points to.
Hermet. op. cit.
This was also the impression I received in interviews with militants of the period. Moreover, Amsden himself admits that some ex-Falangists had been imprisoned for their activities before October 1964.
148. "Apuntes para una Historia". op. cit.
149. Apuntes. op. cit.
J. Amsden. op. cit.
Sanz Oiler, op. cit.
Interviews with several militants who took part in the first Workers' Commissions in Barcelona, 1979.
150. Jon Amsden. op. cit.
A look at the labour conflicts in Barcelona, and the nearby textile towns of Terrasa and Sabadell, bear this out.
Amsden. op. cit. p. 96.
151. Jose Maravall : Dictatorship and Political Dissent, p. 56 - 57.He stresses the success of the strategy of infiltration within the official trade unions in Catalonia, particu­larly in Baix Llobregat and Valles, and the towns of Hospitatel, Cornell^, Gavel, Sardanyola, Terrasa and Sabadell.
152. J. Amsden. op. cit. p. 99.
153. There were obvious reasons for this late reaction ;a) being the last seat of the Second Republic, the repression was particularly harsh and left a deep impres­
sion on the local population.b) the economic structure of the region : a fairly fertile agricultural economy with some allied industry, (packing, conservation) but without heavy industry until fairly recently. Even now, many urban workers still have access to land (in the orange groves) either 
belonging to their family or friends.
154. There is some discrepancy of opinions over the role played by the CP in Bilbao. Jon Amsden holds the opinion that the CP was the driving force behind the Commissions
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155.
here, which had been a stronghold of the party since the Second Republic. Maravall, on the contrary, believes that the Socialist Party still had considerable strength.He thus concludes that the Commissions were relatively weak in Vizcaya, as the Socialist strategy was one of boycott of the "vertical".
Basque nationalists - such as Letamendia, stress the influence of ETA within the trade unions, particularly in Bilbao. (Interview in Vietio Topo, June 197 9) .Sanz Oiler, a militant in the Commissions in Barcelona, also believe that national feeling played an important part in workers' mobilisation in the Basque country at the time.
S. Oiler, op. cit.
There is great difficulty in assessing the strength of the Commissions in Asturias, home of the first Commissions in 1962. Both Amsden and Maravall hold the view that the Commissions were relatively weak (vis-à-vis the other industrial centres) . This seems to be supported by the fact that the Socialist Party, still strong in the province, did not advise infiltration into the official trade unions, crucial to the whole strategy of the Commissions proposed by the CP, the FLP, and the Christian organisations. But in interviews which Jordi Blanc carried-out in Asturias, it would seem that the Commissions there functioned as a parallel trade union, and had grown enormously since 1962, collecting strike funds and organising demonstrations. Moreover, the Commissions in Asturias had not been propelled by any political party, but had grown out of the struggle itself, at the level of the firm and mine.
J. Blanc, op. cit.
156. J. Amsden. op. cit. p. 99.
157. J. Amsden. op. cit.
Apuntes. op. cit.
S. Oiler, op. cit.
This was the overwhelming impression I received from interviews with various militants of this period.
158. This was not, however, universally the case s at the Barreices (Chrysler) plant in Madrid, workers were unable to establish a plant organisation, despite strong organisation in the same area and same industry during 
the same period.
J. Maravall. op. cit.
159. For an account of this historic strike, written by the strikers themselves, see 'Nuestra Huelgai 
Paris, 1968.
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Looking at the programme of the Workers' Commissions / UGT/USO, Maravall has this to say of the Commissions :"It must however be noted that in no document was it possible to find a statement referring to specific features of the alternative society defended by the 
Commissions:there is no reference in their publications to planning, nationalisation, self-management, nor to demands for wide economic reforms. The whole of the 
claims of the Workers' Commissions is on immediate trade- union demands, which were occasionally placed within the context of a strong attack against the regime!'.
op. cit. p. 86.
Also, see J. Amsden (op. cit. p. 101). on the compla­cency with which the Opus Dei viewed the Commissions in their magazine "Mundo".
160. Madrid witnessed rapid industrialisation in the mid-60's. In 1965, the number of metal workers was 115,000, a 43,5 % increase on 1958. The car factories of Pegaso-ENSAand Chrysler, the engineering, machine tool and light factories made Madrid the second industrial city of Spain in the late 60's. Although working class struggle was more dispersed through various branches of industry, than was the case in other regions (only registering 49,2 % metal workers compared to 81,2 % in Barcelona), it was, as in the other provinces, overwhelmingly located in the larger firms. Building workers and bank employees were also an important part of the working class movement in Madrid.
Maravall : Dictatorship, op. cit.
Later in the decade, the metal workers of Seville,El Ferrol and Vigo in Corunna, and Asturias, emerged increasingly as militant and combative sectors of the working class, as did building workers and bank employees in Madrid.
In Asturias, the economic crisis of the mines ran counter to the increasing importance of the steel indus­try, consisting of two modern firms : UNINSA, private, and ENSIDESA, a nationalised company.
Maravall. op. cit.
161. This was overwhelmingly the case in the Basque provinces, where 58 % of conflicts in the steel and metal industry were over issues of solidarity, including demands for democracy and amnesty. Between 1963—1967, Vizcayaand Guipuzcoa alone accounted for 58 % of workers in the iron and steel industry whose wages and working conditions were governed by NOC awards (these "normas" were granted through the Ministry of Labour, when a break-down in negotiations occurred). "Area General strikes", when whole industries in the locality struck, seemed to have been more common in the Basque provinces, and were often over issues of solidarity.
Maravall. op. cit.
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1 6 2 . This was the case in Catalonia, where the main source of conflict was wages. Detentions and other sanctions against workers' leaders however quickly led to shows of solidarity (strikes, go-slows and demonstrations).
J. Maravall. op. cit.
163. In 1959, 433,229 workers were covered by the system 
of collective bargaining. Ten years later five million workers were thus covered. The changeover from the system of "reglamentaciones" (wage guidelines) from the Minister of Labour, was by no means immediate. The dramatic change occurred in 1962, when the figures shot-up from 937,316 (1961) to 2,316,413.
J. Maravall. op. cit.
164. For figures, see Amsden. op. cit. p. 152.
He lists the industries where plant bargaining was more frequent : engineering, construction, glass and ceramics and chemicals.
165. J. Amsden. op. cit.
166. J. Maravall : Modernisation, Authoritarianism and the Growth of Working Class Dissent s The case of Spain, in Government and Opposition.Vol. 8 N° 4, 1973.
167. These strikes were in Transport and engineering in Barcelona, light engineering in Madrid, Seville and Pamplona, and banking in Catalonia.
J. Maravall. op. cit.
168. Apuntes, op. cit.
169. Mild stabilisation measures had been taken during 1964, in April 1965, and again in October 1966. Devaluation of the peseta followed in November 1967, accompanied by tougher measures on stabilisation.
J. Esteban, op. cit.
170. Gallo, op. cit.
171. As Maravall points out : "As it grew more intensive, industrial conflict after 1967 also became more political. Thus, from 1963 to 1967, economic demands were pre­dominant (44.2 %) followed by claims related to collective bargaining (15.2 %) while solidarity claims were relatively rare (4 %).From 1967 the situation changed s solidarity claims reached 45.4 %,collective bargaining claims increased to 20.1 %, while economic demands dropped to 25.6 % Solidarity was not limited to thefirm ; it soon extended to an inter-industrial , and later to an inter-provincial level, as support for workers who already were in conflict in other firms or who had suffered sanctions. Politically oriented demands generally consisted of demands for free and democratic 
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